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I am being cautious in my approach because I recognize that the area of con-
tacts with former employees is a veritable minefield in which, until it is cleared
by authoritative interpretation, short and tentative steps are the most
appropriate. 1
I. INTRODUCTION
Many domestic, international, and foreign enterprises have drasti-
cally "downsized," "rightsized," and "redeployed" their work forces in
recent years.2 Individuals are also voluntarily changing jobs at near-
1. Plan Comm. in Driggs Reorg. Case v. Driggs, 217 B.R. 67, 70 (Bankr. D. Md.
1998) (observation of Chief Judge Motz); see also Sharpe v. Leonard Stulman
Enter. Ltd. P'ship, 12 F. Supp. 2d 502, 507 (D. Md. 1998) (affirming Judge Motz's
approach).
2. See, e.g., Thor Valdmanis & Andrew Backover, WorldCom in 'Death Spiral,'
U.S.A. TODAY, June 27, 2002, at 1B (reporting WorldCom's plan to lay off 17,000
workers); James F. Peltz, Tyco Cancels Plan to Split into Four Firms, L.A. TIMES,
Apr. 26, 2002, § 3, at 1 (relating that Tyco will lay off more than 7,000 workers
and close 24 facilities); Kirstin Downey Grimsley & David S. Hilzenrath, Ander-
sen Sued Over Timing of Layoffs, WASHINGTON POST, Apr. 18, 2002 (reporting on
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record levels. 3 As a result, "former employees" now populate this
planet.
When employees depart, voluntarily or otherwise, they take with
them extensive general knowledge of the day to day operations of their
former employers. Former employees frequently retain information
specific to the particular event, transaction, or occurrence that led to a
claim or litigation. It is not unusual for former employees to be eye-
witnesses to key events, authors or recipients of the dreaded "smok-
ing-gun" documents, or players in the decisionmaking process which
led to the disputed matter. 4 This phenomenon applies to mid-level
and lower-level former employees as well as more senior executives.5
consequences of accounting firm's decision to lay off 7,000 employees resulting
from Andersen's role in the collapse of Enron Corp.); Jason De Parle, A Mass of
Newly Laid Off Workers Will Put Social Security Safety Net to the Test, N.Y.
TIMES, Oct. 8, 2001, at A12 (discussing the thousands of workers who lost their
jobs following the Sept. 11, 2001 terrorist attacks on the United States); Thomas
W. Gerdel, Nordson to Cut Global Payroll, PLAIN DEALER, Oct. 28, 1999, at 1-C(reporting on the machinery builder's plan to cut 5% of the thousands of people it
employees in 32 countries); Mitsubishi Motors Joins Other Japanese Firms in
Cutbacks, CHI. TRIB., Oct. 27, 1999, at 2N (stating that the Japanese automaker
will cut almost 10,000 workers from its payroll by 2004, and noting that many
other Japanese based companies, including Nissan Motor Co., were taking simi-
lar action).
3. See Robert O'Neill, Fewer Americans Happy with Their Jobs, Survey Finds, PLAIN
DEALER, Aug. 22, 2002, at C1 (reporting on survey that found continuing decrease
in job satisfaction among U.S. workers); Leigh Strope, Layoffs and Job Uncer-
tainty Put a Damper on Labor Day, RECORD, Sept. 2, 2001, at A7 (stating that less
than one-fourth of survey respondents said they were committed to their current
employer and planned to stay at least another two years); Daniel McGinn and
John McCormick, Your Next Job, NEWSWEEK, Feb. 1, 1999, at 43 (documenting
the willingness of U.S. workers to change employers frequently if change ad-
vances career goals); see also Tami Luhby, Big Stores Told Turnover Costly,
NEWSDAY, Jan. 17, 2001, at A46 (reporting that nationwide survey of retailers by
Institute for Retail Excellence showed that 21% of managers and 73% of
nonmanagers leave their jobs each year); Devorah Ben-David, Many Taking a
Look at the Market; Some Job Seekers Are on an Active Hunt; Others Look Si-
lently, RICH. TIMES-DISPATCH, May 20, 2001, at S-3 (reporting results of a na-
tional poll conducted in 2000 showing that 34% of the workforce said they were
likely to change jobs during that year and from a 2001 poll indicating that 38%
said they were likely to change jobs in 2001).
4. In the patent infringement case of Rally Mfg., Inc. v. Mr. Gasket Co., No. 87-1533
CIV., 1992 U.S. Dist. LEXIS 20681 (S.D. Fla. June 12, 1992), for example, the
former employee of the defendant embroiled in a discovery controversy was the
designer of the defendant's allegedly infringing product. In another case, the for-
mer employee at issue had been the primary underwriter of a defendant insur-
ance company that faced $50 million in potential liability in a reinsurance
dispute. See Centennial Mgmt. Servs., Inc. v. Axa Re Vie, 193 F.R.D. 671 (D.
Kan. 2000). And in yet another matter, the former employee was the driver of a
sanitation truck whose negligence allegedly caused plaintiffs injuries. See
Sanifill of Ga., Inc. v. Roberts, 502 S.E.2d 343 (Ga. Ct. App. 1998).
5. See Frank G. Usseglio, Product Liability Strategy: Limiting Opposing Counsel's
Access to Ex-Employees, 11 CORP. COUNS. 13 (1997).
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As one court observed, every former employee has a memory. 6 Stated
more bluntly, former employees know where the bodies are buried.
Some former employees also retain, intentionally or inadvertently,
documents and other tangible evidence among their personal posses-
sions.7 This possibility grows greater as each day passes due to the
continued exponential growth of technology in the work place and at
home.8 Indeed, entire records of a corporation, division, or depart-
ment can now be downloaded onto a few floppy or compact disks and
physically removed from the employer's premises, or attached to an e-
mail file and whisked by a single click of a mouse to a home office
computer or other remote location. 9 More and more people work for
their employer while at home,10 thereby creating and storing em-
ployer-related records and back-up files on their home computers."1
6. Rentclub Inc. v. Transamerica Rental Fin. Corp., 811 F. Supp. 651, 657 (M.D. Fla.
1992), affd, 43 F.3d 1439 (11th Cir. 1995).
7. A party allegedly obtained sixty-two boxes of documents from an adversary's for-
mer employees in In re Bank of Louisiana/Kenwin Shops, Inc., 1998 WL 788776
(E.D. La. Nov. 10, 1998). The court ordered the documents returned to the former
employer. Id. at *5. In another case, a long-time employee of Philip Morris took
documents that allegedly proved that the tobacco company intentionally manipu-
lated nicotine levels in its products. Suein L. Hwang, Phillip Morris Files Fall
into Hand of Antitobacco Team, WALL ST. J., Apr. 10, 1996, at B8. The em-
ployee's ex-fianc6 gave the documents to plaintiffs' counsel in a class action where
Phillip Morris was a defendant. Id.
8. One of the perks of working for Enron Corporation, for example, was that it fur-
nished home computers for all its workers. Jeff Kunerth, Enron Chiefs Rise Be-
gan in Winter Park, ORLANDO SENTINEL, Dec. 23, 2001, at Al. Data stored on
those home computers undoubtedly became highly relevant when Enron col-
lapsed and its accounting firm of Arthur Andersen was charged with and ulti-
mately convicted of illegally destroying relevant documents. See Jeff Freeley,
Arthur Andersen Ordered to Protect Enron Documents, BLOOMBERG NEWS SERV.,
Jan. 24, 2002 (reporting on court order requiring Arthur Andersen to report to
court how destroyed documents could be reconstructed).
9. Biocore Med. Techs., Inc. v. Khosrowshahi, 181 F.R.D. 660, 673 (D. Kan. 1998)
(observing that a former employee "took to her home computer disks which con-
tained information on sales, customer lists, medicare, and sales representatives'
agreement letters and logs").
10. Such activity can occur with or without the employer's knowledge. An individual
described by the press as a "rogue trader," for example, allegedly used his home
computer to forge transactions aimed at covering up $750 million in investment
losses. Weekend Press Briefing, FIN. TIMES LTD., Feb. 11, 2002, at 27.
11. Discovery of material stored electronically has become common in modern litiga-
tion. See generally, Jason Krause, Discovery Channels: Electronic Documents are
Vital to Building a Case, So Don't Get Papered Over, A.B.A. J., July 2002, at 49;
Mark D. Robins, Computers and the Discovery of Evidence - A New Dimension to
Civil Procedure, XVII J. COMPUTER & INFO. L. 411 (1999); Jonathan M. Redgrave,
Electronic Discovery Becoming Vitally Important, 21 LAW. WKLY, Feb. 1, 2002;
Jay E. Grenig, Electronic Discovery: Making Your Opponent's Computer a Vital
Part of Your Legal Team, 21 AM. J. TRIAL ADvoc. 293, 297-305 (1997).
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Simply put, former employees often possess information and docu-
mentation critical to, if not determinative of,12 a matter in litigation.13
The discovery process is the heart and soul of modern litigation.14
A litigator's premier task is to discover well-supported facts on which
a claim or defense can be built.15 Failure to fully explore the reality
underlying a claim or defense can result in unpleasant surprises for
legal counsel engaged in pre-filing negotiation or post-filing media-
tion, arbitration, discovery, summary judgment, settlement negotia-
tion or trial.16 For the reasons previously mentioned, today's
litigators cannot ignore former employees of clients or of adversaries
as key sources of information. And yet, one inappropriate step by
counsel in contacting a litigant's former employees may result in sanc-
tions such as disqualification of counsel, exclusion of evidence ob-
tained from former employees, monetary penalties, and initiation of
disciplinary action.17 Even where the attorney is fully exonerated,
12. See, e.g., Peralta v. Cendant Corp., 190 F.R.D. 38, 39 (D. Conn. 1999) (noting that
former employee of defendant was plaintiffs "former immediate supervisor and
allegedly the decision-maker with regard to plaintiffs claim of employment
discrimination").
13. In some instances, former employees are the only persons with information about
the disputed matter. See, e.g., Jakob v. Champion Int'l Corp., No. 01 C 0497,
2001 U.S. Dist. LEXIS 19019, at *2 (N.D. Ill. Nov. 14, 2001) (observing that sev-
eral rapid changes of ownership of corporate defendant resulted in situation
where no current employees of defendant had knowledge of the events on which
plaintiffs retaliatory discharge claim were based).
14. As the U.S. Supreme Court stated, the basic notice pleading requirements of
modern rules of civil procedure rely "on liberal discovery rules and summaryjudgment motions to define disputed facts and issues and to dispose of unmer-
itorious claims." Swierkiewicz v. Sorema, 534 U.S. 506, 512 (2002).
15. Sharpe v. Leonard Stulman Enters. Ltd. P'ship, 12 F. Supp. 2d 502, 507 (D. Md.
1998) (recognizing attorneys' "important professional and ethical obligations: to
investigate factual claims and to develop evidentiary foundations for those
claims").
16. A client's displeasure with her attorney's failure to divine all relevant facts may,
of course, also result in a meritorious malpractice claim being pursued against
the attorney.
17. Trial courts have significant discretion in determining whether an attorney's con-
duct in obtaining information from a litigant's former employees violates ethical
standards, general or localized rules of procedure, or other relevant authorities,
and in fashioning a remedy appropriate to the offense. Weeks v. Indep. Sch. Dist.
No. 1-89, 230 F.3d 1201, 1208 (10th Cir. 2000). Potential sanctions include disci-
plinary action, entry of a protective order precluding further contact, dismissal of
the adversary proceeding, compelled production of documents and information
obtained from former employees, suppression of evidence, impositions of fees and
costs, and, in extreme cases, disqualification of counsel. See FleetBoston Robert-
son Stephens, Inc. v. Innovex, Inc., 172 F. Supp. 2d 1190, 1194 (D. Minn. 2001)(considering but ultimately rejecting defense motion to strike declaration of for-
mer employee attached in support of plaintiffs summary judgment motion and to
exclude former employee from testifying at trial); Rockland Trust Co. v. Com-
puter Assocs. Int'l, Inc., 1999 WL 95722 (D. Mass. Feb. 19, 1999) (ruling on mo-
tion to strike affidavit in support of defendant's motion for summary judgment
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however, merely defending against a claim of inappropriate behavior
significantly sidetracks the attorney from focusing on the merits of the
case, and therefore from advancing her client's interests. Imposition
of even mild or moderate sanctions places a party at a significant tac-
where affiant was former employee of plaintiff); Sharpe, 12 F. Supp. 2d at 502
(entertaining defendant's motion in limine to preclude plaintiffs' use of affidavits
and potential testimony of defendant's former employees); Biocore Med. Techs.,
Inc. v. Khosrowshahi, 181 F.R.D. 660 (D. Kan. 1998) (stating that court has the
power to disqualify counsel where counsel violates code of professional ethics, dis-
regards requirements in Federal Rules of Civil Procedure, or engages in other
conduct that justifies the court invoking its inherent power to regulate the con-
duct of the attorneys appearing before it); Plan Comm. in Driggs Reorg. Case v.
Driggs, 217 B.R. 67, 72 (Bankr. D. Md. 1998) (recognizing wide range of possible
sanctions but finding no sanctionable conduct in case before it); Olson v. Snap
Prods., Inc., 183 F.R.D. 539, 541 (D. Minn. 1998) (stating that the court "has wide
discretion in framing sanctions to remedy abuses" concerning improper contact
with former employees, "including attorney disqualification, the assessment of
attorney's fees, monetary sanctions, and the dismissal of an action"); In re Bank
of La./Kenwin Shops, Inc., 1998 WL 788776 at *5-6 (E.D. La. Nov. 10, 1998) (en-
tertaining numerous claims for sanctions for allegedly improper contact with ad-
versary's former employees); Camden v. Maryland, 910 F. Supp. 1115, 1123 (D.
Md. 1996) (disqualifying plaintiffs counsel and suppressing evidence wrongfully
obtained during ex parte contact with defendant's former employee); Zachair,
Ltd. v. Driggs, 965 F. Supp. 741, 749-55 (D. Md. 1997) (same); Brown v. St. Jo-
seph's County, 148 F.R.D. 246, 255 (N.D. Ind. 1993) (pronouncing that "this court
may order the disqualification of counsel for a violation of one or more of the
Rules of Professional Conduct"); Kitchen v. Aristech Chem., 769 F. Supp. 254, 256
(S.D. Ohio 1991) (stating that "[a] motion to disqualify counsel is the proper
method for a party to bring an alleged breach of ethical duties to the court's at-
tention" (citation omitted)); Upjohn Co. v. Aetna Cas. & Sur. Co., 768 F. Supp.
1186 (W.D. Mich. 1991) (affirming magistrate's order requiring counsel who used
investigators to communicate improperly with opponent's former employees to
disclose all information gathered from the employees and to not use any evidence
gathered from the former employees at trial).
Courts have been somewhat hesitant to readily impose the most severe of
sanctions where the law defining the objectionable conduct is clearly unsettled.
See Belote v. Maritrans Operating Partners, L.P., No. CIV. A.97-3993, 1998 WL
136523, at *7 (E.D. Pa. Mar. 20, 1998) (rejecting disqualification of counsel in
favor of lesser sanction of precluding offending counsel from using at trial any
information obtained through improper ex parte contacts).
Courts also refrain from imposing extreme sanctions such as disqualification
of counsel or exclusion of evidence where doing so will penalize the client rather
than punish the attorney's unethical behavior. See Weider Sports Equip. Co.,
Ltd. v. Fitness First, Inc., 912 F. Supp. 502, 510-11 (D. Utah 1996); Brown, 148
F.R.D. at 255; Kitchen, 769 F. Supp. at 256.
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tical disadvantage,18 as rulings on sanctions are rarely subject to im-
mediate appeal.19
The role of former employees in litigated matters presents a vari-
ety of legal, ethical, and practical concerns for attorneys who wish to
obtain information from their own clients' or their opponents' former
employees.20 What are the appropriate boundaries attorneys must
observe when contacting a party's former employee who is a potential
witness? Is informal, ex parte contact with the opponent's former em-
ployees permissible? Is the approval of the court or notice to the other
side necessary, either before or after contact is made? May an attor-
ney agree to represent a former employee of his client without violat-
ing the ethical canons on conflict of interest and client solicitation? Is
an attorney's contact with a litigant's former employees shielded from
discovery by the attorney-client privilege, work product doctrine, or
other laws of privilege? Can an employer successfully prevent or limit
former employees' cooperation with an opposing party through use of
a separation agreement or similar contractual arrangement? Should
the answers to these questions change based on the status the former
employee held within the organization or the role she played in the
situation that led to the dispute? Should the answers change based on
18. In Weider Sports Equip. Co., Ltd., 912 F. Supp. at 509, for example, the court
noted that defendants' efforts to have serious sanctions imposed on opposing
counsel were motivated not by an interest in legal ethics but rather to obtain
"tactical trial advantages." In another case, the court disqualified plaintiffs trial
counsel for contacting defendant's current and former employees and ordered an
associate to proceed with the trial. McCarthy v. S.E. Pa. Transp. Auth., 772 A.2d
987 (Pa. Super. Ct. 2001). After losing at trial, plaintiff convinced the appellate
court that the trial court erred in disqualifying her original attorney, and the case
was remanded for a new trial. Id. at 995. Thus, after months of litigating the
disqualification motion and completing an entire trial, the parties were back
where they started, resulting in a tactical advantage for neither side.
19. "Matters concerning the disqualification of counsel and pretrial discovery mat-
ters are invariably treated as non-dispositive pretrial motions by courts in thisjurisdiction and elsewhere." Andrews v. Goodyear Tire & Rubber Co., 191 F.R.D.
59, 68 (D.N.J. 2000) (citations omitted). As a practical matter, the interlocutory
status precludes an immediate appeal, except via extraordinary means such as
filing a writ of mandamus. See, e.g., Weeks, 230 F.3d at 1201 (illustrating usual
procedure of counsel appealing her pretrial disqualification ruling after substi-
tute counsel had litigated case to final appealable order stage); Humco, Inc. v.
Noble, 31 S.W.3d 916 (Ky. 2000) (detailing party's unsuccessful attempt to use
writ of mandamus to obtain reversal of trial court's interlocutory order denying
defendant's motion to disqualify plaintiffs counsel for contacting defendant's cur-
rent and former employees).
20. This situation becomes even more complicated when the potential witness is a
former employee of more than one party, or when the witness is a former em-
ployee of one party and a current employee of another. See, e.g., WorldCom, Inc.
v. O'Hara, No. 97 C 6158, 1998 U.S. Dist. LEXIS 17608 (N.D. Ill. Oct. 6, 1998).
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whether the attorney is pursuing informal or formal means of
discovery?2 1
Unfortunately for attorneys, their clients, and the courts, these
questions "certainly raise interesting ethics issues that are far from
settled."22 To the contrary, "serious ethical issues . . . will often be
confronted by ... attorneys who seek to aggressively represent their
clients" 23  by initiating discovery of an adversary's former
employees. 24
As noted throughout this Article, multiple authorities touch on the
questions highlighted above. Rules of civil procedure, evidentiary
standards, common law and statutory privileges, and ethical rules
governing attorneys' conduct apply directly or by analogy. In addition,
trial courts' inherent power to sanction attorneys for improper conduct
may operate even when no specific rule has been violated.2 5 But no
single legal authority comprehensively addresses the most trouble-
some issues. In fact, rules that appear to govern a particular issue
relating to former employees are interpreted and applied by judges-
even judges presiding in the same jurisdiction 2 6-to reach opposite re-
sults. The goal of this Article is to untangle some of the issues sur-
rounding the recurring dilemmas posed by discovery of information
held by former employees. 27
21. "Informal discovery" is, by default, any method an attorney uses to obtain infor-
mation for which no express authorization is found in the formal discovery rules
such as FED. R. Civ. P. 26-37, 45, 69 or analogous state and agency procedural
rules and statutes. The most common form of informal discovery is an ex parte
interview of a potential witness. The interview may also involve an examination
of documents or other tangible materials possessed by the interviewee.
22. Olson, 183 F.R.D. at 542; see also Lang v. Reedy Creek Improvement Dist., 888 F.
Supp. 1143, 1145 (M.D. Fla. 1995).
23. In re Air Crash Disaster, 909 F. Supp. 1116, 1117 (N.D. Ill. 1995).
24. For an illustrative discussion of the myriad cases and issues arising in the federal
and state courts within a single state, see Bernard H. Dempsey, Jr., New Develop-
ments in the Law, Ex Parte Communications with Current and Former Employees
of a Corporate Defendant, 71 FLA. B. J. 10 (1997).
25. See Chambers v. NASCO, Inc., 501 U.S. 32 (1991) (holding that trial court has
inherent power to sanction litigant and counsel for filing false pleadings and mo-
tions and for engaging in fraudulent conduct outside of court).
26. See Plan Comm. in Driggs Reorg. Case v. Driggs, 217 B.R. 67, 69-70 (Bankr. D.
Md. 1998) (explaining contradictory interpretations among federal district courts
in Maryland regarding rules governing ex parte contact with former employees of
opposing party); Biocore Med. Techs., Inc., v. Khosrowshahi 181 F.R.D. 660, 673
(D. Kan. 1998) (observing that "Kansas courts and scholars have created three
divergent approaches" to dealing with former employee contact).
27. A limited amount of material here updates issues previously addressed by the
author in Susan J. Becker, Conducting Informal Discovery of a Party's Former
Employees: Legal and Ethical Concerns and Constraints, 51 MD. L. REv. 239
(1992). The greater part of this Article presents discovery dilemmas not dis-
cussed in the previous piece.
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Part II of this Article elucidates the competing interests of the liti-
gators, their respective clients, the courts, and the potential witnesses
when discovery is sought from former employees of a party. Part III
provides a brief overview of the various legal authorities that govern
an attorney's discovery of former employees and the synergy created
by these sources. Part IV examines the potential pitfalls attorneys
encounter when pursuing informal discovery of former employees of a
party. Part V presents specific issues that arise when an attorney
uses formal discovery devices to obtain information from former em-
ployees of a party. Part VI outlines the major additional limitations
imposed on an attorney's communications and interactions with for-
mer employees of a party that must be heeded when discovery is
sought under formal or informal methods. Part VII concludes the Ar-
ticle with the author's modest suggestions for clarifying applicable
standards and avoiding the myriad minefields highlighted throughout
this Article.28
II. THE CLASH OF INTERESTS IN EXPANDING OR LIMITING
DISCOVERY OF A PARTY'S FORMER EMPLOYEES
Whenever an ethical choice arises in which a lawyer cannot serve simultane-
ously the interests of the client, the court, and/or the guild, such that the inter-
ests of one or more must yield, our ethical rules resort to a 'rock, paper, scissors'
method of solving the problem, only without the clarity or the simplicity of that
childhood game. 2 9
Allowing expanded, informal, ex parte access to former employees
of a party significantly reduces costs30 and expedites resolution of dis-
28. Many decisions cited in this Article are unpublished, trial court opinions. Al-
though interlocutory in nature and apparently of little precedential weight at the
time of issuance, these opinions collectively constitute the body of jurisprudence
that governs discovery of former employees. Since the decisions discussed herein
involve courts' resolution of discrete pretrial discovery matters, this Article inten-
tionally omits citations to prior proceedings or subsequent case histories that re-
solve additional discovery disputes or involve the merits of the cases.
29. Richard C. Stanley, A Professional Model of Ethics, 47 Loy. L. REV. 773, 776
(2001).
30. See, e.g., Sharpe v. Leonard Stulman Enters. Ltd. P'ship, 12 F. Supp. 2d 502, 508
(D. Md. 1998) (approving counsel's ex parte contact with former employees and
observing that "counsel should purse such sources of information as they are able
without having to resort to the costly and burdensome system of formal discov-
ery"); Weider Sports Equip. Co. v. Fitness First, Inc., 912 F. Supp. 502, 508 (D.
Utah 1996) (making the same general observation). The cost savings are espe-
cially significant in class action and other multiple party cases. See Lisa Bren-
nan, Judge Okays Ex Parte Contacts, 143 N.J. L.J. 93 (1996) (discussing
economies created through judge's ruling that plaintiffs counsel in class action
could interview former employees of insurance company charged with misrepre-
sentation of its products). In one case, an appeals court reversed a protective
order that required plaintiffs counsel to formally depose sixty former employees
of the defendant's nursing home instead of interviewing them informally. See
Reynoso v. Greynolds Park Manor, Inc., 659 So. 2d 1156 (Fla. Ct. App. 1995).
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putes.3 1 It enables counsel "to access the merits of a case inexpen-
sively and quickly by contacting these witnesses."32 The information
obtained during former employee interviews may persuade counsel to
initiate or reject litigation as a means of resolving the dispute, or may
be instrumental in counsel's decision to pursue or to settle pending
litigation. "Formal discovery, in turn, can create protracted and quar-
relsome discovery disputes which consume finite judicial resources." 33
As one judge surmised, "[flormal discovery is no substitute.., for the
opportunity to speak to witnesses, whether favorable or not, outside of
opposing counsel's presence." 34
So why not allow unfettered, informal access to former employees
as a matter of course? Such a bright line would be easy to apply and
would respect "the time honored right of counsel for all parties to in-
terview willing non-party witnesses in private, without the presence
or consent of opposing counsel and without a transcript being
made."35
The reason for adopting a bright line test is perhaps obvious. As is
true of many legal issues, the competing interests of those involved
and the unique facts each case presents undermine any chance of es-
tablishing a "one size fits all" standard for informal discovery of for-
mer employees. Unfortunately, even the application of explicit rules
governing formal discovery do not always reconcile the competing in-
terests of all the actors. 36 And no rules will remedy contentious dis-
covery situations where litigation is motivated by something other
than seeking a legal remedy, such as attempts to gain favorable mar-
ket position or to mandate or punish ongoing conduct of nonparties. 37
31. See, e.g., United States v. Beiersdorf-Jobst, Inc., 980 F. Supp. 257, 262 (N.D. Ohio
1997) (opining that the "basic cornerstone of our judicial system is the unimpeded
flow of information between adversaries to encourage the early detection and
elimination of both undisputed and meritless claims").
32. Cram v. Lamson & Sessions Co., 148 F.R.D. 259, 261 (S.D. Iowa 1993). In a ruling
allowing ex parte contact between an attorney and his opponent's former employ-
ees, one court stated: "In an era when easing or eliminating the unnecessary bur-
dens and expense of litigation is widely viewed as desirable, this court is loath to
create limitations on attorney communications which make the litigation process
more difficult while providing little in the way of corresponding benefit."
Turnbull v. Topeka State Hosp., 185 F.R.D. 645, 652 (D. Kan. 1999).
33. Cram, 148 F.R.D. at 261; Terra Int'l, Inc. v. Miss. Chem. Corp., 913 F. Supp.
1306, 1314 n.8 (N.D. Iowa 1996).
34. Pardo v. Gen. Hosp. Corp., No. 98-2714, 2000 Mass. Super. LEXIS 536, at *6
(Mass. Super. Ct. Oct. 31, 2000).
35. Shoreline Computers, Inc. v. Warnaco Inc., No. CIV. 9904228535, 2000 Conn.
Super. LEXIS 842, at *8 (Conn. Super. Ct. Apr. 3, 2000) (citing I.B.M. v. Edel-
stein, 526 F.2d 37 (2d Cir. 1975)).
36. See infra Part V (Formal Discovery).
37. See, e.g., Gucci Am., Inc. v. Costco Co., No. 98CIV. 5613, 2000 U.S. Dist. LEXIS
602, at *2 (S.D.N.Y. Jan. 24, 2000) (observing that the many discovery battles in
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Judges, attorneys, litigants, and former employee witnesses no
doubt agree, at least in principle, that the free flow of information
among parties and other persons with relevant knowledge is the key
to the fair and efficient resolution of any case. Yet, each player has a
slightly different perspective on how and when the information should
flow, resulting in conflicts that significantly hamper efficient resolu-
tion of disputes.
Judges desire that parties effectuate discovery without court inter-
vention, yet are often called upon to compel compliance with the fluid
limitations established by the formal rules governing discovery and
unclear ethical standards governing informal discovery. Judges must
effectuate a gate-keeping function that allows information to flow
freely to all parties, but prevents materials from being obtained in vio-
lation of rules and privileges that shield certain data from disclosure
and limit inappropriate influences.
Certainly, allowing former employees to be interviewed in a re-
laxed and familiar atmosphere, such as their own homes and by a sin-
gle attorney, encourages the flow of information that might otherwise
be stifled "under intense and formal proceedings."3s At the same time,
unregulated ex parte communication with these former employees
and other nonparty witnesses licenses the attorney to shape, inten-
tionally or inadvertently, the recollection-and thus the veracity of
the factual contributions-of the former employees. As a result, some
judges have constructed their own rules to govern discovery of former
employees.39 As one judge opined, "[t]he integrity of the justice sys-
tem is at risk unless a stand is taken against the conduct of the sort"40
that allows parties to invade other parties confidential information.
Attorneys desire unrestricted access to opposing parties' former
employees without the "chill" exacted by opposing counsel's presence
on the disclosure of relevant factual information.41 At a minimum, ex
parte access provides an inexpensive means of discovering basic infor-
mation about the case, and allows the attorney to make decisions as to
whether formal discovery is warranted. Ex parte contact also provides
an opportunity to recruit former employees into the contacting attor-
ney's camp, or at least determine if the persons are, or plan to become,
soldiers for an adversary. The use of formal discovery, especially sub-
poenas, 42 provides the attorney with additional tools for mining infor-
mation from an adversary's former employees.
the case arose "because each side appears to have certain goals which are not
immediately apparent from the face of the pleadings").
38. Cram, 148 F.R.D. at 262.
39. Dempsey, supra note 24, at 16-18.
40. Camden v. Maryland, 910 F. Supp. 1115, 1123 (D. Md. 1996).
41. Hanntz v. Shiley, Inc., 766 F. Supp. 258, 261 (D.N.J. 1991).
42. See infra subsection V.B.4.d (Subpoenas and Subpoenas Duces Tecum).
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While expecting unfettered access to an adversary's former em-
ployees, most attorneys prefer to shield their own clients' former em-
ployees from the discovery spotlight. This is because a former
employee, especially a disgruntled one, "is precisely the witness most
likely to shed light on internal corporate activities that otherwise
would be difficult or impossible to uncover."4 3 This reality often in-
spires attempts by counsel to discourage clients' former employees
from speaking to opposing counsel,44 or from fully responding to a sub-
poena.45 In general, however, counsel cannot forbid the former em-
ployees from doing s0.46
Former employees may be reluctant to cooperate with attorneys for
a variety of personal and professional reasons. The time and emo-
tional demands of participating in litigation or other dispute resolu-
tion processes is one obvious disincentive. Former employees may
fear negative economic consequences from their former employer and
social ostracism from former co-workers following cooperation with an
adversary. 4 7 Cooperation with either side's attorney could lead to
pressure to provide information spun in a way that decreases its accu-
racy, thus causing former employees to wrestle with issues of con-
science. In an extreme case, former employees may feel pressured to
commit perjury.48 Former employees also may fear revealing facts
that implicate personal culpability for the alleged wrongdoing or even
civil or criminal liability.
In some instances, of course, all participants in the litigation, arbi-
tration, or other dispute resolution process share common objectives
and philosophies that predispose them to an amiable resolution of po-
tentially troublesome issues surrounding discovery of information
held by former employees. Those situations go unreported by the
courts, the popular press, and legal journals. But because our evolv-
ing adversary system encourages but does not necessarily reward co-
43. George B. Wyeth, Talking to the Other Side's Employees and Ex-Employees, 15
LITIG. 8, 12 (1989).
44. See Brown v. St. Joseph's County, 148 F.R.D. 246, 248 (N.D. Ind. 1993) (noting
that former employee had been told not to speak to opposing counsel "under any
circumstances").
45. The most common tactic in this respect involves an attorney moving to quash the
subpoena directed to a client's former employees. The issue of whether the attor-
ney has standing to pursue this motion is discussed infra text accompanying
notes 444-63.
46. Prohibitions against speaking to opposing counsel might be appropriate based on
a contractual agreement with the former employer, although the enforceability of
such agreements is questionable. See infra section VI.F (Private Law).
47. Cram v. Lamson & Sessions Co., 148 F.R.D. 259, 262 (S.D. Iowa 1993).
48. In Smith v. Kansas City So. Ry. Co., No. WD 59676, 2002 Mo. App. LEXIS 1437
(Mo. Ct. App. June 28, 2002), for example, a former employee stated that a defen-
dant former employer had asked him to testify falsely that plaintiff had a bad
back prior to the injury that precipitated the litigation. Id. at *6.
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operation, the players often struggle fiercely to protect their own
interests rather than seek common ground that might accommodate
all participants' perspectives. As the many cases cited throughout
this Article demonstrate, judges and former employees often find
themselves caught in the crossfire of those struggles without clear le-
gal authority to arm or to shield them.
III. SYNERGY OF RULES, CODES, AND COMMON
LAW DOCTRINES
Procedural rules, ethical codes, privilege doctrines, and the com-
mon law weave a jurisprudential web that sometimes serves as a trap
and other times as a safety net for attorneys, their clients, and non-
parties engaged in discovery disputes. As discussed throughout this
Article, various rules and doctrines clearly apply to many situations
with former employees, yet they rarely converge into a coherent map
for practitioners and courts to follow. This is because legal authorities
routinely overlook the vital role former employees play in resolving
modern litigation. It also results from the competing policies underly-
ing the various standards governing informal and formal discovery.
Ongoing efforts by the American Bar Association ("ABA"),49 the
American Law Institute ("ALI"),50 the Judicial Conference of the
49. The ABA is the leading authority on rules of ethical attorney conduct. ABA ef-
forts to make ethical rules more directly applicable to modern law practice in-
clude its appointment in 1997 of a Commission on the Evaluation of the Rules of
Professional Conduct. Chaired by Chief Judge E. Norman Veasey of the Dela-
ware Supreme Court, the "Ethics 2000 Commission," as it is known, undertook a
substantial review of the ABA's Model Rules of Professional Conduct. Its work
culminated in the Ethics 2000 report presented to the ABA's House of Delegates
in August 2001 and in the ABA's approval of numerous amendments to its Model
Rules of Professional Conduct in February 2002. A comprehensive explanation of
the Ethics 2000 project and resulting amendments to the Model Rules are availa-
ble on the ABA's internet web site at http:///www.abanet.org. See Mark Hansen,
Hot off the Press: Revised Model Ethics Rules are Nearly Ready for State Scrunity,
A.B.A. J., June 2002, at 37; Mark Hansen, Let the Debate Begin: Report on ABA
Ethics Rules is Ready for the House, A.B.A. J., Aug. 2001, at 80; Anthony E. Da-
vis, ABA Ethics 2000 Commission Report: Confidentiality, N.Y. L.J. 3 (July 11,
2001); David W. Raack, The Ethics 2000 Commission's Proposed Revision of the
Model Rules: Substantive Change or Just a Makeover?, 27 OHIO N.U. L. REV. 233(2001); Ethics 2000 Commission Releases Fourth Set of Draft Changes to Model
Rules, 68 U.S.L.W. 2647 (May 2, 2000).
50. The ALI's contribution is embodied in its Restatement (Third) of the Law Gov-
erning Lawyers. See ALI Completes Restatement on Lawyers, Gives Final Ap-
proval to All Sections, 8 LAw. MAN. PROF. CONDUCT (ABA/BNA) 211 (May 13,
1998). The Restatement attempts to combine and reconcile various standards and
laws that govern attorney conduct into a single cohesive authority. See RESTATE-
MENT (THIRD) OF THE LAW GOVERNING LAWYERS, Foreword, at xxii (Proposed Final
Draft No. 1, 1996) (reporting that the "rules of law set forth in this Restatement
are generally drawn, and in all events influenced, by the rules set forth" in the
existing "lawyer code" comprised not only of the Model Rules and the Model Code
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U.S.,51 and others to make the rules governing attorney conduct more
uniform and practical have been helpful, but have failed to generate
uniformity on general principles, much less something as specific as
discovery of former employees. Significant amendments to relevant
rules of civil procedure in 199352 and 200053 and to model ethical
rules in 200254 have not eliminated the confusion. 55 The explosion of
local rules of courts5 6 and detailed standing orders by individual
judges57 add more layers of regulation, and therefore, of complexity. 58
of Professional Responsibility but also local rules and other authorities in state
and federal law). Courts may consult the Restatement but it has not been
adopted in toto as binding authority in any jurisdiction. Members of the ABA's
Ethics 2000 Commission considered the Restatement when undertaking their re-
vision to the Model Rules of Professional Conduct. Ritchenya A. Shepherd, Law
of Lawyering: New ALI Restatement for Attorneys Could Affect Malpractice Lia-
bility A.B.A. J., July 1998, at 30 (quoting the chair of the Commission as stating
that the group's work was "being informed by the ALI Restatement of the Law...
in practically every aspect that we look at").
51. The Judicial Conference is charged by Congress with reviewing and updating
rules of civil procedure, evidence, criminal procedure, and other rules used in
federal courts. 28 U.S.C. §2073(b) (1994). For a detailed account of how federal
rules are made and amended, see JUDITH A. MCMoRROW & DANIEL R. COQUIL-
LETTE, MOORE'S FEDERAL PRACTICE, THE FEDERAL LAW OF ATTORNEY CONDUCT 11
801.25-801.42 (3d ed. 2001).
52. The most significant change effectuated by the 1993 amendments was the re-
quirement that parties voluntarily disclose certain information at the initiation
of the lawsuit. See FED. R. Civ. P. 26(a) (1993). District courts could, however,
opt out of the mandatory disclosure system, id., and about half of them did. A
number of other changes required heightened cooperation among counsel, liti-
gants, and the courts. See, e.g., FED. R. Civ. P. 26(f)(2) (requiring adversaries to
jointly develop a discovery plan addressing "whether discovery should be con-
ducted in phases or be limited to or focused upon particular issues," and whether
modifications should be made to discovery as provided for in the general or local
rules of court); see also discussion of the 1993 amendments in section V.B, infra.
53. The 2000 amendments removed of the provision that allowed district courts to
opt out of mandatory disclosure procedures. See FED. R. Civ. P. 26(a); see also
subsection V.B.2, infra.
54. The 2002 amendments to the ABA's Model Rules of Professional Conduct are ex-
plained in Part IV, infra.
55. See Carl Tobias, Discovery Reform Redux, 31 CONN. L. REV. 1433 (1999).
56. Federal district courts are authorized to promulgate local rules "consistent with -
but not duplicative of' the general civil rules and federal statutes governing pro-
cedure. FED. R. Civ. P. 83(a)(1). Congress vested district courts with this author-
ity in the Rules Enabling Act, 28 U.S.C. 2071 (1988). Alabama has taken a
radically different approach to local rules. Its counterpart to FED. R. Civ. P. 83
provides: "All local rules are abolished effective April 14, 1992, and no local rules
shall thereafter be permitted." ALA. R. Crv. P. 83.
57. Federal judges may develop standing orders imposing detailed requirements on
attorneys and others appearing before them pursuant to courts' inherent power
to manage dockets and control decorum during the litigation process. See, e.g.,
Chambers v. NASCO, Inc., 501 U.S. 32, 43 (1991); Cannon v. Cherry Hill Toyota,
190 F.R.D. 147, 161 (D.N.J. 1999) (stating that court's inherent power "may be
invoked to regulate the conduct of lawyers appearing before it and, when neces-
sary, may be invoked to impose sanctions on those lawyers who violate the Rules
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The chaos is compounded by the ubiquitous codes of professionalism
and civility readily embraced by state and federal courts in recent
years, adding yet more briars of uncertainty to an already thorny
thicket.59 All efforts to reform standards of attorney conduct are be-
ing done against a backdrop of a larger reform movement to simplify
the law in this country.60
The law's amorphous boundaries create major challenges for attor-
neys, especially those who practice in multiple state and federal
courts.61 It also routinely vexes judges who are mired in discovery
disputes and the disciplinary boards that adjudicate charges of uneth-
ical conduct by attorneys. The AL162 has put forth a valiant effort to
bring some order to this chaos in its Restatement (Third) of the Law
Governing Lawyers. Formulated through more than a decade of de-
of Professional Responsibility, the Federal Rules of Civil Procedure, the Local
Rules or the general obligations of attorneys practicing in the federal courts to
work towards a just, speedy and efficient resolution of claims"); see also FED. R.
Crv. P. 83(b) advisory committee note, 1995 amendments (recognizing the propri-
ety of a judge's standing order, and the judge's imposition of sanctions for viola-
tions of it, provided the order gives adequate notice to attorneys of the court's
expectations).
58. See Carl Tobias, Local Federal Civil Procedure for the Twenty-First Century, 77
NOTRE DAME L. REV. 533 (2002).
59. See generally Symposium, Improving the Professionalism of Lawyers: Can Com-
mittees and Centers Make a Difference?, 52 S.C. L. REV. 443 (2001) (containing
articles and transcripts from panel discussions concerning new standards de-
manding increased civility and professionalism by attorneys, judges, witnesses,
and parties); Symposium, supra, app. at 747-58 (providing illustrative lists of
ongoing projects across the country); WORKING GROUP ON LEGAL CONDUCT AND
PROFESSIONALISM, A NATIONAL ACTION PLAN ON LAWYER CONDUCT AND PROFES-
SIONALISM, http://www.ncsc.dni.us/ccj/natlplan.htm (later adopted by the Confer-
ence of Chief Justices of state courts on January 21, 1999); Chief Justices Devise
'Action Plan' to Promote Lawyers' Professionalism, 67 U.S.L.W. 2214 (Oct. 20,
1998) (discussing key themes of National Action Plan, supra); Peter A. Joy, What
We Talk About When We Talk About Professionalism: A Review of Lawyers' Ide-
als/Lawyers' Practices: Transformations in the American Legal Profession, 7
GEO. J. LEGAL ETHICS 987 (1994). See also Susan Daicoff, Asking Leopards to
Change Their Spots: Should Lawyers Change? A Critique of Solutions to
Problems with Professionalism by Reference to Empirically-Derived Attorney Per-
sonality Tributes, 11 GEO. J. LEGAL ETHICS 547 (1998) (advocating fewer new
rules, codes, and external regulations and more self-examination and reflection
by lawyers of what the legal profession should symbolize and their individual
places in the profession).
60. See Symposium on the UCC, SEC, ALI, Federal Rules and Federal Government
Simplification Experiences - Is It Time for a Model Set of Drafting Principles?,
105 DICK. L. REV. 205 (2001).
61. See generally Larry E. Ribstein, Ethical Rules, Law Firm Structure, and Choice of
Law, 69 U. CIN. L. REV. 1161 (2002) (explaining that law firms with offices in
different states are subject to a variety of ethical restrictions, often resulting in
the firm's adherence to the most restrictive standards in a manner that may be
inefficient and ineffective for serving their clients in a particular jurisdiction).
62. ALI members include law professors, judges, and practitioners.
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bate and formally approved by the ALI in 1998,63 the Restatement at-
tempts to reconcile and refine the core ethical rules, privilege
doctrines, and other authorities that collectively define a lawyer's ap-
propriate role in the profession and in society at large. Like the Model
Rules of Professional Conduct, the Restatement's provisions are not
binding unless a court specifically adopts them. As one observer ex-
plained, the Restatement may be consulted when violations of attorney
disciplinary codes are alleged, but "its primary purpose is to guide
lawyers and judges on what the law says in matters arising in the civil
context,"6 4 including malpractice actions and disputes over motions to
disqualify counsel. Accordingly, courts may turn to the Restatement
for guidance on difficult attorney conduct issues, but no state or fed-
eral court has expressly adopted the Restatement in toto.65
In its current state, all of the authorities cited above seek, on the
one hand, to provide expansive opportunities for an efficient and inex-
pensive exchange of information throughout litigation and other civil
dispute resolution processes. On the other hand, these authorities
seek to draw lines regarding how, when, and what information can
properly be obtained. While engaging in these line drawing exercises,
the law tries to accommodate diverse interests ranging from corporate
trade secrets to individual privacy, from the lawyer's duty to zealously
represent her clients to the court's duty to protect the integrity of the
civil justice system. These often opposing goals of the law are evi-
denced throughout this Article, as are the efforts of courts, counsel,
and litigants to locate that elusive middle ground where all interests
are served.
Faced with layers of legal authority that do not apply to former
employees, courts often switch focus from the letter of the law to an
analysis of the underlying policies. Through this process, many dis-
covery disputes, and certainly those involving former employees, are
decided by the specific judge's weighing of policies favoring free disclo-
sure of information against policies demanding protection of certain
types of information from particular sources. Accordingly, judicial dis-
cretion injects a wild card into any discovery dispute, and especially
those involving former employees of a party.
63. Standards of Conduct: Restatement on Lawyers Completed with Final ALI Ap-
proval of All Sections, 66 U.S.L.W. 2716 (May 26, 1998).
64. Id.
65. See, e.g., Peralta v. Cendant Corp., 190 F.R.D. 38, 41 n.1 (D. Conn. 1999) (citing
Restatement (Third) of Law Governing Lawyers as one of numerous sources con-
sulted on the applicability of attorney-client privilege to a deposition discovery
dispute).
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IV. INFORMAL DISCOVERY OF A PARTY'S
FORMER EMPLOYEES
Suffice it to say that the full spectrum of ethical requirements that bind an
attorney in any other situation is equally binding when the attorney engages in
ex parte contact with an unrepresented former employee of an opposing organi-
zational party. 6 6
The right of counsel for all parties to interview willing nonparty
witnesses in private and without a transcript being made is based on
"time-honored and decision-honored principles."67 These principles
apply, in theory, "to former employees of an adverse party."68 And yet,
attorneys initiating ex parte contact with an adversary's former em-
ployees navigate a minefield of ethical rules and privilege doctrines.
The most potentially explosive conventions are the ethical rules
prohibiting contact with a represented party69 and the attorney-client
privilege. As more fully explained throughout this Article, however,
numerous other rules and doctrines are also implicated, and violations
of any of these rules or standards can result in significant sanctions.
The Model Rules of Professional Conduct promulgated by the
American Bar Association in 1983 serve as the focal point for this
Part. Where adopted, the Model Rules govern attorney conduct when
litigation or other formal adversary proceeding is contemplated but
not yet initiated,70 in criminal and civil matters, 71 and in transac-
tional work.72 More than two-thirds of the states and the District of
Columbia have adopted the Model Rules73 as have U.S. territories.74
Several states have developed hybrid rules by retaining the ABA's
66. Shearson Lehman Bros., Inc. v. Wasatch Bank, 139 F.R.D. 412, 418 (D. Utah
1991).
67. G-I Holdings, Inc. v. Baron & Budd, 199 F.R.D. 529, 533 (S.D.N.Y. 2001) (quoting
Int'l Business Machines Corp. v. Edelstein, 526 F.2d 37, 42 (2d Cir. 1975)).
68. G-I Holdings, 199 F.R.D. at 533.
69. One study concluded that interpretations of these rules accounted for over ten
percent of the disciplinary actions taken by federal district court judges. MCMOR-
ROW & COQUILLETTE, supra note 51, 802.60.
70. See, e.g., ABA Comm. on Ethics and Profl Responsibility, Formal Op. 95-396(1995) (noting that the interest the rules seek to protect "are engaged when litiga-
tion is simply under consideration, even though it has not actually been insti-
tuted," so long as potential parties have retained counsel to handle the dispute).71. See, e.g., id. (advising that model rule prohibiting attorney from contacting party
represented by counsel applies equally in criminal and civil cases); see also
Brenna K. DeVaney, Note, The "No Contact" Rule: Helping or Hurting Criminal
Defendants in Plea Negotiations?, 14 GEo. J. LEGAL ETHICS 933 (2001) (question-
ing the wisdom of applying Model Rule 4.2 in criminal cases).
72. See, e.g., ABA Comm. on Ethics and Profl Responsibility, Formal Op. 95-396(1995) (holding that "although most frequently encountered in the context of liti-
gation," rules prohibiting contact with a represented party apply "in transac-
tional circumstances as well," such as the sale and purchase of real estate).
73. See generally Gregory C. Sisk, Iowa's Legal Ethics Rules: It's Time to Join the
Crowd, 47 DRAKE L. REV. 279, 280-83 (1999) (explaining that, as of 1999, Geor-
gia, Tennessee, Vermont and Virginia are moving away from the Model Code,
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previous exemplar, the Model Code, and making substantial amend-
ments that often reflect Model Rule standards. 7 5 Other states have
developed their own systems of ethical rules. 76
Significant variations of "model" rules are found in federal as well
as state courts. 77 Federal law controls the ethical standards of attor-
neys appearing in federal courts.78 Through local rules,7 9 federal
courts frequently adopt the ethical rules of the states in which they
sit8O and the state courts' interpretations of those rules.8 1 The bor-
potentially leaving only Iowa, Nebraska, New York, Ohio and Oregon adhering to
the Model Code).
74. See, e.g., Jones v. Daily News Publ'g Co., Civ. No. 1999/138, 2001 U.S. Dist.
LEXIS 5349, at *3 n.3 (V.I. Mar. 16, 2001) (stating that the Virgin Islands have
adopted the Model Rules).
75. Most states have amended the Model Code and the Model Rules, both at the time
of the initial adoption and in subsequent years. Non-uniformity prevails because
the various amendments tend "to be on the most controversial-and thus the
most important-topics." Arvid E. Roach II, The Virtues of Clarity: The ABA's
New Choice of Law Rule for Legal Ethics, 36 S. TEX. L. REV. 907, 910 (1995); see
also Charles H. Oates & Marie Summerlin Hamm, A New Twist for an Olde Code:
Examining Viginia's New Rules of Professional Conduct, 13 REGENT U. L. REV. 65
(2000/2001) (discussing Virginia's hybrid rules adopted by the Virginia Supreme
Court on Jan. 25, 1999 and effective January 1, 2000); Attorneys - Regulations for
Bar: New York Revises Disciplinary Rules with Broad Group of Changes, Addi-
tions, 68 U.S.L.W. 2067 (Aug. 10, 1999) (discussing significant amendments to
the state's Code of Professional Responsibility effective in July 1999).
76. California, for example, has adopted a black letter law format with official "Dis-
cussions" interpreting the rules. See RULES OF PROFESSIONAL CONDUCT OF THE
STATE BAR OF CALIFORNIA (2002). Additional rules are found in other California
laws, such as the rule on client confidentiality set forth in the CALIFORNIA Busi-
NESS AND PROFESSIONAL CODE § 6068(e) (providing that duties of an attorney in-
clude "to maintain inviolate the confidence ... of his or her client").
77. See generally MCMORROW & COQUILLETTE, supra note 51.
78. In re Snyder, 472 U.S. 634, 645 n.6 (1985).
79. MCMORROW & COQUILLETTE, supra note 51, 801.14.
80. As of June 2001, eighty-two of the ninety-four federal district courts had enacted
local rules adopting the standards of the state in which the court was located.
MCMORROW & COQUILLETTE, supra note 51, 802.06; see, e.g., Branham v. Nor-
folk & Western Ry. Co., 151 F.R.D. 67 (S.D.W. Va. 1993) (applying ethical rules
adopted by West Virginia's highest court); McCallum v. CSX Transp., Inc., 149
F.R.D. 104, 108 (M.D.N.C. 1993) (holding that "[ilnasmuch as neither Congress
nor the Supreme Court have adopted a uniform set of federal ethical standards
governing attorneys practicing in the federal courts, the various federal courts
may look to the rules of the state in which that court sits or widely accepted
national rules, such as the American Bar Association (ABA) Model Rules of Pro-
fessional Conduct"); Goff v. Wheaton Indus., 145 F.R.D. 351, 353 (D.N.J. 1992)
(stating that federal court sitting in New Jersey applies ABA's Rules of Profes-
sional Conduct as modified by the New Jersey Supreme Court along with other
standards "required or permitted by federal statute, regulation, court rules, or
decisions of law"); Valassis v. Samelson, 143 F.R.D. 118, 120 n.1 (E.D. Mich.
1992) (stating that an attorneys practicing in the Eastern District of Michigan
are governed by the Rules of Professional Conduct adopted by the Michigan Su-
preme Court). Federal courts' use of state law is recommended by the ABA. See
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rowed state standards are often supplemented with district-specific lo-
cal rules governing attorney conduct.8 2 Several comprehensive
studies of federal courts conducted in the mid-1990s "confirmed that
there were literally hundreds of different local rules governing attor-
ney conduct in the district courts, and many more in the courts of ap-
peal and bankruptcy courts."8 3
Even when federal courts adopt the ethical rules of their home
states, however, state court decisions interpreting those rules do not
bind the federal courts.8 4 Federal courts are guided on ethical issues
"by federal case law, as well as the ABA's comments to its Model Rules
of Professional Conduct and the policies underlying the particular eth-
ical rule at issue."85 As is the case with state courts, formal and infor-
mal opinions on the rules issued by the ABA and state attorney
disciplinary boards provide guidance but are not binding on the fed-
eral courts.8 6 In short, the unified system of federal courts has no uni-
form standards governing attorney conduct, despite many compelling
arguments favoring one set of standards for all federal courts.8 7
MODEL FEDERAL RULES OF DISCIPLINARY ENFORCEMENT R. IV(B) (1978). But even
with most federal courts adopting the ethics standards of the states in which they
sit, lack of uniformity arises between districts in the same state. In the U.S.
District Court for the Northern District of Ohio, for example, attorney conduct is
governed by the Code of Professional Responsibility as adopted by the Supreme
Court of Ohio. See N.D.L.R. 1:5.1(b), as embellished by N.D.L.R. 1:5.2's proce-
dures for attorney discipline and disbarment. In contrast, the U.S. District Court
for the Southern District of Ohio has adopted all but two of the fifteen Model
Federal Rules detailing attorney discipline and procedure. See S.D. Ohio L.R.
83.4(f); see also Roach, supra note 75, at 914-18 (explaining the conflicting ethical
standards in federal courts).
81. See, e.g., Rogosin v. Mayor and City Council of Baltimore, 164 F. Supp. 2d 684,
686 (D. Md. 2001) (stating that the federal district court located in Maryland
applies the Maryland Rules of Professional Conduct "as they have been construed
by the Maryland Court of Appeals").
82. MCMORROW & COQUILLETTE, supra note 51, 802.06; see, e.g., McCallum, 149
F.R.D. at 108 (stating that "the various federal courts may look to the rules of the
state in which that court sits"); Kitchen v. Aristech Chem., 769 F. Supp. 254, 258
(S.D. Ohio 1991) (looking toward federal case law to determine whether local eth-
ics rules had been violated).
83. MCMORROW & COQUILLETTE, supra note 51, 801.52 (citation omitted).
84. Calloway v. DST Systems, Inc., No. 98-1303-CV-W-6, 2000 U.S. Dist. LEXIS
2635, at *5 n.3, 83 Fair Empl. Prac. Cas. (BNA) 1608 (W.D. Mo. Feb. 28, 2000).
85. Kitchen, 769 F. Supp. at 258.
86. See, e.g., FleetBoston Robertson Stephens, Inc. v. Innovex, Inc., 172 F. Supp. 2d
1190, 1194 (D. Minn. 2001) (observing that "[w]hile the ABA's opinion is not bind-
ing upon this court, the Eighth Circuit has instructed courts to consider the ABA
Code of Professional Responsibility in Construing the Minnesota Rules of Profes-
sional Conduct") (citing United States v. Agosto, 675 F.2d 965, 969 (8th Cir.
1982)).
87. See MCMORROW & COQUILLETTE, supra note 51, 11 802.79-802.113 (describing
efforts to establish a uniform set of"Federal Rules of Attorney Conduct" and of-
fering a possible text of those rules); see also H. Geoffrey Moulton, Jr., Federalism
[Vol. 81:868
DISCOVERY AND FORMER EMPLOYEES
Battles also rage over whether attorneys representing the federal
government are subject to state and federal court rules governing at-
torney conduct,8 8 and whether administrative agencies, such as the
Internal Revenue Service, Patent and Trademark Office, and the Se-
curities and Exchange Commission have independent authority to
promulgate their own standards governing the conduct of the attor-
neys who practice before them.8 9 Agencies regularly promulgate and
enforce such standards, and also establish standards for their own at-
torneys. The National Labor Relations Board, for example, recently
enacted new guidelines designed to avoid the ethical problems that
arise when interviewing current and former employees of a party en-
gaged in an unfair labor practice proceeding. 90 In addition, Executive
Orders have been issued by recent U.S. Presidents to control the con-
duct of attorneys who litigate on behalf of the federal government in
federal and state courts and other adjudicatory settings.9 1
and the Choice of Law in the Regulation of Legal Ethics, 82 MINN. L. REV. 73
(1997); Bruce A. Green, Whose Rules of Professional Conduct Should Govern
Lawyers in Federal Court and How Should the Rules Be Created?, 64 GEO. WASH.
L. REV. 460 (1996); Linda S. Mullenix, Multiforum Federal Practice: Ethics and
Erie, 9 GEO. J. LEGAL ETHICS 89 (1995).
88. The issue of whether federal government counsel should be exempt from state
and federal attorney conduct rules has plagued the profession for years. The
matter appeared to be resolved when the so-called "McDade Amendment" was
enacted as part of the Omnibus Consolidated and Emergency Supplemental Ap-
propriations Act of 1999. Codified at 28 U.S.C. §503B, the amendment subjects
federal government attorneys to the same standards as all other attorneys who
practice in a particular jurisdiction. 28 U.S.C. §503(B)(a) (2001). Controversy
remains, however, as federal prosecutors and others claim that the rules prevent
them from effectively conducting investigations vital to their assignments. See
Note, Federal Prosecutors, State Ethics Regulations, and the McDade Amend-
ment, 113 HAav. L.REv. 2080 (2001); Randy Lee, Symposium, Legal Ethics for
Government Lawyers: Straight Talk for Tough Times, 9 WIDENER J. PUBLIC. L.
199 (2000). A proposed Senate bill, S. 1437, would prohibit the Department of
Justice from writing its own ethical rules and would direct the Judicial Confer-
ence to develop a national uniform rule for government attorneys relating to con-
tact with represented persons. The legislation was referred to the Senate's
Judiciary Committee on Sept. 19, 2001 and no further action has been taken.
89. MCMORROW & COQUILLETTE, supra note 51, $ 801.42.
90. NLRB: Board Official Issues Guidelines to Regions on Interviewing Supervisions,
Other Witnesses, DAILY LABOR REPORT, Feb. 22, 2002, at A-1.
91. See, e.g., Exec. Order No. 12988, reprinted in 3 U.S.C. § 301 (1996) (promulgating
"Guidelines to Promote Just and Efficient Government Civil Litigation" requiring
attorneys who represent the federal government to provide pre-filing notices of
complaints to potential defendants, actively explore settlement possibilities prior
to and during litigation, participate in alternative dispute resolution where feasi-
ble, and to cooperate fully with opposing counsel in discovery). This Executive
Order, issued by then-President William Clinton, revoked a similar order exe-
cuted by President George Bush. Id. at § 12. Absent action by current President
George W. Bush, this Executive Order remains in effect.
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Despite the lack of overall uniformity in the rules and standards
governing attorney conduct and the recurring criticisms of whatever
code applies, certain themes permeate all codes. These include limita-
tions applicable to obtaining discovery from former employees, such as
prohibitions against client solicitation, requirements that attorneys
respect their own clients' confidences and secrets and the privileges
owned by persons who are not clients, 92 avoidance of conflicts of inter-
est,9 3 bars on ex parte contact with persons represented by counsel,
and mandates that attorneys cannot insulate themselves from disci-
plinary actions by directing or encouraging others to engage in activi-
ties prohibited by the rules.94 In addition, whatever the literal
language of the code in a particular jurisdiction, the same spirit of
restraining attorneys from overzealous representation pervades all
codes. One clear message is that ethical rules should be used to guide
and govern attorney's conduct, and must not be utilized by counsel to
control and limit the flow of pertinent, non-privileged information to
another party.9 5
Finally, ethical rules are neither all encompassing nor self-explan-
atory. Courts and litigators seek guidance in advisory opinions issued
by the ABA's Standing Committee on Ethics and Professional Respon-
sibility96 and states' ethics committees. 9 7 They also consider the poli-
92. The numerous variations on the ubiquitous requirement that an attorney main-
tain a client's confidence are explained in THOMAS D. MORGAN & RONALD D. Ro-
TUNDA, 1998 SELECTED STANDARDS OF PROFESSIONAL RESPONSIBILITY, app. A at
133-42 (1998).
93. See id., app. B at 143-50 (explaining variations on requirement screening of law-
yers within firm to avoid conflicts of interest).
94. Model Rule 5.3 and Model Code DR 4-101(D) make a lawyer responsible for the
actions of her nonlawyer employees and associates. Specifically, Model Rule
5.3(b) states that "a lawyer having direct supervisory authority over the nonlaw-
yer shall make reasonable efforts to ensure that the person's conduct is compati-
ble with the professional obligations of the lawyer." Model Rule 8.4(a) and Model
Code DR 1-102(A) state that it is professional misconduct for an attorney to cir-
cumvent an ethical rule through the actions of another. And, if those rules are
not clear enough, the comment to the rule on which debate usually focuses in
cases involving discovery and former employees adds this advice: "A lawyer may
not make a communication prohibited by this Rule through the acts of another."
MODEL RULES OF PROF'L CONDUCT Rule 4.2 cmt. 2 (2002); see also Holdren v. Gen.
Motors Corp., 13 F. Supp. 2d 1192, 1194 (D. Kan. 1998) (relying on Model Rule
8.4(a) to declare that an attorney may not direct an adversary's employee to ob-
tain affidavits from other employees whom that attorney is forbidden to contact
directly); Upjohn Co. v. Aetna Cas. & Sur. Co., 768 F. Supp. 1186, 1213 (W.D.
Mich. 1991) (relying on Model Rule 5.3 to sanction a lawyer whose investigators
conducted improper ex parte interviews of former employees of the attorney's
opponent).
95. Curley v. Cumberland Farms, Inc., 134 F.R.D. 77, 82 (D.N.J. 1991).
96. See, e.g., Olson v. Snap Prods., Inc., 183 F.R.D. 539, 544 (D. Minn. 1998) (holding
that the ABA opinion does not control Minnesota's interpretation of Model Rule
4.2, but "[nonetheless .... is of clear guidance); Aiken v. Bus. & Indus. Health
Group, Inc., 885 F. Supp. 1474, 1478 n.2 (D. Kan. 1995) (same).
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cies underlying the rule in question, the decisions of other state and
federal judges interpreting the rule, and similar interpretations of
analogous rules from other ethical codes. 98
A. Model Rule 4.2 and DR 7-104: Who is a "Person
Represented by Counsel"?
There is a split of decision across the nation on the propriety of ex parte
contact with former employees.9 9
The inescapable conclusion is that the rule is ambiguous.10 0
A breach of the ethical rules governing contact with a litigant's for-
mer employees can be avoided by making two threshold inquiries.
The first is whether ex parte contact with an adversary's former em-
ployees is proper. If not, the lawyer must avoid contact, or if prelimi-
nary contact has been made, immediately terminate contact with the
former employee. l0 1 If contact is appropriate initially, then a second
analysis is required to define the proper breadth of the ex parte com-
munications between the attorney and the former employees. As ex-
plained here and in Part V below, significant variations exist as to the
factors courts take into consideration in performing these two
analyses.
As early as 1836, attorneys recognized a potential ethical problem
in directly contacting a party already represented by counsel.l0 2 The
ABA's 1908 Canons of Professional Ethics also reflected this con-
97. See, e.g., Brown v. Or. Dept. of Corrections, 173 F.R.D. 265 (D. Or. 1997) (consult-
ing informal and formal opinions of the Legal Ethics Committee of the Oregon
State Bar to resolve discovery dispute over ex parte contact between plaintiffs
counsel and defendant's current and former employees); Zachair, Ltd. v. Driggs,
965 F. Supp. 741, 752 (D. Md. 1997) (observing that "lilt is settled ... that the
opinions issued by the Ethics Committee of the Maryland State Bar Association
are not binding" on the courts); see also Lawrence K. Hellman, A Better Way to
Make State Legal Ethics Opinions, 22 OKLA. CITY U. L. REV. 973 (1997).
98. United States v. Beiersdorf-Jobst, Inc., 980 F. Supp. 257, 259 (N.D. Ohio 1997)
(citing Polycast Tech. Corp. v. Uniroyal, Inc., 129 F.R.D. 621, 625 (S.D.N.Y.
1990)).
99. Barfuss v. Diversicare Corp. of Am., 656 So. 2d 486, 488 (Fla. Dist. Ct. App.
1995).
100. Weider Sports Equip. Co., v. Fitness First, Inc., 912 F. Supp. 502, 510 (D. Utah
1996).
101. MODEL RULES OF PROF'L CONDUCT R. 4.2 cmt. 3 (2002).
102. An early nineteenth century legal ethicist provided the following guidance on the
subject: "I will never enter into any conversation with my opponent's client, rela-
tive to his claim or defense, except with the consent, and in the presence of his
counsel." 2 DAVID HOFFMAN, A COURSE OF LEGAL STUDY ADDRESSED TO STUDENTS
AND THE PROFESSION GENERALLY 771 (Baltimore, 2d ed. 1836) (1817), quoted in
John Leubsdorf, Communicating with Another's Client: the Lawyer's Veto and the
Client's Interests, 127 U. Pa. L. Rev. 683, 684 n.6 (1979).
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cern.10 3 In more recent times, Model Rule 4.2 of the Model Rules of
Professional Conduct104 and its counterpart, Disciplinary Rule 7-
104(A) of the Model Code of Professional Responsibility,105 prohibit at-
torneys from contacting persons represented by counsel. These mod-
ern rules, often interpreted and applied interchangeably,106 lie at the
heart of most controversies involving an attorney whose discovery
plan includes ex parte contact with former employees of a party repre-
sented by counsel.107
The Model Rules attempt to accomplish the laudable goals of pro-
tecting uncounseled persons from the overzealous attorneys of their
adversarieslOS through seemingly straightforward language. Until
103. "A lawyer should not in any way communicate upon the subject of controversy
with a party represented by counsel ... but should deal only with his counsel."
CANONS OF PROF'L ETHICS, Canon 9 (1908).
104. From its inception until 1995, Model Rule 4.2 provided: "In representing a client,
a lawyer shall not communicate about the subject of the representation with a
party the lawyer knows to be represented by another lawyer in the matter, unless
the lawyer has the consent of the other lawyer or is authorized by law to do so."
AMERICAN BAR ASSOCIATION CENTER FOR PROFESSIONAL RESPONSIBILITY, A LEGIS-
LATIVE HISTORY: THE DEVELOPMENT OF THE ABA MODEL RULES OF PROFESSIONAL
CONDUCT, 1982-98, 219 (1999). The ABA changed the word "party" to "person" in
1995. Id.
105. The text of DR 7-104(a) states: "During the course of his representation of a client
a lawyer shall not ... [c]ommunicate or cause another to communicate on the
subject of the representation with a party he knows to be represented by a lawyer
in that matter unless he has the prior consent of the lawyer representing such
other party or is authorized by law to do so." (emphasis added).
106. See, e.g., United States v. Beiersdorf-Jobst, Inc., 980 F. Supp. 257, 259 n.2, 261
n.3 (N.D. Ohio 1997) (applying ABA formal opinion interpreting Model Rule 4.2
to DR 7-104(A)(1)); Cram v. Lamson & Sessions Co., 148 F.R.D. 259, 261 (S.D.
Iowa 1993) (determining that "appropriate resolution" of a dispute regarding ex
parte contact with former employees "is guided by substantial case law on this
issue interpreting both DR 7-104(A)(1) and Model Rule 4.2").
107. For an excellent historical account of one state's struggle with the interpretation
of Model Rule 4.2 and DR 7-104(a), see Andrews v. Goodyear Tire & Rubber Co.,
191 F.R.D. 59, 69-76 (D.N.J. 2000) (recounting efforts by state and federal courts
in New Jersey to apply Model Rule 4.2 in the corporate context).
108. The critical role played by Model Rule 4.2 and its predecessor DR 7-104(A)(1) in
an adversarial system of justice was explained by a federal district court judge at
follows:
It preserves the integrity of the lawyer-client relationship by prohibiting
contact, absent consent or legal authorization, with the represented
party. It also recognizes that without such a Rule "the professionally
trained lawyer may, in many cases, be able to win, or in the extreme case
coerce, damaging concessions from the unshielded layman." The Rule is
designed to prevent counsel from overreaching and exploiting uncoun-
seled employees into making ill-considered statements or admissions.
While the Rule is not intended to prevent a party from discovering po-
tentially prejudicial facts, it is intended to protect the attorney-client re-
lationship of counsel with a corporate client.
In re Air Crash Disaster, 909 F. Supp. 1116, 1121 (N.D. Ill. 1995) (Roselawn II,
J.) (citations omitted); see also Brown v. St. Joseph's County, 148 F.R.D. 246, 249
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1995, Model Rule 4.2, titled Communication with a Party Represented
by Counsel, provided:
In representing a client, a lawyer shall not communicate about the subject of
the representation with a party the lawyer knows to be represented by an-
other lawyer in the matter, unless the lawyer has the consent of the other
lawyer or is authorized by law to do so. 1 0 9
The parallel language of DR 7-104(A)(1) provides in pertinent part:
During the course of his representation of a client a lawyer shall not . . .
[c]ommunicate or cause another to communicate on the subject of the repre-
sentation with a party he knows to be represented by a lawyer in that matter
unless he has the prior consent of the lawyer representing such other party or
is authorized by law to do so. 1 1 0
It is fairly obvious that "[flormer employees who are in fact repre-
sented by the former employer's counsel, or any counsel, are plainly off
limits under the language of the rules." 1 ' But the voluminous case
law, ethics committee opinions, and legal literature spawned by Model
Rule 4.2 and DR 7-104(A)(1) attest to the significant difficulty in fully
discerning the outside boundaries of these seemingly simple rules
when former employees whose status of being "represented by coun-
sel" is unclear. Accordingly, "[t]he Courts have never set forth a
bright line rule as to the applicability of 4.2 to former employees."112
This has caused judges even within the same jurisdictions to issue
conflicting opinions. 1 13
The lack of clear standards is largely due to the ambiguity inherent
in the use of the word "party" in both Model Rule 4.2 and DR 7-
104(A)(1).114 Several courts have observed that "[wihether an em-
ployee, past or present, is considered within the perimeters of the
(N.D. Ind. 1993) (citing numerous cases). The rule has also been criticized as
being counterproductive to efficient resolutions of disputes. See Marguerite
Zoghby, Note, The Prohibition of Communcation with Adverse Parties in Civil
Negotiations: Protecting Clients or Preventing Solutions?, 14 GEO. J. LEGAL ETH-
iCs 1165 (2001).
109. MODEL RULES OF PROF'L CONDUCT R. 4.2 (1983) (emphasis added).
110. MODEL CODE OF PROF'L RESPONSIBILITY DR 7-104(A) (1969).
111. Terra Int'l, Inc. v. Miss. Chem. Corp., 913 F. Supp. 1306, 1315 (N.D. Iowa 1996).
However, the corporate party's mere offer to provide legal representation to em-
ployees does not automatically establish representation by counsel. Michaels v.
Woodland, 988 F. Supp. 468, 472-74 (D.N.J. 1997); Brown, 148 F.R.D. at 250-51.
112. Patriarca v. Ctr. for Living and Working, Inc., No. CV99-0689, 2000 Mass. Super.
LEXIS 241, at *5 (Mass. Super. Ct. May 24, 2000).
113. Compare Zachair, Ltd. v. Driggs, 965 F. Supp. 741 (D. Md. 1997) (finding that ex
parte contacts with an adversary's former employees violates Model Rule 4.2),
with Davidson Supply Co., v. P.P.E., Inc., 986 F. Supp. 956 (D. Md.1997) (finding
no violation). See also NAACP v. Fla. Dept. of Corrections, 122 F. Supp. 2d 1335,
1339 (M.D. Fla. 2000) (recognizing conflicting opinions within that district).
114. The determination of whether a former employee is a "party" is also critical in
determining whether ex parte contact might impermissibly invade the attorney-
client privilege owned by the former employer/litigant. See infra section VI.A (At-
torney-Client Privilege).
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term 'party' . . . has been the source of confusion and considerable liti-
gation.""l 5 One of the most contentious issues is whether legal repre-
sentation of a collective entity, such as a corporation, means that
former employees of that entity are automatically represented by the
former employer's counsel, thus barring ex parte contact between op-
posing counsel and those former employees.116 One court explained:
Basically, there are five positions [adopted by courts and ethics committees]
on the acceptability of such contact: (1) the ex parte communication with any
former employee is not permitted; (2) ex parte communication with all former
employees is permitted, so long as no other privilege or rule is violated; (3) ex
parte communication with former managerial employees is permitted so long
as specified guidelines are followed and the former employee cannot impute
liability to the former employer; (4) ex parte communication with former em-
ployees is permitted unless the employees' acts or omissions in the matter
under inquiry are binding on the corporation or imputed to the corporation for
the purposes of liability; (5) ex parte communication with former employees is
permitted, but where former employees' acts or omissions could be imputed to
the former employer, the former employer should be given the opportunity to
consent to the contact. 1 1 7
Indeed, the issue of appropriate contact with former employees
even divided the ABA committee charged with interpreting the ABA
Model Rules,"18 and caused the Supreme Court of New Jersey to ap-
point a special committee to study the issue.119
115. Calloway v. DST Sys., Inc., No. 98-1303-CV-W-6, 2000 U.S. Dist. LEXIS 2635, at
*5 n.3, 83 Fair Empl. Prac. Cas. (BNA) 1608 (W.D. Mo. Feb. 28, 2000) (quoting
State ex rel Pitts v. Roberts, 857 S.W.2d 200, 201 (Mo. 1993) (en banc)).
116. [Any analysis of Rule 4.2 must begin with a determination that the per-
son to be approached by the attorney is indeed a party. If the litigants
are individuals, it is relatively simple to determine the identity of the
parties. In the case of an organization, however, the determination of a
'party' is less obvious. As a corporation is simply a group of persons,
each member of a corporation is a potential party.
Valassis v. Samelson, 143 F.R.D. 118, 122-23 (E.D. Mich. 1992).
117. Barfuss v. Diversicare Corp. of Am., 656 So. 2d 486, n.3, 488 (Fla. Dist. Ct. App.
1995) (citing, inter alia, Vicki Jan Isler, Ex Parte Interviews of Former Employees:
An Attorney's Ethical Obligation, 457 P.L.I./LITIG. 55 (1993)); see also Ernest F.
Lidge III, The Ethics of Communicating with an Organization's Employees: An
Analysis of the Unworkable "Hybrid" or "Multifactor" Managing Speaking-Agent,
ABA, and Niesig Tests and a Proposal for a "Supervisor" Standard, 45 ARK. L.
REV. 801 (1993) (critiquing the conflicting standards for judging the propriety of
contact with current employees of a corporation and proposing a solution applica-
ble to both current and former employees).
118. See, e.g., ABA Comm. on Ethics and Profl Responsibility, Formal Op. 95-396
(1995) (featuring a vigorous dissent by Committee Member Ralph G. Elliot that
the majority had misconstrued too broadly the term "party" as used in Model
Rule 4.2 and DR 7-104(A)(1)).
119. See In re Opinion 668 of the Advisory Comm. on Profl Ethics, 633 A.2d 959 (N.J.
1993). The report was published in 1995. See Report of the Special Committee on
RPC 4.2, 139 N.J. L.J. 1161 (1995). For a discussion of the Committee's findings,
see Michaels v. Woodland, 988 F. Supp. 468, 470-72 (D.N.J. 1997). For a more
detailed account of New Jersey's struggles with Model Rule 4.2, see Andrews v.
Goodyear Tire & Rubber Co., 191 F.R.D. 59, 68-72 (D.N.J. 2000).
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Underlying the linguistic battles over the appropriate reach of the
word "party" are philosophical differences regarding the proper cate-
gorization of former employees in the context of litigation involving
the former employer. Are former employees sufficiently detached
from the former employer to constitute non-party witnesses? If so,
counsel for both sides may freely engage in ex parte contact with
them. Are former employees non-parties, but non-parties tinged with
potential agency or fiduciary relationships with the former employer?
If so, then ex parte contact may be appropriate in some cases and not
in others. Or, are former employees sufficiently aligned with the for-
mer employer so that they remain a single entity in the eyes of the
law? If so, contact of former employees is prohibited once the former
employer retains counsel.
The rules' originator, the ABA, historically advocated the first phi-
losophy by interpreting the word "party" as generally excluding for-
mer employees. 120 In a Formal Opinion issued in 1991, the ABA
Committee on Ethics and Professional Responsibility observed that
"[ni either the Rule nor its comment purports to deal with former em-
ployees of a corporate party. Because an organizational party (as con-
trasted with an individual party) necessarily acts through others,
however, the concerns reflected in the Comment to Rule 4.2 may sur-
vive the termination of the employment relationship."12 1
In a Formal Opinion issued four years later, the ABA affirmed its
position that contact with former employees was not automatically
prohibited under Model Rule 4.2.122 After reviewing the conflicting
case law and opinions of commentators on the applicability of Rule 4.2
to former employees, the ABA Committee acknowledged persuasive
arguments for extending Rule 4.2's prohibition of contact to former
employees; however, the Committee was "loathe" to extend the Rule to
former employees where, as in the case before it, application of the
rule would "inhibit the acquisition of information about one's case."12 3
Accordingly, the ABA Committee concluded that a lawyer may "com-
municate about the subject of the representation with an unrepre-
sented former employee of the corporate party without the consent of
the corporation's lawyer."124
Also in 1995, the ABA sought to clarify Model Rule 4.2 by replacing
the term "party" with "person" and amending the comment to reflect
this textual change. The rationale for the change was that "person" is
120. ABA Comm. on Ethics and Profl Responsibility, Formal Op. 91-359 (1991); see
also ABA Comm. on Ethics and Profl Responsibility, Formal Op. 95-396 n.47
(1995).
121. ABA Comm. on Ethics and Profl Responsibility, Formal Op. 91-359 (1991) (em-
phasis added).
122. ABA Comm. on Ethics and Profl Responsibility, Formal Op. 95-396 n.47 (1995).
123. ABA Comm. On Ethics and Profl Responsibility, Formal Op. 91-359 (1991).
124. Id.
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a much broader term than "party," and would appropriately shift focus
to whether the individual being contacted was currently represented
by counsel, rather than focusing on the individual's current relation-
ship with, or former status within, a corporate or other organizational
party.125 But as the many citations to post-1995 cases in this Article
demonstrate, the textual modification has not resolved the prob-
lem.12 6 Rather, the recurring issue is whether a particular former
employee is sufficiently aligned with the former employer/litigant to
automatically become "represented by counsel" when the former em-
ployer retains counsel.127
The ABA declined the opportunity to clarify the text of Rule 4.2
during the Ethics 2000 revision process that resulted in the approval
of a significant number of amendments to the Model Rules by that
organization in February 2002.128 The ABA did, however, change the
official comment to Model Rule 4.2, discussed immediately below, in
an effort to clarify the application of the text.
B. Comment to Model Rule 4.2
"The Comments are intended as guides to interpretation, but the
text of each rule is authoritative."129 Nonetheless, arguments based
on the text of Model Rule 4.2-both before and after the "party" to
"person" amendment in 1995-are often accompanied by citation to
the ABA's official comment accompanying Rule 4.2.
In its original form and as modified by the 1995 amendments, the
comment suggests that a former employee could, under certain cir-
cumstances, fall within the rule's purview, but would not be automati-
cally included or excluded.130  (The Ethical Considerations
125. To the extent ambiguity existed on the applicability of Model Rule 4.2 to pre-
litigation contact with former employees, the use of the word "person" rather
than "party" seems to have resolved that issue as well.
126. See, e.g., Centennial Mgt. Serv. Inc. v. Axa Re Vie, 193 F.R.D. 671, 684 (D. Kan.
2000) (declining to apply ABA's amendment to Model Rule 4.2 changing "party"
to "person" because the Kansas Supreme Court had not yet adopted the
amendment).
127. Numerous amendments to Model Rule 4.2 were proposed and extensively de-
bated as part of the ABA Ethics 2000 project, but in the end, the only change to
the rule was the addition of language allowing an attorney to contact a repre-
sented person if authorized by a court order to do so. MODEL RULES OF PROF'L
CONDUCT R. 4.2 (2002); Raack, supra note 49, at 256. Most of the controversy
focused on the application of the rule to prosecutors attempting to investigate
crimes. See, e.g., Ethics 2000 Commission Releases Drafts for Amendments to
Some ABA Model Rules, 67 U.S.L.W. 2486 (Feb. 23, 1999).
128. See discussion of ABA Ethics 2000 Commission supra note 49.
129. MODEL RULES OF PROF'L CONDUCT, Scope 21 (1983).
130. In relevant part, the 1983 version of the comment states that Model Rule 4.2
"prohibits communications by a lawyer for another person or entity concerning
the matter in representation with persons having a managerial responsibility on
behalf of the organization, and with any other person whose act or omission in
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accompanying Disciplinary Rule 7-104(A)(1) similarly provide no clear
guidance for interpreting and applying the rule.131) The ABA Com-
mittee on Ethics and Professional Responsibility relied on Model Rule
4.2's comment in its 1991 Formal Opinion allowing contact with for-
mer employees of a corporate party.132 Courts have similarly sought
guidance from the comments when interpreting and applying Model
Rule 4.2, but have not always agreed with the ABA's conclusion that
ex parte contact with a party's former employees is proper.13 3
The comment to Model Rule 4.2 was significantly changed in Feb-
ruary 2002 to further define the rule's applicability to current and for-
mer employees of a corporation or other entity represented by counsel.
The new language provides:
In the case of a represented organization, this Rule prohibits communications
with a constituent of the organization who supervises, directs or regularly
consults with the organization's lawyer concerning the matter or has author-
ity to obligate the organization with respect to the matter or whose act or
omission in connection with that matter may be imputed to the organization
for purposes of civil or criminal liability. Consent of the organization's lawyer
is not required for communication with a former constituent. 1 3 4
The ABA's crystallization of the comment to Model Rule 4.2 to ex-
clude former employees of a party will not immediately end the contro-
versy. The ABA's amendments to its Model Rules and accompanying
comments are not effective until adopted by the states and federal
courts that follow the Model Rules.' 3 5 Even after being adopted,
courts may continue to struggle with how much weight to afford the
comments to the rules,13 6 as the rules themselves classify the com-
connection with that matter may be imputed to the organization for purposes of
civil or criminal liability or whose statement may constitute an admission on the
part of the organization." MODEL RULES OF PROF'L CONDUCT R. 4.2 cmt. 4 (1983).
131. MODEL CODE OF PROF'L RESPONSIBILITY EC 7-18 (1980), offers a rationale for DR
7-104(A)(1), but gives no guidance as to the rule's application.
132. ABA Comm. on Ethics and Profl Responsibility, Formal Op. 91-359 (1991).
133. See, e.g., Clark v. Beverly Health & Rehab. Servs., Inc., No. 99-0163B, 2001 Mass.
Super. LEXIS 289 (Mass. Super. Ct. July 5, 2001) (relying on the comment to
Rule 4.2 to hold ex parte contact with former employee inappropriate).
134. MODEL RULES OF PROF'L CONDUCT R. 4.2 cmt. 7 (2002) (emphasis added).
135. See, e.g., Weider Sports Equip. Co. v. Fitness First, Inc., 912 F. Supp. 502, 506 (D.
Utah 1996) (recognizing that the ABA had changed the language of Model Rule
4.2 but noting that "the changes are not now a part of the ethical rules of this
district"). In addition, the ABA no longer suggests amendments to the Discipli-
nary Rules; the language of DR 7-104 remains unchanged absent independent
action by the handful of states which still follow that rule.
136. In Valassis v. Samelson, 143 F.R.D. 118, 122 (E.D. Mich. 1992), for example, the
judge found fault with other courts that placed too much stock in the comment to
Rule 4.2: "The Court initially observes that the purpose of a comment is to ex-
plain a rule; a comment to a rule does not add to or any way expand upon the
rule; it is explicative of the rule. Therefore, although the Comment in this case
explains the application of Rule 4.2 to a corporate party, it does not expand the
scope of that rule" to persons not a party to the lawsuit.
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ments as guidelines rather than mandates.137 Because of the long-
standing confusion regarding application of Model Rule 4.2 to former
employees, even courts that purport to adopt the 2002 version of the
rule and its comment may choose to retain the standards for contact-
ing a party's former employees that they have developed over many
years and after much debate and weighing of the competition policies
supporting protection and disclosure.' 38 Finally, while allowing con-
tact with former employees as a general rule, the newly revised com-
ment to Model Rule 4.2 adds this caveat: "In communicating with a
current or former constituent of an organization, a lawyer must not
use methods of obtaining evidence that violate the legal rights of the
organization."139 This observation reiterates the possibility of other
limitations on ex parte contact with a party's former employee based
on attorney-client privilege, work product doctrine, trade secrets, and
other legal doctrines discussed in Part VI of this Article.
C. Additional Ambiguities in Model Rule 4.2 and DR 7-104
Three other provisions of Model Rule 4.2 and DR 7-104 serve to
simultaneously clarify and cloud the lines between permissible and
impermissible contact with an adversary's former employees.
First, the rule does not prohibit all communication, but only bars
communication between the attorney and the represented person on
the "subject of the representation." An attorney is allowed to contact a
former employee who has counsel, as long as the communication is
limited to topics outside the dispute or controversy. 140 At a minimum,
this clarifies that an attorney may contact, with impunity, a former
employee solely for the purpose of determining whether counsel repre-
sents her. Further, it empowers the attorney to discuss some matters
with the former employee. But the extent of those further discussions
is governed by the vague contours of the "subject of the
representation."
Second, Model Rule 4.2's prohibition applies when the attorney
knows that the person being contacted is represented by counsel. The
comment states "[t]his means that the lawyer has actual knowledge of
the fact of the representation."141 However, "such actual knowledge
137. MODEL RULES OF PROF'L CONDUCT, Scope 21 (1983).
138. According to the ABA, the District of Columbia and at least 16 states are review-
ing the 2002 amendments to the Model Rules for possible adoption in those juris-
dictions. Mark Hansen, Hot off the Press: Revised Model Ethics Rules are Nearly
Ready for State Scrunity, A.B.A. J., June 2002, at 38.
139. MODEL RULES OF PROF'L CONDUCT R. 4.2 cmt. 6 (2002).
140. "If a person is represented by counsel on a particular matter, that representation
does not bar communications on other, unrelated matters." ABA Comm. on Eth-
ics and Profl Responsibility, Formal Op. 95-396 (1995).
141. MODEL RULES OF PROF'L CONDUCT R. 4.2 cmt. 8 (2002). The same standard ap-
plied prior to the 2002 amendments to the rule and comment.
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may be inferred from the circumstances." 142 The concept of "actual
inferred" knowledge is a legal oxymoron as it attempts to eliminate
the use of constructive knowledge while defining "actual" in a way
that allows imputation of knowledge, commonly known as construc-
tive knowledge. At a minimum, "a lawyer may not avoid Rule 4.2's
bar against communication with a represented person simply by clos-
ing her eyes to the obvious."' 43 But just how "obvious" does the repre-
sentation have to be before knowledge will be imputed to the attorney?
The use of the oxymoronic standard adds more ambiguity to the deter-
mination of when sanctions are appropriate for violation of the rule.
Third and finally, there is no prohibition on contact when the law-
yer has the consent of opposing counsel' 4M or is authorized by law to
initiate communication with a person represented by counsel.145
These additional requirements give rise to an unlimited combina-
tion of issues in any case where the ethical ramifications of an attor-
ney contacting a former employee are debated. For example, is it
appropriate for an attorney to contact a former employee who has
counsel and inquire only as to the person's attitude toward his former
employer, or ask if the person has plans to relocate beyond the court's
subpoena power in the near future? Stated differently, are such in-
quiries "about the subject of the representation"? Similarly, since the
prohibition only limits contacts to persons the attorney knows to be
represented by counsel, is actual knowledge, as the comment to the
rule suggests, truly required of the representation, or is the construc-
tive "should have known" standard applicable? And when is an attor-
ney "authorized by law" to contact a former employee or other person
represented by counsel?146
142. Id.
143. ABA Comm. on Ethics and Profl Responsibility, Formal Op. 95-396 (1995), re-
printed in ABA/BNA LAwYERs' MAN. ON PROF'L CONDUCT 1001:299 (1995); see
also Metrahealth Ins. Co. v. Anclote Psychiatric Hosp., Ltd., 961 F. Supp. 1580,
1583-84 (M.D. Fla. 1997) (requiring actual knowledge that person is represented
by counsel prior to imposing sanctions for violation of Model Rule 4.2).
144. Consent to contact can be explicit or implied. See, e.g., Dillion Co. v. Sico Co., No.
CIV.A.92-1512, 1993 U.S. Dist. LEXIS 17450, at *6-9 (E.D. Pa. Nov. 24, 1993)
(holding that where defense attorneys consented to review of documents by plain-
tiffs counsel with defendant's employee, but with no defense counsel present, it
was not unreasonable for plaintiffs counsel to conclude that implied consent had
been given to question the employee about the documents).
145. "Communications authorized by law include.., the right of a party to a contro-
versy with a government agency to speak with government officials about the
matter." MODEL RULES OF PROF'L CONDUCT R. 4.2 cmt. 2 (1999). In a situation
involving a former employee, a court order allowing ex parte contact could consti-
tute contact "authorized by law." See generally ABA Comm. on Ethics and Profl
Responsibility, Formal Op. 95-396 (1995).
146. The "authorized by law" exception generally involves situations with government
personnel. For example, a person litigating a case against the government may
seek ex parte contact with government officials. Such contact is normally viewed
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Like the definition of the word "party" or "person," there are no
universal answers to any of these questions; rather, the three addi-
tional qualifications of Model Rule 4.2 and DR 7-104 mandate exact-
ing examination of the facts of each situation to determine whether
the disputed contact was within the prohibitions established by the
rules.
D. Current Interpretations of Model Rule 4.2 and DR 7-104
Many courts and disciplinary boards allow ex parte contact with
former employees of a party,14 7 while others reject such contact. 148 A
few jurisdictions have standing prohibitions against ex parte contact
with former employees,14 9 while some utilize the "control group
test"15 0 to limit but not prohibit such contact. The control group stan-
as part of the constitutional right to "petition for redress of grievances" provided
by the First Amendment. See, e.g., Assoc. of the Bar of the City of New York, Op.
1988-8, 4 LAW. MAN. ON PROF'L CONDUCT (ABA/BNA) 300-01 (Aug. 24, 1988).
147. Courts allowing contact between former employees and opposing counsel include
FleetBoston Robertson Stephens, Inc. v. Innovex, Inc., 172 F. Supp. 2d 1190, 1193
(D. Minn. 2001); Houck v. Hardee's Food System, Inc., No. 5:98-CV-373-BR(2),
1999 U.S. Dist. LEXIS 6856, at *3-5 (E.D.N.C. Mar. 23, 1999); Turnbull v. To-
peka State Hospital, 185 F.R.D. 645, 652 (D. Kan. 1999); E.E.O.C. v. General Mo-
tors Corp., 1998 WL 469890, at *2, 77 Far Empl. Prac. Cas. (BNA) 267 (E.D. Mo.
June 4, 1998); United States v. Beiersdorf-Jobst, Inc., 980 F. Supp. 257, 261 (N.D.
Ohio 1997); Goff v. Wheaton Industries, 145 F.R.D. 351, 354-55 (D.N.J. 1992);
Humco, Inc. v. Noble, 21 S.W.3d 916, 920 (Ky. 2000); P.T. Barnum's Nightclub v.
Duhamell, 766 N.E.2d 729, 737 (Ind. App. 2002); H.B.A. Management, Inc. v. Es-
tate of Schwartz, 693 So. 2d 541, 546 (Fla. 1997); Continental Insurance Co. v.
Superior Court, 37 Cal. Rptr. 2d 853, 858-859 (Ct. App. 1995). See also cases
cited in Olson v. Snap Products, Inc., 183 F.R.D. 539, 544 (D. Minn. 1998), and
Aiken v. Business & Industrial Health Group, Inc., 885 F. Supp. 1474, 1477-78
(D. Kan. 1995). Comparable decisions from state bar committees include: Ark.
Bar Ass'n Ethics Comm., Ethics Op. 91-1 (1991); Conn. Bar Ass'n, Informal Op.
No. 99-43 (1999); Fla. State Bar Ass'n, Comm. on Profi Ethics, Op. No. 88-14; Ill.
State Bar Ass'n, Op. No. 85-12 (1985); The Supreme Court of Ohio, Bd. of
Comm'rs. on Grievance and Discipline, Op. 96-1 (1996); Or. State Bar Ass'n Bd. of
Governors, Formal Op. 1991-80 (1991); SC Bar Ethics Advisory Comm., Ethics
Advisory Op. 01-01 (2001).
148. The Kansas Bar Association diverged from the ABA's liberal approach by holding
that Rule 4.2 and its comment prohibit contact with a former employee if the
former employee's act or omission might impute liability to the corporation or the
attorney is seeking information protected from discovery by the attorney-client
privilege. Kan. Bar Assoc., Formal Advisory Op. 92-07 (1991).
149. See Camden v. Maryland, 910 F. Supp. 1115, 1121 (D. Md. 1996).
150. See, e.g., Jones v. Daily News Publ'g Co., Civ. No. 1999/138, 2001 U.S. Dist.
LEXIS 5349, at *13 (V.I. Mar. 16, 2001) (finding violation of Model Rule 4.2 due
to former employee's managerial responsibilities in the decisionmaking process
that led to the employment termination at the heart of the litigation); United
States v. Hous. Auth., 179 F.R.D. 69, 72 (D. Conn. 1997); In re Prudential Ins.
Co., 911 F. Supp. 148 (D.N.J. 1995) (applying "control group test" to determine
which current and former employees could be contacted ex parte by opposing
counsel).
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dard prohibits contact only with employees who manage and speak for
the corporation,151 and is sometimes even more narrowly limited to
those who make decisions directly related to the management of the
litigation or controversy for which the entity retained legal counsel.15 2
Still other courts endorse a "management-speaking agent" test prohib-
iting contact with current or former employees who have the authority
to bind the former employer "in a legal evidentiary sense."15 3 Other
jurisdictions allow contact as long as the contacting attorney observes
certain limitations,'54 such as taking precautions against the former
employee divulging privileged information.15 5 A few courts embrace a
multi-factor weighing test.156 Whether these jurisdictions will each
abandon or alter their current standards and adopt a uniform rule
allowing at least a presumption in favor of contact with former em-
151. See, e.g., NAACP v. Fla. Bd. of Regents, 122 F. Supp. 1335, 1340 n.6 (M.D. Fla.
2000) (barring contact with former high level management employees); Smith v.
Kansas City S. Ry., No. WD.59676, 2002 Mo. App. LEXIS 1437, at *23-25 (Mo.
Ct. App. June 28, 2002) (recognizing that some of defendant's former managerial
employees might be off limits to plaintiffs counsel, but holding that former em-
ployee at issue did not fit within that classification); Wright v. Group Health
Hosp., 691 P.2d 564 (Wash. 1984) (interpreting DR 7-104(A)(1) in concluding that
former employees could not bind corporation, therefore attorney for corporation's
opponent could contact them).
152. See, e.g., Essex County Jail Annex Inmates v. Treffinger, 18 F. Supp. 2d 418
(D.N.J. 1998) (using "litigation control group" standard); In re Prudential Ins. Co.
of Am., 911 F. Supp. 148, 153-54 (D.N.J. 1995) (applying New Jersey law, court
defines control group as persons "making final decisions regarding the company's
conduct of the instant litigation" and persons who established firm-wide policies
and procedures on which plaintiffs based their claim of fraud).
153. Palmer v. Pioneer Hotel & Casino, 19 F. Supp. 2d 1157, 1161 (D. Nev. 1998);
Chancellor v. Boeing Co., 678 F. Supp. 250, 252 (D. Kan. 1988); see also Branham
v. Norfolk & W. Ry. Co., 151 F.R.D. 67 (S.D.W. Va. 1993) (discussing variations of
the managing-speaking-agent test); Strawser v. Exxon Co., 843 P.2d 613, 620-23
(Wyo. 1992) (discussing various tests used to interpret application of Model Rule
4.2 to current and former employer).
154. See, e.g., Lang v. Reedy Creek Imp. Dist., 888 F. Supp. 1143 (D .Fla. 1995) (ruling
contact permissible if counsel identifies self, explains purpose of interview, in-
forms person of their right to decline to participate, avoids disclosure of privileged
information, and keeps detailed records of contact with all former employees
which opponent is allowed to review).
155. Palmer, 19 F. Supp. 2d at 1161; Olson v. Snap Prods., Inc., 183 F.R.D. 539, 545
(D. Minn. 1998); In re Bank of La./Kenwin Shops, Inc., No. CIV.A.97MDL No.
1193, 1998 WL 788776, at *2-3 (E.D. La. Nov. 10, 1998).
156. See Spencer v. Steinman, 179 F.R.D. 484, 491 (E.D. Pa. 1998) (holding that deter-
mination of whether contact with former employee was appropriate depended
"upon weighing such factors as the positions of the former employees in relation
to the issues in the suit; whether they were privy to communications between the
former employer and its counsel concerning the subject matter of the litigation, or
otherwise; the nature of the inquiry by opposing counsel; and how much time had
elapsed between the end of the employment relationship and the questioning by
opposing counsel"). The Spencer approach was previously utilized in Dillon Cos.
v. Sico Co., No. CIV.A.92-1512, 1993 WL 492746, at *5 (E.D. Pa. Nov. 24, 1993).
20031
NEBRASKA LAW REVIEW [Vol. 81:868
ployees as advocated in the ABA's 2002 amendments to Model Rule
4.2 and its comments is a page of legal history yet to be written.157
Counsel considering initiating informal discovery of an opponent's
former employee must also keep these caveats in mind. Since "[tihe
rule against communicating with represented parties is fundamen-
tally concerned with the duties of attorneys, not the rights of parties,"
the represented party cannot waive it.158 Thus, an attorney may be
subject to disciplinary action even if the represented former employee
initiated the contact. Moreover, even when a represented former em-
ployee informs the contacting attorney that he has or is going to termi-
nate the existing representation, the contacting (or contacted)
attorney must obtain reasonable assurances that representation has
in fact been terminated before communicating with that person. 159
In addition, an attorney cannot use an investigator or other agent
to circumvent the rules prohibiting contact with a former employee
represented by counsel.160 Thus, while the ethical rules do not pro-
157. A more detailed jurisdiction-specific explanation of the status of Model Rule 4.2
and D.R. 7-104 is provided in Benjamin J. Vernia, Right of Attorney to Conduct
Ex Parte Interviews with Former Corporate Employees, 57 A.L.R.5th 633 (1998);
see also A.B.A. COMM. ON ENVTL. LITIG., Ex PARTE CONTACTS WITH FORMER EM-
PLOYERS (2002) (providing defendants state by state analysis). A number of state-
specific articles provide additional insights and guidance, but a researcher con-
sulting these articles must be aware that the status of the law in each jurisdiction
is constantly changing. See, e.g., Rockland Trust Co. v. Computer Assocs. Int'l,
Inc., No. CIV.A.95-11683-DPW, 1999 WL 95722 (D. Mass. Feb. 19, 1999) (stating
that jurisdiction's previous interpretation of DR 7-104(A)(1) allowing contact with
former employees was not automatically binding when jurisdiction adopted
Model Rule 4.2 in its stead); Sharyn M. Epley, Note, Confusing Communications
- Analyzing South Carolina's Stance on Ex Parte Communication with Former
Employees, 52 S.C. L. REV. 775 (2001); Ashlie L. Ringel, Note, Communication
with Represented Persons: An Analysis of the Scope of Rule 4.2 of the Massachu-
setts Rules of Professional Conduct as it Applies to Corporations and Federal
Prosecutors, 5 SUFFOLK J. TRIAL & APP. ADvoc. 181 (2000); Ann Kaminski, Com-
ment, A Call for Clarity: Pennsylvannia Should Uniformly Allow Ex Parte Con-
tact with Former Employees of a Represented Party Under PRPC 4.2, 73 TEMPLE
L. REV. 1095 (2000); N. Gregory Smith, Missed Opportunities: Louisiana's Ver-
sion of the Rules of Professional Conduct, 61 LA. L .Rev. 1 (2000); Michael Foster,
Rule 4-4.2: Continuing Confusion About the Limits of Ex Parte Communications
with Former Employees of a Corporate Defendant, 70 FLA. B.J. 14 (1996) (discuss-
ing Florida law); Charles B. Lewis & Michael L. Morkin, Restrictions on Attorney
Contacts with Adversaries' Former Employees, 83 ILL. B.J. 242 (1995) (addressing
Illinois law); Marshall Lasser, An Attorney's Right to Interview Ex Parte Employ-
ees of a Corporate Adversary, 74 MICH. B.J. 166 (1995) (analyzing Michigan
standards).
158. United States v. Lopez, 4 F.3d 1455, 1462 (9th Cir. 1993); see also ABA Comm. on
Ethics and Profl Responsibility, Formal Op. 95-396 (1995).
159. ABA Comm. on Ethics and Profl Responsibility, Formal Op. 95-396 (1995).
160. Holdren v. Gen. Motors Corp., 13 F. Supp. 2d 1192, 1195-96 (D. Kan. 1998) (pro-
viding thoughtful discussion of when an attorney violates an ethical rule
"through the acts of another"); McCallum v. CSX Transp., Inc., 149 F.R.D. 104,
106 (M.D.N.C. 1993); Upjohn Co. v. Aetna Cas. & Sur. Co., 768 F. Supp. 1186,
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hibit a party from independently contacting potential witnesses' 6 ' in-
cluding former employees, the attorney cannot facilitate or encourage
contacts that would be inappropriate if made by the attorney. 62 An
attorney can also be sanctioned for the unintentional violation of ethi-
cal rules by a paralegal or other subordinate working under the attor-
ney's supervision.163 And, a former employee's placing of information
about his employer into the public domain does not prevent the court
from barring ex parte interviews with the counsel of an adversary.164
In sum, interpretation of the ethical rules prohibiting ex parte con-
tact with represented persons, as well as the more subtle nuances of
the principles underlying the rules, varies greatly among jurisdic-
tions. An attorney must carefully research local ethical rules and
common practices before initiating contact with a party's former
employees.
E. Dealing with Unrepresented Persons
An attorney who initiates ex parte contact with a former employee
may also find herself defending against a claim that she violated
Model Rule 4.3.165 (There is no direct analogy in the Model Code to
Model Rule 4.3.) Model Rule 4.3 does not prohibit such contacts, but
unequivocally requires that the contacting attorney make clear her
role in the pending litigation or other matter that inspired the contact.
The pre-2002 comment to Model Rule 4.3166 and the text of DR 7-
1213-15 (W.D. Mich. 1991); ABA Comm. on Ethics and Profl Responsibility, For-
mal Op. 95-396 (1995) (interpreting and applying Model Rules 5.3 and 8.4(a)).
161. Holdren, 13 F. Supp. 2d at 1195.
162. Id. at 1195-96.
163. See, e.g., Spencer v. Steinman, 179 F.R.D. 484, 488-89 (E.D. Pa. 1998) (affirming
that an attorney "cannot escape liability for ... abuse of process by pointing to
the inexperience of a subordinate").
164. See, e.g., Castona v. Am. Tobacco Co., 908 F. Supp. 378 (E.D. La. 1995) (conclud-
ing that interviews given by former employee of defendant to Department of Jus-
tice officials, a member of Congress, and a television network did not exempt
former employee from the courts' order forbidding contact by plaintiffs counsel
with certain former employees of defendant).
165. Prior to February 2002, Rule 4.3 stated: "In dealing on behalf of a client with a
person who is not represented by counsel, a lawyer shall not state or imply that
the lawyer is disinterested. When the lawyer knows or reasonably should know
that the unrepresented person misunderstands the lawyer's role in the matter,
the lawyer shall make reasonable efforts to correct the misunderstanding."
MODEL RULES OF PROF'L CONDUCT R. 4.3 (1983). The 2002 revisions added this
sentence: "The lawyer shall not give legal advice to an unrepresented person,
other than advice to secure counsel, if the lawyer knows or reasonably should
know that the interests of such a person are or have a reasonable possibility of
being in conflict with the interests of the client." MODEL RULES OF PROF'L CON-
DUCT R. 4.3 (2002).
166. MODEL RULES OF PROF'L CONDUCT R. 4.3 cmt. (1983).
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104(A)(2)167 forbid the lawyer from giving advice to the unrepresented
person contacted on behalf of another client, although the lawyer may
suggest that the unrepresented person should obtain counsel. The
February 2002 amendments incorporate this requirement into the
text of the Model Rule.168
Courts have interpreted Model Rule 4.3 to require counsel to pro-
vide a Miranda-type warning to former employees and other unrepre-
sented persons whom they contact ex parte. "Under this rule, the
lawyer must make clear to the unrepresented employee the lawyer's
role in the case, including the nature of the case, the identity of the
lawyer's client, and the fact that the person's former or current em-
ployer is an adverse party."16 9 In addition,
It]he interviewer should inform the potential interviewee that she need not
speak to the interviewer, that she may wish an attorney and that if, during
her employment . . . she ever engaged in discussion with [the former em-
ployer's] ... counsel regarding this lawsuit or the circumstances from which it
arose, she should not reveal it.170
The ABA has approved this cautionary approach.171
Efforts to avoid the restraints of Model Rule 4.3 by using a nonlaw-
yer intermediary to gather information have proven unwise. 172 In one
multi-district case initiated by plaintiffs injured in an airplane crash,
plaintiffs' counsel hired a consulting expert to serve as an intermedi-
ary empowered to commission a survey of pilots by a research corpora-
tion.173 Improper de-icing of the aircraft was one of plaintiffs theories
of liability. The survey asked pilots who flew aircraft manufactured
by one of the defendants-Avions de Transport Regional ("ATR")-
about the training and experience they received regarding icing condi-
tions on ATR aircraft. 17 4 Pilots employed by another defendant in
167. DR 7-104(A)(2) states that a lawyer shall not "[g]ive advice to a person who is not
represented by a lawyer, other than the advice to secure counsel."
168. See supra note 165 for text of Model Rule 4.3.
169. Brown v. St. Joseph's County, 148 F.R.D. 246, 254 (N.D. Ill. 1993).
170. In re Prudential Ins. Co. of Am., 911 F. Supp. 148, 153 n.5 (D.N.J. 1995); see also
NAACP v. Fla. Dept. of Corrections, 122 F. Supp. 2d 1335, 1340-41 (M.D. Fla.
2000) (providing disclosures that must be made by attorney prior to ex parte in-
terview); McCallum v. CSX Transp., Inc., 149 F.R.D. 104, 112 (M.D.N.C. 1993)
(same).
171. ABA Comm. on Ethics and Profl Responsibility, Formal Op. 91-359 (1991) (re-
quiring that lawyers "punctiliously comply" with Rule 4.3's requirements when
contacting a party's former employees).
172. See, e.g., Upjohn Co. v. Aetna Cas. & Sur. Co., 768 F. Supp. 1186, 1213-15 (W.D.
Mich. 1991) (upholding severe sanctions on attorney whose investigators did not
provide sufficient information to former employees of attorney's opponent prior to
interviewing them).
173. See In re Air Crash Disaster, 909 F. Supp. 1116 (N.D. Ill. 1995).
174. See id. at 1118.
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this case-the airplane's owner/operator Simmons Airline, Inc.-were
among those who received the surveys.1
75
The cover letter accompanying the surveys did not disclose any re-
lationship to the pending litigation, and further implied that the Fed-
eral Aviation Administration, which had supplied the names of the
pilots, had endorsed the survey. 176 Defendants suspected that plain-
tiffs counsel might have sponsored the survey, but efforts to discover
that information from the survey company were unavailing. 177 Plain-
tiffs counsel eventually admitted his role in the survey. 178 Defendant
sought sanctions including exclusion from evidence of all data gath-
ered by the surveys, an order enjoining plaintiffs counsel from contin-
uing with its planned distribution of surveys, and monetary
sanctions. 179
In ruling on the motions for sanctions, the court adopted the de-
fendants' view that the cover letter "contained misleading information
regarding the true purpose underlying the distribution of the ques-
tionnaire" which constituted "a paradigm example of conduct prohib-
ited by Rule 4.3."180 The court further recognized that counsel's use of
an intermediary to develop the cover letter and questionnaire was "ir-
relevant with regard to their accountability for such actions," since an
attorney cannot induce or assist others to engage in conduct violating
the ethical rules without running afoul of the rules himself.18l
Relying on its inherent power and broad discretion to discipline an
attorney, the court considered "the seriousness of the violations and
whether the violations were intentional, as well as the nature and ex-
tent of the prejudice suffered or likely to be suffered by the parties in
the future as a result of the violation."' 8 2 Concluding that plaintiffs
counsel operated "in good faith but used poor judgment,"' 8 3 and being
"mindful of the fact that there is a general absence of case law in this
area,"' 8 4 the court imposed sanctions including the return of the ques-
tionnaire responses to defense counsel and suppression of any evi-
175. The court's primary concern with the so-called "ATR survey" was that it might be
distributed to current employees of another defendant, Simmons Airlines, Inc.,
the owner/operator of the ATR plane that crashed. Because the planned distribu-
tion of the ATR survey included over a thousand pilots who flew similar aircraft,
it is logical to include that former employees of defendant Simmons would also be
asked to respond to the questionnaires. See id. at 1118-19.
176. See id. at 1119.
177. See id.
178. See Id. at 1119-20.
179. See id. at 1124.
180. See id. at 1123.
181. Id. at 1124 (citing MODEL RULES OF PROF'L CONDUCT R. 8.4(a)(2) (1983)).
182. Id. (citing generally In re Am. Airlines, Inc., 972 F.2d 605, 611 (5th Cir. 1992)).
183. Id. at 1125.
184. Id.
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dence gleaned from the surveys, but declined to impose further
sanctions including a monetary penalty.185
The 2002 amendments to the comment to Model Rule 4.3 codified
this common law practice of requiring extensive disclosure by an at-
torney to any unrepresented persons (including former employees) as
to his client and the client's interests that might be in conflict with the
interests of the individual.186
F. Soliciting Clients
When an attorney contacts a former employee of his client or oppo-
nent, the individual may respond that counsel already represents her.
The attorney's knowledge that counsel represents the person usually
should cause the attorney to terminate the ex parte communication as
required by Model Rule 4.2 and DR 7-104(A). The inquiring attorney
must then resort to formal discovery to obtain information from the
represented former employee. If, however, the extant legal represen-
tation of the former employee was borne in contravention of long-es-
tablished ethical rulesl8 7 prohibiting client solicitation, then the
alleged attorney-client relationship may not be a shield to
discovery. 188
As one author observed:
For most people, the term "attorney solicitation" conjures up stereotypical
images of "ambulance chasing" attorneys who prey on bed-ridden accident vic-
tims. Whether the solicitation occurs in the personal injury context, or simply
through the practice of"giving unsolicited legal advice ... [and accepting] ...
employment resulting from such advice," both the United States Supreme
Court and the American Bar Association ("ABA") condemn this practice. 189
185. See id.
186. MODEL RULES OF PROF'L CONDUCT R. 4.3 cmts. 1 & 2 (2002).
187. The 1908 version of the ethical rules deemed it "unprofessional" for an attorney to
solicit employment "by circulars, advertisements, . . or by personal communica-
tions or interviews not warranted by personal relations." ABA CANONS OF PROF'L
ETHICS Canon 27 (1908).
188. First Amendment concerns are often raised due to the restrictions solicitation
rules place on the free speech and association rights of attorneys and potential
clients. See generally Kathleen M. Sullivan, The Intersection of Free Speech and
the Legal Profession: Constraints on Lawyers' First Amendment Rights, 67 Ford-
ham L. Rev. 569 (1998); Roederick White Sr., Constitutional Ethics: Lawyer Solic-
itation of Clients, 22 S.U. L. REV. 275 (1995); L. Anita Richardson, Stopping the
Chase: Solicitation Regulations are Well Intentioned, but May Be Unconstitu-
tional, A.B.A. J., Jan. 1995, at 38. For the purpose of this Article it is assumed
that courts will honor the solicitation rules as written, or will view the First
Amendment concerns as legitimate but not determinative. Support for this as-
sumption is found in cases such as Ohralik v. Ohio State Bar Ass'n, 436 U.S. 447(1978), in which the Supreme Court rejected constitutional attacks to the rules
prohibiting in-person solicitation of clients by lawyers.
189. Betina A. Suessmann, Subjective and Objective: You Can't Have One Without the
Other: A Recommendation for Model Rule 7.3, 33 Loy. L.A. L. REV. 229, 229-30
(1999) (footnotes omitted; bracketed material in original).
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This condemnation should be compounded when an attorney solic-
its a former employee as a client for the specific purpose of preventing
opposing counsel's effort to obtain informal discovery from the former
employee. 190
Model Rule 7.3 and its counterparts in the Model Code, DR 2-103
and DR 2-104, prohibit an attorney from directly soliciting clients.
Before and after the 2002 amendments, Model Rule 7.3 prohibits an
attorney from soliciting a client where "a significant motive for the
lawyer's doing so is the lawyer's pecuniary gain,"19 1 where "the solici-
tation involves coercion, duress, or harassment,"19 2 or where the law-
yer knows the client does not want to retain the attorney.19 3 DR 2-
103(A) states that "a lawyer shall not.., recommend employment...
of himself, his partner, or associate to a layperson who has not sought
his advice regarding employment of a lawyer."' 9 4 DR 2-104(A) prohib-
its a lawyer from giving unsolicited advice to a lay person "that he
should obtain legal counsel or take legal action" and then accepting
employment stemming from that advice. 19 5
The prohibition against direct client solicitation protects lay per-
sons from overzealous "importuning1 9 6 by attorneys. The comment
to Model Rule 7.3 explains that the prospective client "may already
feel overwhelmed by the circumstances giving rise to the need for legal
services," and thus be unable to clearly assess other alternatives with
an appropriate degree of self-interest while being pressured by the at-
torney to engage his services. 19 7 This scenario "is fraught with the
possibility of undue influence, intimidation, and over-reaching"198 by
the attorney seeking employment. In short, the anti-solicitation rules
are intended to prevent "invasion of privacy and the subordination of
the client's legal interests to the attorney's financial [or other] self-
interest."' 9 9 The United States Supreme Court demonstrated deep re-
190. In addition to the solicitation rules discussed above, soliciting a client for the
purposes of inhibiting an opponent's discovery efforts arguably violates ethical
rules governing fairness discussed in section IV.H, infra.
191. MODEL RULES OF PROF'L CONDUCT R. 7.3(a) (2002).
192. Id. R. 7.3(b)(2).
193. Id. R. 7.3(b)(1).
194. MODEL CODE OF PROF'L RESPONSIBILITY DR 2-103(A) (1980).
195. Id. DR 2-104(A) specifically states: "a lawyer who has given in-person unsolicited
advice to a lay person that he should obtain counsel or take legal action shall not
accept employment resulting from that advice."
196. MODEL RULES OF PROF'L CONDUCT R. 7.3 cmt. 1 (2002).
197. See id.
198. Id.
199. Steven P. Handler et al., The Ethics of Solicitation of Business from Corporate
Clients, 5 GEO. J. LEGAL ETHICS 423, 424 (1991). An attorney who "volunteers" to
represent a former employee of a client obtains a pecuniary gain from such repre-
sentation. The attorney may receive both a direct financial benefit, found in the
hourly rate the client pays the attorney to work with the former employee, and an
indirect benefit, such as obtaining more work from the satisfied client. An attor-
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spect for the goals of anti-solicitation rules when it rejected attorneys'
arguments that such rules violate attorneys' First Amendment
rights.200
The letter as well as the spirit of the anti-solicitation rules could be
breached in a number of situations involving former employees of a
litigant. The attorney representing the former employer, for example,
could exert undue influence or otherwise harass his client's former
employees to accept his representation under a thinly veiled threat
that the employees may lose pension or other continuing benefits if
they fail to cooperate. A lawyer for the former employer's adversary
might easily convince disgruntled former employees that joining
forces with the employer's adversary will be an appropriate "pay back"
to the employer. A lawyer for either side could hint that the former
employees may be joined as parties to one lawsuit, thereby raising the
potential of significant personal liability, if the persons refuse the
proffered legal services. 2O1
An attorney who solicits former employees introduces policy con-
cerns beyond those normally associated with solicitation rules. First,
acceptance of the volunteered services elevates the former employees
to "persons represented by counsel," thus blocking the other side from
conducting informal interviews pursuant to Model Rule 4.2.202 Sec-
ond, such representation opens the door for intentional or insidious
coaching of the former employees by the soliciting attorney.20 3 The
third, related concern is that the opposing attorney's efforts to explore
ney who volunteers to represent his opponent's former employee may enjoy those
same benefits, and in addition, may be able to demand a higher settlement due to
the recruitment of the adversary's former employee to his camp. See Aspgren v.
Montgomery Ward & Co., No. 82 C 7277, 1984 U.S. Dist. LEXIS 21892, at
*10-11, 87 Fair Empl. Prac. Cas. (BNA) 1438 (N.D. Ill. Nov. 19, 1984) (discussing
the remuneration the attorney received by volunteering to represent his client's
former employees during their depositions).
200. Ohralik v. Ohio State Bar Ass'n, 436 U.S. 447, 461-62 (1978).
201. If the attorney has no grounds for joining former employees, the threat to them as
parties also violates Model Rule 7.1, which prohibits an attorney from making a
"false or misleading communication" regarding his services." MODEL RULES OF
PROF'L CONDUCT R. 7.1 (2002). A communication meets those criteria "if it con-
tains a material misrepresentation of fact or law, or omits a fact necessary to
make the statement considered as a whole not materially misleading." Id.
202. Ethics rules cannot be construed to "empower the organization to create a fiction-
piece in which its attorney is deemed to represent former employees for the sake
of barring an adversary's informal contacts with them." Curley v. Cumberland
Farms, Inc., 134 F.R.D. 77, 91 (D.N.J. 1991).
203. During the sessions devoted to "coaching," the future witness is likely to
try to adapt himself to expectations mirrored in the interviewer's one-
sided attitude. As a consequence, gaps in his memory may even uncon-
sciously be filled out by what he thinks accords with the lawyer's expec-
tations and are in tune with his thesis. Later, in court, these additions
to memory images may appear to the witness himself as accurate repro-
ductions of his original perceptions.
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the extent of his adversary's coaching of the former employees are
thwarted by the application of the attorney-client privilege and possi-
bly the work-product doctrine.
Should this trilogy of taboos justify a ban on attorneys from either
side from soliciting former employees as clients? Opposing answers to
that question were rendered by the federal trial and appellate courts
overseeing the pretrial phase of a major petroleum antitrust case.20 4
In that case, plaintiffs were the attorneys general of several states
and the defendants were several major oil producers accused of con-
spiring to violate antitrust laws.20 5 At the plaintiffs' urging, the dis-
trict court disqualified the oil defendants' attorneys from representing
current and former employees of their clients during depositions and
other proceedings. 2 06
In reaching this decision, the trial court characterized the former
employees as "independent witnesses whose duty and only appropri-
ate objective is to tell 'the truth, the whole truth, and nothing but the
truth."' 20 7 In contrast, the court described the duty of defense counsel
as causing "the record of a deposition or of a trial to be just as
favorable to their clients as they can."20 8 This raised the court's con-
cern that defense counsel's "orientation and guidance" of the former
employees-in terms of refreshing their memories, familiarizing them
with documents, and communicating the company's "views and atti-
tudes concerning the litigation"-could have significant impact on the
witnesses' testimony.20 9 The court was especially wary of allowing de-
fense attorneys to solicit the representation of former employees be-
cause any coaching of those employees/witnesses would remain
impenetrable by opposing counsel due to the attorney-client
privilege. 2 10
Since the former employees were not parties, the court declared, "it
is in the interests of justice that both sides be entitled to their testi-
mony and be able to make full inquiry into any influences that may
have affected such testimony."2 1 1 Therefore, the trial court forbid for-
mation of an attorney-client relationship between defense counsel and
Mirjan R. Damaska, Presentation of Evidence and Factfinding Precision, 123 U.
PA. L. REV. 1083, 1094 (1975). Damaska's observation was characterized as "very
perceptive and pertinent" in Coordinated Pretrial Proceedings in Petroleum Prod-
ucts Antitrust Litigation, 502 F. Supp. 1092 (C.D. Cal. 1980), affd, 658 F.2d 1355
(9th Cir. 1981).
204. See Coordinated Pretrial Proceedings in Petroleum Prods. Antitrust Litig., 502 F.
Supp. at 1097.
205. See id. at 1095.
206. See id. at 1097.
207. Id. at 1095.
208. Id.
209. Id. at 1097.
210. See id.
211. Id.
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former employees that would block such inquiry by plaintiffs'
counsel.212
The Ninth Circuit reversed the disqualification ruling2 13 in large
part because it found the trial court's concerns largely "anticipatory
and speculative," 2 14 and thus not serious enough to override the for-
mer employees' rights to be represented by counsel of their choice. 2 15
The court concluded that "[t]he 'solicitation' alleged, even if it could be
substantiated, does not cut to the heart of the integrity of the system
so as to require the court to take drastic steps to safeguard the image
of the judicial process in the eyes of the public."2 16
These petroleum antitrust decisions illustrate the continuing com-
peting policies that courts attempt to reconcile when counsel for an
organizational party volunteers to represent her client's former em-
ployees. Those conflicting policies caused two other courts to find mid-
dle ground by holding that a former employer's attorneys may
represent a client's former employees, but could not, in keeping with
the anti-solicitation rules, contact the former employees and offer
their legal services at no cost. 2 17
In both cases, the former employer's attorneys were allowed to con-
tact former employees regarding upcoming depositions planned by
their respective adversaries and advise the former employees that
they could be deposed with or without counsel. 2 18 However, the for-
mer employers' attorneys could not provide legal services gratuitously
unless the prospective deponent specifically requested representation
by the employer's attorneys.2 19
Arguments centering on client solicitation are readily available to
adversaries disputing the appropriate bounds of each side's contact
with former employees, and yet are not always raised. 22 0 When
212. See id.
213. See In re Coordinated Pretrial Proceedings in Petroleum Products Antitrust Li-
tig., 658 F.2d 1355 (9th Cir. 1981).
214. Id. at 1361.
215. See id.
216. Id. The Ninth Circuit also based its holding on a then-recent Supreme Court
opinion, Upjohn v. United States, 449 U.S. 383 (1981), which arguably redefined
the attorney-client relationship in the corporate context. Id. The 1981 Upjohn
decision and its applicability to former employees of an organizational party are
discussed in detail in Becker, supra note 27, at 255-68. See also Sherman L.
Cohn, The Organizational Client: Attorney-Client Privilege and the No-Contact
Rule, 10 GEO. J. LEGAL ETHICS 739 (1997).
217. United States v. Occidental Chem. Corp., 606 F. Supp. 1470, 1477 (W.D.N.Y.
1985); Aspgren v. Montgomery Ward & Co., No. 82 C 7277, 1984 U.S. Dist.
LEXIS 21892, 87 Fair Empl. Prac. Cas. (BNA) 1438 (N.D. Ill. Nov. 19, 1984).
218. See Occidental Chem. Corp., 606 F. Supp. at 1477.
219. See id.
220. In National Union Fire Insurance Co. v. Stauffer Chemical Co., No. 87C-SE-11,
1990 Del. Super. LEXIS 346 (Del. Super. Ct. Sept. 13, 1990), for example, plain-
tiffs counsel apparently did not raise the issue of solicitation even though en-
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raised, however, one thing is clear: a former employee must consent to
the representation by his former employer's attorney before the limi-
tations on contacting represented persons under Model Rule 4.2 or DR
7-104(A) apply. 22 1
G. Conflicts of Interest
A lawyer's general duty to avoid conflicts of interest is another cor-
nerstone of the various codes of attorney conduct.2 22 "In fact, such a
duty lies at the core of professional responsibility."22 3 Avoiding actual
and potential conflicts sounds like a clear command, but, as usual, the
devil lies in the details. This is especially true when the rules are
applied to an attorney's representation of former employees of a client.
Model Rule 1.7 prohibits a lawyer from representing a client if rep-
resentation "will be directly adverse to another client"224 or "if the
representation of that client may be materially limited by the lawyer's
responsibilities to another client or to a third person, or by the lawyers
own interests."22 5 Representation is permitted, however, if "the law-
yer reasonably believes" representation of both clients will not ad-
versely affect each client 226 and if consent is obtained from both
clients after full explanation about the conflict. 227 Parallel provisions
are found in the Model Code.2 28
gaged in a series of hard fought discovery battles with a defense attorney who
sent letters to its former employees suggesting that they not talk with plaintiffs
counsel and offering to provide free legal counsel for them.
221. In Brown v. St. Joseph's County, 148 F.R.D. 246, 248 (N.D. Ind. 1993), for exam-
ple, a former employer initially argued, successfully, that former employees were
both "parties" and "represented by counsel" under Model Rule 4.2 because the
employer's liability insurer retained a law firm to represent all current and for-
mer employees covered under its policy. The court subsequently vacated its order
prohibiting contact with former employees due to the lack of evidence that the
former employees had consented to be represented by the employer's attorney
and their statements disavowing the employer's attorney as their counsel. Id. at
255.
222. The initial rules promulgated by the ABA deemed it "unprofessional to represent
conflicting interests, except by express consent of all concerned given after full
disclosure of the facts." CANONS OF PROF'L ETHICS Canon 6 (1908).
223. Bluebeard's Castle, Inc. v. Delmar Mktg., Inc., 32 V.I. 278, Civ. No. 1993-125,
1995 U.S. Dist. LEXIS 4976, at *3 (1995).
224. MODEL RULES OF PROF'L CONDUCT R. 1.7(a) (1987).
225. Id. R. 1.7(b).
226. Id. R. 1.7(a)(1) and (b)(1).
227. Id. R. 1.7(a)(2) and (b)(1).
228. The Model Code prohibits an attorney from accepting employment "if the exercise
of his independent professional judgment in behalf of a client will be or is likely to
be adversely affected." MODEL CODE OF PROF'L RESPONSIBILITY DR 5-105(A)
(1980). Multiple clients may be represented, however, "if it is obvious" that the
lawyer "can adequately represent the interest of each and if each consents to the
representation after full disclosure." Id. DR 5-105(C).
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The mere possibility of conflict does not preclude representation.
"The critical questions are the likelihood that a conflict will eventuate
and, if it does, whether it will materially interfere with the lawyer's
independent professional judgment in considering alternatives or fore-
close causes of action that reasonably should be pursued on behalf of
the client."22 9
The potential for sanctionable conflict arises when the attorney is
receiving compensation from someone other than the client being rep-
resented.2 30 Such a fee arrangement is only appropriate under the
Model Rules if three conditions are met: "the client consents after con-
sultation,"23 1 the fee arrangement does not interfere "with the law-
yer's independence of professional judgment or the client-lawyer
relationship,"2 32 and the client's confidences and secrets are main-
tained.23 3 The Model Code offers this caveat: "Since a lawyer must
always be free to exercise his professional judgment without regard to
the interests or motives of a third person, the lawyer who is employed
by one to represent another must constantly guard against erosion of
his professional freedom."2 34
Potential conflicts of interest are ubiquitous in the former em-
ployee-former employer relationship. The most striking examples are
found in cases, such as environmental clean-up, sexual harassment, or
civil whistleblower litigation, where the former employee might face
personal liability based on facts exposed during the litigation pro-
cess. 23 5 Another scenario rife with potential conflict is where the for-
mer employee is considering litigation against the employer, either by
joining an existing lawsuit or filing a separate action.2 36 Nonetheless,
there is a surprising dearth of case law where an attorney's represen-
229. MODEL RULES OF PROF'L CONDUCT R. 1.8 cmt. 4 (1987).
230. Id. R. 1.8 (f); MODEL CODE OF PROF'L RESPONSIBILITY DR 5-107(A)(1) (1980).
231. MODEL RULES OF PROF'L CONDUCT R. 1.8(f)(1) (1987).
232. Id. R. 1.8(f)(2).
233. Id. R. 1.8 (f)(3).
234. MODEL CODE OF PROF'L RESPONSIBILITY EC 5-23 (1980).
235. Unique discovery issues involving former employees that arise in these types of
litigation are discussed in the following: John W. Robinson & Cathy J. Beveridge,
Ethical Issues When Dealing with Sexual Harassment Litigation, 6 EMP. L.
STRATEGIST 1 (1998); Frank G. Usseglio, Product Liability Strategy: Limiting Op-
posing Counsel's Access to Ex-Employees, 11 CORP. COUNS. 13 (1997); Vicki Jan
Isler, Environmental Enforcement: Ex Parte Interviews of Former Employees: An
Attorney's Ethical Obligation, 457 P.L.I./LITIG. 55 (1993).
236. In Dondore v. NGK Metals Corp., No. 00-1966, 2001 U.S. Dist. LEXIS 6268 (E.D.
Pa. 2001), for example, the court was faced with resolving conflicts of interest and
Model Rule 4.2 issues surrounding defense counsel's request to engage in ex
parte contact with his client's former employees who were putative members of a
class action pending before another court. The court allowed the contact provided
that defense counsel contact the former employees by mail and include specific
language in the correspondence explaining potential ethical problems. Id. at
*7-13.
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tation of both the employer and one or more former employees has
been challenged under conflict of interest principles.
Several factors may contribute to this lack of reported cases. An
opposing party generally lacks standing to move for disqualification of
an opposing party's counsel under Model Rule 1.7 because standing to
pursue a conflict of interest claim is usually only accorded a current or
former client of the attorney. 23 7 An opposing party will have stand-
ing, however, if the conflict negatively impacts the fair and efficient
administration of justice or implicates public interests. 238 "Such an
objection should be viewed with caution, however, for it can be mis-
used as a technique of harassment."2 39
Even if an opposing party satisfies the standing requirement, there
is often a significant gap between the potential for conflict, which may
appear obvious, and actual proof of such conflict, which is often elu-
sive.2 40 Another possibility is that attorneys representing former em-
ployers may be disengaging from representing former employees when
an actionable conflict of interest arises, thus avoiding protracted
sidebar litigation and/or disciplinary proceedings regarding the pro-
priety of representing both the former employers and employees. Fi-
nally, attorneys may be avoiding sanctions due to apparent or actual
conflicts by obtaining consent of all parties whose interests are af-
fected by the multiple representation. 2 4 1
H. Fairness and Civility
In a civil justice system where equity is valued as highly as black
letter law, the requirement that advocates treat each other fairly
seems obvious. Nonetheless, codes of ethics have long mandated fair-
ness to clients, parties, the courts, and non-parties. If these provisions
leave any doubt, the recent proliferation of civility and professional-
ism codes in state and federal courts have hammered home the point
237. USX Corp. v. Tieco, Inc., 929 F. Supp. 1455, 1459 (N.D. Ala. 1996); Dawson v.
City of Bartlesville, 901 F. Supp. 314, 314-15 (N.D. Okla. 1995); Chapman Engi-
neers v. Nat'l Gas Sales Co., 766 F. Supp. 949, 954 (D. Kan. 1991). See generally
Douglas R. Richmond, The Rude Question of Standing in Attorney Disqualifica-
tion Disputes, 25 Am. J. TRIAL ADvoc. 17 (2001).
238. MODEL RULES OF PROF'L CONDUCT R. 1.7 cmt. 15 (1987); Dawson, 901 F. Supp. at
315; Chapman, 766 F. Supp. at 955.
239. MODEL RULES OF PROF'L CONDUCT R. 1.7 cmt. 15 (1987).
240. See, e.g., Aspgren v. Montgomery Ward & Co., No. 82 C 7277, 1984 U.S. Dist.
LEXIS 21892, at *6, 87 Fair Empl. Prac. Cas. (BNA) 1438 (N.D. Ill. Nov. 19,
1984) (recognizing potential conflict of interest in representation of former em-
ployees by employer's attorneys, but finding no record of conflict in the case
before it).
241. Ethical rules allowing clients to waive conflicts of interest include MODEL RULES
OF PROFESSIONAL CONDUCT R. 1.7(a) and (b) (1987), and MODEL CODE OF PROFES-
SIONAL RESPONSIBILITY DR 5-105(C) (1980). See generally Fred C. Zacharias,
Waiving Conflicts ofInterest, 108 YALE L.J. 407 (1998).
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that attorneys who seek justice must practice fairness or risk the
wrath of the courts. 242
Fairness means acting in a "just and honest" manner.2 43 To a cer-
tain degree, then, every rule of ethics has fairness as its core. In deal-
ing with the propriety of an attorney contacting former employees of
an adversary, however, specific fairness provisions apply. These are
found in Model Rule 3.4 and its counterparts in the Model Code: DR 7-
102(A)(6), DR 7-104(A)(2), and DR 7-109(B).
Model Rule 3.4, entitled "Fairness to Opposing Party and Counsel,"
states in relevant part:
A lawyer shall not:
(a) unlawfully obstruct another party's access to evidence or unlawfully alter,destroy or conceal a document or other material having potential evidentiary
value. A lawyer shall not counsel or assist another person to do such act;
(b) falsify evidence, counsel or assist a witness to testify falsely, or offer an
inducement to a witness that is prohibited by law;
(f) request a person other than a client to refrain from voluntarily giving rele-
vant information to another party unless the person is a relative or an em-ployee or other agent of a client and the lawyer reasonably believes that the
person's interests will not be adversely affected by refraining from giving such
information. 244
Similarly, the Model Code prohibits an attorney from suppressing
evidence,245 encouraging a witness to make herself unavailable,246
participating in the "creation or preservation" of false evidence,247
providing financial inducements that might tempt witnesses to testify
untruthfully,248 or giving any advice to an unrepresented person "if
the interests of such person are or have a reasonable possibility of be-
ing in conflict with the interests of his client."249
The express language of Model Rule 3.4 and its counterparts in the
Model Code clearly place restraints on attorneys when contacting
their clients' or their opponents' former employees. An attorney may
not suggest that former employees hide or destroy documents or other
evidence the employees possess, aid in the creation of false testimony
or other evidence, provide an "inducement" to employees for testimony
favorable to their clients if such inducement will result in tainted tes-
timony, or instruct employees to refrain from voluntarily giving rele-
vant information to anyone else-including opponents' counsel. In
242. See discussion of new codes of civility and professionalism supra note 59.
243. WEBSTER's NEW WORLD DICTIONARY 487 (3d College ed. 1988).
244. MODEL RULES OF PROF'L CONDUCT R. 3.4 (1980).
245. A lawyer "shall not suppress any evidence that he or his client has a legal obliga-
tion to reveal." MODEL CODE OF PROF'L RESPONSIBILITY DR 7-109(A) (1980).
246. Id. DR 7-109(B).
247. Id. DR 7-102(A)(6).
248. Id. EC 7-28.
249. Id. DR 7-104(A)(2).
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addition to disciplinary measures and litigation sanctions, attorneys
who violate Model Rule 3.4 could face criminal 250 and other civil
liability.2 5 1
Fairness rules raise a number of interesting questions regarding
contact with former employees of a party. Does an attorney's meeting
with the former employee and "suggesting" various facts to help fill in
memory gaps create "false" evidence because such detailed testimonial
evidence would not have existed but for the attorney's intervention?
Does an offer to serve as counsel in the event that the person is de-
posed or otherwise called to testify by the former employer serve as an
improper "inducement" to testify?252 Obtaining legal counsel could
prove quite expensive to the former employee, so an offer of "free" rep-
resentation may sway that person's testimony favorably toward the
party underwriting the costs. And what of counsel's attempts to dis-
suade his client's former employees from communicating with oppos-
ing counsel? Does such conduct violate Model Rule 4.3(f)'s
proscription on requesting that a third party "refrain from voluntarily
giving relevant information to another party?"2
53
Each of the scenarios profiled in the above inquiries occur com-
monly in modern litigation, yet none of the questions posed can be
answered in the abstract. The determination of whether a particular
attorney has violated Model Rule 4.3 or attendant sections of the
Model Code during contact with former employees of a litigant is
highly fact specific. Thus, like the other rules and doctrines discussed
herein, the fairness rules neither commend nor condemn contact be-
tween former employees and counsel for the employer or the adver-
sary's attorney. Rather, these rules provide additional tutelage on the
proper boundaries between counsel for opposing parties and former
employees of a litigant who possess information relevant to the
litigation.
250. "Applicable law in many jurisdictions makes it an offense to destroy material for
purposes of impairing its availability in a pending proceeding or one whose com-
mencement can be foreseen. Falsifying evidence is also generally a criminal of-
fense." MODEL RULES OF PROF'L CONDUCT R. 3.4 cmt. 2 (1983).
251. Destruction of evidence may lead to civil liability in a subsequent lawsuit against
the attorney under the tort of spoliation of evidence. See generally, Steven W.
Huang & Robert H. Muriel, Spoliation of Evidence: Defining the Ethical Bounda-
ries of Destroying Evidence, 22 AM. J. TRAL ADvoc. 191 (1998); Robert L. Tucker,
The Flexible Doctrine of Spoliation of Evidence: Cause of Action, Defense, Eviden-
tiary Presumption, and Discovery Sanction, 27 U. TOL. L. REV. 67 (1995).
252. As previously noted, such an offer might also be construed as a violation of ethical
rules prohibiting client solicitation. See supra section I.F.
253. At least one court has held that Model Rule 3.4(f) prohibits a litigant from advis-
ing its former employees to refrain from voluntarily giving information to another
party. See Porter v. Arco Metals Co., 642 F. Supp. 1116, 1118 n.3 (D. Mont.
1986). As the discussion in this section of the Article makes clear, however, not
all courts hold that view.
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The battles waged in a Delaware court over Model Rule 3.4(f's pro-
hibition on discouraging a nonparty "from voluntarily giving relevant
information to another party" illustrate the equivocal nature of that
rule.254 In that insurance coverage dispute, the defendant sent letters
to its former employees requesting that they not voluntarily provide
information to one of the plaintiffs, Travelers Indemnity Company.255
The plaintiff sought sanctions, arguing that the letter violated Dela-
ware's version of Model Rule 3.4(f).256 The plaintiff also asserted that
the violation warranted an order requiring the defendant to send a
curative letter and withdraw its offer to provide legal counsel to the
defendant's former employees.257
The Delaware court denied the plaintiffs motion. In its terse or-
der, the court explained that even if defendant's conduct violated
Model Rule 3.4, the plaintiff had not met its burden of showing that
the defendant's action "had tainted, or threatened to taint, the pro-
ceedings before the Court."258 The court refused to "impose a remedy
that might affect the outcome of the litigation before it,"259 but did
refer the matter to the Delaware Disciplinary Counsel.260
In denying the plaintiffs request for certification of an interlocu-
tory appeal of the order denying sanctions, 26 1 the court clarified that
its previous order did not prohibit plaintiffs counsel from engaging in
informal discovery with the defendant's former employees.262 The
court further opined that had the ruling effectively required plaintiffs
counsel to use formal discovery to obtain information from the defen-
dant's former employees, it still would not have affected a substantial
legal right or resolve a major issue as required for certification.263
Everyone lost in that Model Rule 3.4 dispute. The defendant and
the plaintiff no doubt incurred substantial attorney fees in pursuing
and opposing the initial motion for sanctions and subsequent motion
to certify. The plaintiff most likely had to resort to subpoenas and
depositions to obtain information from the defendant's former employ-
ees. Defense counsel may have succeeded in shielding their client's
former employees from ex parte contact with plaintiffs counsel, but
254. See Nat'l Union Fire Ins. Co. v. Stauffer Chem. Co., No. 87C-SE-11, 1990 Del.
Super. LEXIS 346 (Del. Super. Ct. Sept. 13, 1990).
255. See id. at *1.
256. See id. at *2.
257. See id.
258. Id. at *3.
259. Id. at *4 (citation omitted).
260. See id.
261. Nat'l Union Fire Ins. Co. v. Stauffer Chem. Co., No. 87C-SE-11, 1990 Del. Super.
LEXIS 408 (Del. Super. Ct. Oct. 23, 1990).
262. See id. at *6.
263. See id.
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still had to justify their methods to the Disciplinary Counsel, and, of
course, the court spent significant time considering the issue.
In another matter, a defendant invoked Model Rule 3.4(f) to chal-
lenge a federal magistrate's remedial order. 264 The magistrate deter-
mined that the investigative firm hired by defendant conducted
inappropriate interviews of plaintiffs former employees regarding en-
vironmental damage in an insurance coverage dispute. 2 65 The magis-
trate ordered defendant's investigators to send letters to plaintiffs
former employees informing them of their right to refuse to talk to
anyone about the case. 26 6 The court required the letter to state that it
is "being sent pursuant to a federal court order"2 67 to help the former
employees make "an informed decision whether to consent to an inter-
view."2 68 The court also required that the letter clearly explain the
investigators' relationship with the defendant, and inform the employ-
ees that they had "the freedom to refuse to be interviewed."
26 9
Defendant appealed the magistrate's ruling, arguing that the re-
medial letter was inappropriate because it violated Model Rule 3.4(f)'s
prohibition on requesting that a person, other than a client, not volun-
tarily provide information to another party.27 0 The district court re-
jected this argument for two reasons. First, the court found that "the
letter is a clear statement defining the reader's options and does not
constitute an inducement not to voluntarily provide information."
27 1
Second, the court found no effort on the investigators' part "to clarify
misconceptions that the investigators should have known the inter-
viewees had."2 72 Callous disregard by the investigators made the
magistrate's letter appropriate. 2 73
Model Rule 3.4(b)'s prohibition of offering "an inducement to a wit-
ness that is prohibited by law" was one of several ethical violations
asserted by defense counsel in a Kansas federal court.2 74 In a case
borne when several employees departed plaintiffs company to work
for a competitor, a defense attorney hired Marilyn Johnson, formerly
employed by plaintiff as an executive administrative assistant, to help
organize documents that the plaintiff had produced. 2 75 The defense
264. Upjohn Co. v. Aetna Cas. & Sur. Co., 768 F. Supp. 1186 (W.D. Mich. 1990).
265. The investigators hired by defendant failed clearly to identify themselves as rep-
resenting an adversary of the plaintiff/former employer and to provide other in-
formation required by ethics rules in Michigan. Id. at 1212.
266. See id.
267. Id. at 1216.
268. Id. at 1216-17.
269. Id.
270. See id. at 1217.
271. Id.
272. Id.
273. See id.
274. Biocore Med. Techs., Inc. v. Khosrowshahi, 181 F.R.D. 660 (D. Kan. 1998)
275. See id. at 665.
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attorney also represented Johnson without charge when plaintiff de-
posed her.2 76 The plaintiff/former employer sought disqualification of
defense counsel by arguing, inter alia, that the compensation the de-
fendant provided to Johnson for organizing plaintiffs documents and
the free legal services constituted "an inducement to a witness that is
prohibited by law" according to Model Rule 3.4(b).277
The court rejected plaintiffs allegation that defense counsel
breached Model Rule 3.4(b). The court recognized that "[e]mployment
of a witness can amount to inducing a witness when it serves as a
pretext for paying a witness for testimony."2 78 In this case, however,
the plaintiff failed to show that defense counsel hired Johnson as a
pretext for payment influencing Johnson's testimony.27 9 Thus, de-
fense counsel's conduct stood in contrast to cases where Model Rule
3.4(b) was violated due to "an express agreement that payment was
either directly in exchange for testimony or contingent upon a
favorable outcome of the case." 28 0
While also recognizing that free legal services could provide an im-
proper inducement to testify in some cases, 28 1 the court found no evi-
dence that defense counsel had exchanged free legal services for
Johnson's testimony.2 82 Absent hard evidence, the court was "unwill-
ing to infer" that the legal services were offered for Johnson's
favorable testimony.283 Moreover, the court noted that even if defense
counsel had intended to influence Johnson's testimony, the attendant
loss in Johnson's credibility due to her relationship with defense coun-
sel "seriously diminished" any impact such testimony might have on
the jury.2 84
276. See id.
277. Id. at 669-70.
278. Id. at 670 (citing Comm. on Legal Ethics v. Sheatsley, 452 S.E.2d 75, 80 (W. Va.
1994)).
279. See id. at 670.
280. Id. The contrasting cases cited by the court, where Model Rule 3.4(b) violations
were found, were Sheatsley, 452 S.E.2d at 80, and Cresswell v. Sullivan & Crom-
well, 922 F.2d 60, 72 (2d Cir. 1990).
281. See Biocore Med. Techs., Inc., 181 F.R.D. at 670.
282. See id. at 671.
283. Id.
284. Id. A similar conclusion could be reached in Centennial Management Services,
Inc. v. Axa Re Vie, 193 F.R.D. 671, 682 (D. Kan. 2000) (rejecting claim that a
party violated Model Rule 3.4(b) and other ethical laws by entering a lucrative
consulting contract with a former employee who had key information about the
matter being litigated). A discussion of the Centennial Management case is pro-
vided infra notes 824-57 and accompanying text.
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V. FORMAL DISCOVERY OF A PARTY'S FORMER EMPLOYEES
A. Overview
Numerous rules of civil procedure are wielded as weapons in bat-
tles over discovery of a litigant's former employees. 28 5 Since no ex-
plicit provisions in the rules address discovery of former employees, an
understanding of the purpose and goals of the rules in general, as well
as the specific rules invoked when discovery of a former employee is at
issue, is necessary.
The Federal Rules of Civil Procedure were adopted the same year
the United States Supreme Court issued its groundbreaking opinion
in Erie v. Thompkins.286 This 1938 pairing of a single set of rules to
govern all federal district court procedures with the Erie Court's clari-
fication on the substantive and procedural law applicable in federal
courts was heralded as a high water mark in the uniformity and clar-
ity of federal court proceedings. The new Federal Rules mandated
that they "be construed to secure the just, speedy, and inexpensive
determination of every action."28 7 The subsequent adoption of the
Federal Rules by many states provided even greater hope for lucidity
and uniformity in procedural matters.
As the years progressed, the utopian vision of efficiency and uni-
formity among federal and state courts faded. Courts and litigants
encountered difficulties in deciding which laws were procedural as op-
posed to substantive for purposes of applying the Erie doctrine.28 8
Not all state courts adopted the Federal Rules of Civil Procedure, and
those that did often amended them to create versions only roughly re-
sembling the original. 28 9 The Federal Rules also underwent numer-
ous amendments and local rules of court exploded in popularity and
285. The rules discussed herein also apply to discovery commenced prior to litigation
pursuant to FED. R. Civ. P. 27 and analogous state rules, and to discovery taken
in aid of judgment authorized by FED. R. Crv. P. 69 and state counterparts.
286. 304 U.S. 64 (1938) (announcing the "Erie Doctrine" directing federal courts to use
federal procedural law in all cases and to apply the substantive law of the states,
rather than federal common law, in cases where subject matter jurisdiction is
based on diversity).
287. FED. R. Crv. P. 1 (1938). The rule was changed in 1993 to clarify that rules
should be "construed and administered" toward the expedient and inexpensive
resolution of lawsuits, thus emphasizing the judges' role as litigation manager.
FED. R. Civ. P. 1 advisory committee note (1993) (emphasis added).
288. See generally ERWIN CHEMERINSKY, FEDERAL JURISDICTION 294-311 (2d ed. 1994)
(explaining the complicated development of pre- and post-Erie jurisprudence).
289. Thomas 0. Main, Procedural Uniformity and the Exaggerated Role of Rules: A
Survey of the Intra-State Uniformity in Three States that Have Not Adopted the
Federal Rules of Civil Procedure, 46 VILL. L. REV. 311, 322-23 (2001) (summariz-
ing previous studies by scholars that document the paucity of adoption of the
Federal Rules by states initially and the subsequent failure of states that initially
adopted the federal models to embrace amendments of the Federal Rules ap-
proved over the years by the Supreme Court).
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impact. Today, local rules significantly alter the applicable general
rules of procedure, as do judges' standing orders and courts' "internal
operating procedures."29 0 Although many of the reform efforts aimed
at state and federal rules were meant to encourage efficiency, econo-
mies offered by uniformity were often sacrificed in the process. 29 1
Recent reform efforts added more pieces to the patchwork quilt of
rules governing modern civil procedure. As a result, attorneys may no
longer assume that all rules are created and interpreted uniformly
among jurisdictions, even when the rules appear facially identical or
substantially similar. Local court rules must be meticulously re-
viewed and the judge's standing order consulted, especially on matters
relating to discovery.292
State and federal discovery rules, in particular, have undergone
sea changes in the past decade. Clearly, the autonomous civil justice
systems of the various states and the unified federal system remain
adversarial in nature, with each side bearing the burden of preparing
its own case. 29 3 But a new tide of compulsory cooperation294 has rid-
den in with recent amendments. Modern Federal Rules, for example,
place heightened responsibilities on counsel2 95 and judicial officers296
290. MCMORROW & COQUILLETTE, supra note 51, 801.15.
291. The Civil Justice Reform Act 1990, 28 U.S.C. §§ 471-82 (1990), for example, re-
quired every federal district court to re-examine, and where necessary, to revise,
its local rules and procedures in an effort to streamline the litigation process.
This congressional mandate resulted in federal districts formulating rules that
complimented their individual cultures and caseloads, without much concern for
whether the revised procedures were consistent with those used by other
districts.
292. Virtually all local rules of court and some judges' standing orders are available on
the courts' Internet home pages. Links to state court home pages are provided at
the National Center for State Courts homepage found at http://
www.ncsconline.org. Information on federal courts is found at http:/!
www.uscourts.gov/districtcourts.html. The home page for a particular court can
also be located by typing in the full or abbreviated name of the court (e.g., "North-
ern District Ohio," for the U.S. District Court for the Northern District of Ohio) in
any Internet general search engine.
293. See generally Stephan Landsman, A Brief Survey of the Development of the Adver-
sary System, 44 OHIO ST. L.J. 713 (1983) (explaining the history and key attrib-
utes of the adversary system used in England and the U.S.).
294. To the extent the term "compulsory cooperation" is oxymoronic, the author in-
tends the linguistic implications.
295. See, e.g., FED. R. Civ. P. 26(f) (requiring adversaries to jointly develop a discovery
plan for the court's review and possible integration into a pretrial management
order that addresses "whether discovery should be conducted in phases or be lim-
ited to or focused upon particular issues" and whether modifications should be
made to the limitations on discovery imposed by the general or local rules of
court).
296. The 1993 amendment to FED. R. Civ. P. 1 added the term "and administered" to
the rule that requires efficient and fair construction of all other procedural rules.
The added language was intended "to recognize the affirmative duty of the court
to exercise the authority conferred by these rules to ensure that civil litigation is
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to anticipate discovery and other disputes and exert substantial good
faith efforts to amiably resolve those disagreements.
The most radical and controversial amendments to discovery prac-
tice are rules that demand automatic disclosure of information to op-
posing counsel at the outset of litigation.2 97 These disclosures must
be completed in all federal courts and some state courts prior to using
traditional discovery devices such as requests for production of docu-
ments, interrogatories, and depositions.2 98 The impact of these rule
changes on discovery of information held by former employees of a
party is discussed later in this Article.2 99
The procedural rule most frequently invoked when disputes arise
over former employees is Federal Rule of Civil Procedure ("Fed. R.
Civ. P.") 26(c). This rule vests trial judges with wide discretion to
fashion "any order which justice requires" 30 0 to control discovery. At-
torneys often invoke Fed. R. Civ. P. 26(c) when urging courts to allow,
limit, condition, or deny ex parte informal communications with, or
formal discovery of, former employees. 30 1
In addition, Fed. R. Civ. P. 26(b) and state counterparts authorize
discovery of "any matter, not privileged, that is relevant to the claim
resolved not only fairly, but also without undue cost or delay." FED. R. Civ. P. 1
advisory committee note, 1993 amendments; see also, FED. R. Civ. P. 16(a)(2)
(suggesting that the court hold one or more pretrial conferences starting shortly
after each case is commenced with the goal of "establishing early and continuing
control so that the case will not be protracted because of lack of management");
FED. R. Civ. P. 16(b) (requiring the court to enter a scheduling order controlling
the timing of filing motions, completing discovery, and other matters); FED. R.
Civ. P. 26(c)(7) (advising the court to consider, and if possible, take action, on
numerous matters during pretrial conferences including "the control and sched-
uling of discovery").
297. See Linda S. Mullenix, Adversarial Justice, Professional Responsibility, and the
New Federal Discovery Rules, 14 REV. LITIG. 13 (1994); see also Eric F. Spade,
Note, A Mandatory Disclosure and Civil Justice Reform Proposal Based on the
Civil Justice Reform Act Experiments, 43 CLEV. ST. L. REV. 147 (1995).
298. The mandatory disclosure requirements were effectuated in federal courts
through the adoption of FED. R. Civ. P. 26(a)(1). Inaugurated in 1993 and materi-
ally amended in 2000, Fed. R. Civ. P. 26(a)(1) requires that "a party must, with-
out awaiting a discovery request, provide to other parties" non-privileged
information including names and addresses of individuals with knowledge sup-
portive of the disclosing party's claims or defenses, copies or descriptions of docu-
ments and tangible things that the disclosing party may use to support its claims
or defenses, and "a computation of any category of damages claimed by the dis-
closing party," with documentation of those calculations made available to oppo-
nents. Arizona's rule mandating automatic disclosure, which predates the
federal rule, requires even more information to be disclosed. See ARiz. R. Crv. P.
26.1(a) (requiring, inter alia, automatic disclosure of the factual basis and the
legal theories for each claim or defense asserted by the disclosing party).
299. See infra subsection V.B.2 (discussing initial mandatory disclosures).
300. FED. R. Civ. P. 26(c).
301. The role of protective orders in disputes concerning former employees is dis-
cussed infra subsection V.B.4.f.
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or defense of any party." As explained below, this rule often takes
center stage when adversaries clash over whether discovery of former
employees will invade privileges owned by the former employer. 30 2
Finally, pursuant to Fed. R. Civ. P. 11 and analogous state rules,
every pleading, motion, and other paper submitted to a court carries
an implicit certification that "an inquiry reasonable under the circum-
stances" 30 3 has been conducted, and that "the allegations and other
factual contentions have evidentiary support or, if specifically so iden-
tified, are likely to have evidentiary support after a reasonable oppor-
tunity for further investigation or discovery."304 Courts have
recognized that rigid application of ethical and other rules to limit dis-
covery, especially informal discovery, can seriously cripple an attor-
ney's effort to meet Fed. R. Civ. P. l's mandate, and thus should be
construed with Fed. R. Civ. P. 11 in mind. 30 5
B. The Pretrial Process
Modern litigation involves a wide range of pretrial rules that de-
mand immediate attention and action by counsel and judicial officers.
The goal of recent revisions to the rules,306 especially in federal
302. See the discussions of attorney-client privilege, work product, trade secrets and
proprietary information, self-evaluative privilege, and private law including con-
fidentiality and consulting agreements in Part VI, infra.
303. FED. R. Civ. P. 11(b).
304. FED. R. Civ. P. 11(b)(3).
305. See, e.g., Weider Sports Equip. Co. v. Fitness First, Inc., 912 F. Supp. 502, 508 (D.
Utah 1996) (rejecting defendants' argument for a restrictive interpretation of an
ethical rule, stating that the rule at issue is, "in reality, a rule of political and
economic power that shelters organizations, corporations and other business en-
terprises from the legitimate less costly inquiry and fact gathering process some-
times necessary to make a legitimate assessment of whether a valid claim for
relief exists" as required by FED. R. Civ. P. 11).
306. A substantial number of Federal Rules of Civil Procedure governing discovery
and other pretrial matters were amended in 1993 and 2000. For 1993 amend-
ments, see the advisory committee notes, 1993 amendments, and text of FED. R.
Civ. P. 11 (establishing standards for truthfulness in pleadings, motions, and
other representations to the court and clarifying, in subsection 11(d), that FED. R.
Crv. P. 11 sanctions are inapplicable to discovery matters covered by FED. R. Civ.
P.s 26 through 37); FED. R. Civ. P. 16(b) & (c) (governing pretrial conferences
with trial judge); FED. R. Civ. P. 26(a)-(g) (setting forth the general rules applica-
ble to all discovery, mandating voluntary disclosure of certain information at the
outset of the litigation and requiring cooperation between opposing counsel
throughout the discovery process, starting with joint preparation and presenta-
tion of a discovery management plan to the court); FED. R. Civ. P. 30(a)-(f) (pro-
scribing the number of depositions taken in a case and articulating standard of
conduct for attorneys during depositions); FED. R. Civ. P. 33(a)-(b) (setting limits
on interrogatories and clarifying respondents obligation to respond to all requests
for information that are not subject to objection); FED. R. Civ. P. 34 (clarifying
duty of respondent to produce all documents, tangible things and allow entry onto
land for testing purposes); and FED. R. Civ. P. 37 (providing sanctions for parties
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courts, is to inject a calming and cooperative influence 30 7 into a pro-
cess that, not uncommonly, digresses into a chaotic and combative
one.30 8 Stated differently, the amended pretrial rules are intended to
temper the phases of litigation where the "most distinguishing charac-
teristic is the level of acrimony displayed by counsel towards each
other."30
9
General discussions of the federal pretrial rules, and virtually all
disputes as to their appropriate interpretation in a specific case, refer-
ence the premier rule. Fed. R. Civ. P. 1 mandates construction and
administration of the rules to secure "the just, speedy, and inexpen-
sive determination of every action." 3 10 Carrying on with this theme,
Fed. R. Civ. P. 26(b) espouses a liberal discovery approach by permit-
ting "discovery regarding any matter, not privileged, which is relevant
to the subject matter involved in the pending action."3 11 Discovery
expressly encompasses witness testimony, documents, and other tan-
gible materials.312 Separately and in tandem, these rules permit, if
not require, broad, inexpensive, informal discovery as well as stream-
lined utilization of the formal discovery mechanisms, provided that
the information and materials being disclosed are not privileged.
and attorneys failing to comply with new and existing requirements in the discov-
ery rules). The 2000 amendments were fairly minor. One noteworthy change is
the 2000 amendment to FED. R. Civ. P. 26(a), which eliminated the power of indi-
vidual district courts to opt-out of the mandatory disclosure requirements and
clarified the categories of information subject to initial mandatory disclosure to
opposing counsel.
307. For example, modern rules governing depositions require attorneys to state objec-
tions "concisely and in a non-argumentative and non-suggestive manner," FED. R.
Civ. P. 30(d)(1), thereby discouraging so-called "speaking objections" used by de-
fending counsel to interrupt the flow of information from the deponent to oppos-
ing counsel. See generally Gerson A. Zweifach, Depositions Under the New
Federal Rules, 23 LITIG. 6 (1997). The Federal Rules also now require a party to
include in all motions to compel discovery "a certification that that the movant
has in good faith conferred or attempted to confer" with opposing counsel to re-
solve the dispute before seeking judicial intervention. FED. R. Civ. P. 37(a)(2)(A).
Litigants must also serve opponents with motions for sanctions for non-discovery
related transgressions at least twenty-one days before filing the motions with the
court to provide opponents time to modify or correct the offending actions without
judicial intervention. FED. R. Civ. P. 11(c)(1)(A). In addition, substantial recent
additions and amendments to local rules of court have required increased cooper-
ation among counsel. See, e.g., David H. Taylor, Rambo as Potted Plant: Local
Rulemaking's Preemptive Strike Against Witness-Coaching During Depositions,
40 VILL. L. REV. 1057 (1995).
308. See, e.g., John D. Shugrue, Identifying and Combating Discovery Abuse, 23 LITIG.
10 (1997).
309. Spencer v. Steinman, 179 F.R.D. 484, 486 (E.D. Pa. 1998) (commenting on the
partnership dispute before the court that had already appeared on the dockets of
several district, bankruptcy, and state court judges).
310. FED. R. Civ. P. 1.
311. FED. R. Civ. P. 26(b) (emphasis added).
312. See id.
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Due to the conflict among and within jurisdictions regarding the
appropriateness of ex parte contact or formal discovery involving for-
mer employees, an attorney would have, in the recent past, been well-
counseled to turn immediately to Fed. R. Civ. P. 29313 or its state
counterpart to negotiate an agreement with opposing counsel. How-
ever, recent changes in the rules of civil procedure, especially in fed-
eral court, require that counsel give careful consideration to the role
former employees might play in a controversy even before drafting the
complaint or preparing a responsive pleading. These important
changes to federal practice are discussed below.314
Arizona preceded the Federal Rules in requiring mandatory initial
disclosure and other cooperative rule requirements, 3 15 and Alaska fol-
lowed the federal courts' lead.316 Other states, however, have been
extremely reluctant to adopt the mandatory initial disclosure
model.317 Indeed, even federal courts were hesitant to begin the shift
from a purely adversarial model of discovery to a more cooperative one
as envisioned in the 1993 and 2000 amendments to the Federal
Rules.31s Accordingly, the discussion below applies primarily to fed-
eral court practice and assumes that federal courts are following Fed.
R. Civ. P. 26(a)(1)'s requirement of mandatory initial disclosure. But
even if a district court purports to honor Fed. R. Civ. P. 26(a), attor-
neys should, in the matter of initial disclosures and all others, care-
fully review the local rules of court and the assigned judge's standing
order to determine the contours of mandatory disclosure and other
discovery rules in that judge's chambers.319
313. FED. R. Civ. P. 29 provides in pertinent part that, "[u]less otherwise directed by
the court, the parties may by written stipulation... modify ... procedures gov-
erning or limitations placed upon discovery."
314. The process for amending the Federal Rules is explained in McMORROW & Co-
QUILLETTE, supra note 51, [[ 801.25-801.42.
315. See Amiz. R. Civ. P. 26.1(a) (as amended effective July 1, 1992).
316. See ALA. R. Civ. P. 26(a) (containing rules paralleling federal procedures).
317. Some states require automatic disclosure of certain information in specific pro-
ceedings. For example, New York requires disclosure of"any written report of an
accident prepared in the regular course of business operations or practices of any
person, firm, corporation, association, or other public or private entity." N.Y.
CML PRACTICE AND RULES § 3101(g). Massachusetts has mandatory self-disclo-
sure of financial information in domestic relations cases, including disclosure of
the parties' state and federal income tax returns for the past three years, bank
account statements, pay stubs, and other documents that verify the assets and
liabilities of the parties. MASS. SPECIAL PROBATE COURT RULES: DOMESTIC RELA-
TIONS SPECIAL RULES R. 410(a)(1)(a)-(g).
318. See supra note 306 for explanations of the 1993 and 2000 amendments to the
Federal Rules of Civil Procedure.
319. Local rules for all federal judicial districts are available in multi-volume sets in-
cluding West Group's FEDERAL LOCAL COURT RULES (3d ed. 2001). Most state and
federal courts also have Internet home pages sites with links to full text versions
of the local rules, judges' standing orders, and other jurisdiction-specific informa-
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1. Meeting with Opposing Counsel
Added to the Federal Rules in 1993 and as amended in 2000, Fed.
R. Civ. P. 26(f) directs that "the parties must, as soon as practicable
and, in any event, at least twenty-one days before a scheduling confer-
ence is held," meet to discuss a number of issues. The parties must
confer on "the possibilities for a prompt settlement or resolution of the
case"32 0 and must either "make or arrange for"321 the automatic dis-
closures of information required by the Federal Rules. The parties
must also jointly prepare a "proposed discovery plan that indicates the
parties' views and proposals" 3 22 on several topics, including the tim-
ing and scope of discovery and any limitations that should be imposed
on discovery. 32 3
Counsel for the parties "are jointly responsible for arranging the
conference, for attempting in good faith to agree on the proposed dis-
covery plan, and for submitting to the court within 14 days of the con-
ference a written report outlining the plan."3 24 A court may, by local
rule, modify the timing for submission of the plan or permit an oral
report in lieu of a written one, but such modifications are appropriate
only where necessary to comply with a court's other local rules requir-
ing expedited pretrial conferences with a judicial officer. 325
Fed. R. Civ. P. 26(f) provides an opportunity, if not a duty, for coun-
sel to raise anticipated issues regarding discovery of former employ-
ees, to resolve them amicably, and present their resolution for the
court's blessing.32 6 If good faith negotiations fail to produce accord,
attorneys are obliged to bring the issues to the court's attention in the
jointly authored discovery proposal.
Rules requiring counsel to reach an accord regarding discovery of
all incendiary discovery matters raise a more precise issue: to what
should an attorney agree when former employees are an issue? One
reasonable approach is to agree that counsel can contact former em-
ployees of their respective clients, provided that full and fair informa-
tion. The web sites are easily located by subject searching under the name of the
court on any general Internet search engine.
320. FED. R. Civ. P. 26(f).
321. Id.
322. Id.
323. FED. R. Civ. P. 26(f)(2) & (3). See generally Jonathan M. Stern, The Discovery
Plan, 24 LITIG. 34, 37 (Spring 1998) (noting that "discovery is but one part, albeit
an extremely important part, of the litigation plan," and providing an overview of
the plan's required contents as well as practical considerations in jointly prepar-
ing the plan with opposing counsel).
324. FED. R. Civ. P. 26(f).
325. See id.
326. See, e.g., Terra Int'l, Inc. v. Miss. Chem. Corp., 913 F. Supp. 1306, 1315 n.10
(N.D. Iowa 1996) (upholding parties' agreement regarding contact with a former
employee).
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tion is provided to the persons being contacted. 32 7 Another possibility
is agreeing to provide notice to opposing counsel in advance of contact-
ing a particular former employee, paired with an agreement that for-
mer employee's counsel will not contact the person between the time
of the notice and before the conclusion of the interview.328 Among
other things, the notice gives the former employer's counsel time to
ascertain whether claims of privilege may exist regarding the inter-
viewee, and to seek judicial intervention when necessary to preserve
the endangered privilege. 3 29 Another option is to allow -opposing
counsel to attend the interview, but not participate except to state ob-
jections on the grounds of privilege. 330
These procedures defeat any advantage gained through stealth dis-
covery of an opponent's former employees, but they also minimize the
possibility of significant collateral litigation and the imposition of
sanctions stemming from improper contact with former employees as
discussed throughout this Article.3 3 1
2. Initial Mandatory Disclosures
The current Federal Rules 33 2 and some state rules 3 33 embrace effi-
ciency and cooperation as core values by requiring parties to automat-
ically disclose certain information and materials to their opponents
shortly after commencement of litigation. Completed disclosure is
usually a prerequisite to formal discovery.334 Rules requiring
327. See discussion of Model Rule 4.3 supra text accompanying notes 242-84.
328. The approach was endorsed by the court in In re Prudential Insurance Co. of
America, 911 F. Supp. 148, 153 (D.N.J. 1995).
329. See id.
330. See id.
331. See generally John E. Iole & John D. Goetz, Ethics or Procedure? A Discovery
Based Approach to Ex Parte Contacts with Former Employees of a Corporate Ad-
versary, 68 NOTRE DAME L. REV. 81 (1992) (suggesting that formal discovery may
be more appropriate as it avoids ethical dilemmas presented by ex parte contact).
332. These amendments were part of the civil justice reform movement that gained
momentum in the late 1980s and continues to the present day. See, e.g., The
Judicial Improvements Act of 1990, Pub. L. No. 101-650, 104 Stat. 5089 (enacting
and amending various laws aimed at creating a more efficient justice system,
including the Civil Justice Reform Act (CJRA), codified at 28 U.S.C. §§ 471-82
(2001), which directed every federal district court to revise its local procedures to
streamline the litigation process); Heather Russell Koenig, The Eastern District
of Virginia: A Working Solution for Civil Justice Reform, 32 U. RICH. L. REV.799,
801 (1998) (arguing that the subject district was highly efficient prior to the
CJRA due to "judge-controlled dockets and strict attorney compliance with, and
unconditional respect for, the local rules of the district"); Gregory P. Joseph,
Emerging Issues Under the 1993 Amendments to the Federal Civil Rules, 540 PLI
LITIG. 429 (1996) (discussing the positive and negative impact of the reforms ef-
fectuated by the 1993 amendments to the Federal Rules of Civil Procedure).
333. See ARiz. R. Crv. P. 26.1; ALA. R. Civ. P. 26(a).
334. See FED. R. Civ. P. 26(d).
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mandatory disclosures have been lauded 33 5 and condemned. 336 Com-
mentators have critiqued disclosure requirements on general princi-
ples, such as being directly contrary to our adversarial system of
justice, and in specific application, especially regarding the lack of
clarity the 1993 Federal Rules provided as to the consent and timing
of disclosure. Supporters of the changes countered that the adversary
system should be abandoned. 3 37 They also opined that the contro-
versy surrounding rules mandating early disclosure of information
that would inevitably be exchanged during the subsequent formal dis-
covery phase constituted "much ado about nothing."3 38
Lack of clarity in the 1993 version of Fed. R. Civ. P. 26(a) war-
ranted criticism. The 1993 rule required initial disclosures of the
name, address, and telephone number "of each individual likely to
have discoverable information relevant to disputed facts alleged with
particularity in the pleadings" and to identify the type of information
each person might have. 33 9 The 1993 rules also required automatic
disclosure of all documents and tangible evidence "in the possession,
custody, or control of the party that are relevant to disputed facts."
3 4o
The 1993 requirements arguably mandated disclosure of the iden-
tity of and information held by a litigant's former employees which
were relevant to all claims and defenses advocated by all parties to the
litigation. However, the issue of how much investigation a party had
335. See, e.g., Robert E. Oliphant, Four Years of Experience with Rule 26(A)(1): The
Rule is Alive and Well, 24 WM. MITCHELL L. REV. 323 (1998).
336. When the U.S. Supreme Court forwarded the proposed amendments that in-
cluded the mandatory disclosure provisions to Congress in 1993, Justice Scalia
was joined in dissent by Justices Souter and Thomas. The dissenters character-
ized mandatory disclosure as "potentially disastrous," stating that it would un-
dermine the traditional adversary principle that each counsel must prepare his
or her own case. Amendments to the Federal Rules of Civil Procedure, 146 F.R.D.
501, 510-12 (1993). Once the matter was in Congress' hands, the House of Rep-
resentatives passed legislation removing the mandatory disclosure provisions
from the amendments to FED. R. Crv. P. 26(a). See H.R. 2814, 103d Cong. § 2
(1993). The Senate's failure to pass similar legislation allowed the provisions to
become effective. See also Griffin B. Bell et al., Automatic Disclosure in Discovery
- The Rush to Reform, 27 GA. L. REV. 1, 28 (1992) (commenting that "[tihe radical
nature of the proposed changes to Rule 26 triggered a storm of criticism" from
academics, practicing lawyers, bar associations, and other groups and
individuals).
337. See, e.g., Carrie Menkel-Meadow, The Trouble with the Adversary System in a
Post Modern, Multi-Cultural World, 38 WM. & MARY L. REV. 5 (1996); Rogelio A.
Lasso, Gladiators be Gone: The New Disclosure Rules Compel a Re-Examination
of the Adversary Process, 36 B.C. L. REV. 479 (1995).
338. See Charles W. Sorensen, Disclosure Under Federal Rule of Civil Procedure
26(A): "Much Ado About Nothing?", 46 HASTINGs L.J. 679 (1995) (arguing that the
rule changes as best altered the timing but not the substance of discovery
practice).
339. FED. R. Civ. P. 26(a)(1)(A) (1993).
340. FED. R. Civ. P. 26(a)(1)(B) (1993).
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to do at the initiation of the litigation, including locating and commu-
nicating with former employees, was not answered by the 1993 rule
changes.
Another legitimate criticism of the 1993 version of Fed. R. Civ. P.
26(a) was that the civil pleading rules do not require, and indeed re-
ject, the concept of pleading with particularity.3 41 Modern rules re-
quire only that the complaint contain "a short and plain statement of
the claim showing that the pleader is entitled to relief."34 2 The rules
legitimize the most minimal pleadings necessary to give "fair notice of
what the plaintiffs claim is and the grounds upon which it rests."3 43
Thus, requiring disclosure of information relevant to facts "plead with
particularity" was at best confusing and at worst meaningless in a no-
tice pleading system.34 4
As enacted in 1993, Fed. R. Civ. P. 26(a) also expressly allowed
individual federal district courts to opt out of the mandatory disclo-
sure provision, and about one-half of the federal trial courts did.345
The lack of uniform adoption of mandatory disclosure and the in-
herent ambiguity in the rules where the practice was adopted resulted
in significant amendments to Fed. R. Civ. P. 26(a). These changes,
effective in December 2000, eliminated the "opt out" provision for dis-
341. Pleading requirements in FED. R. Civ. P. 8 and in analogous state rules advocate
basic "notice pleading," which is the antithesis of pleading with particularity. See
FED. R. Civ. P. 84 (explaining that the Appendix of Forms provided with the Fed-
eral Rules "are intended to indicate the simplicity and brevity" of pleadings con-
templated by the rules); Swierkiewicz v. Sorema, 534 U.S. 506 (2002) (rejecting
heightened pleading standard for federal age discrimination claims); Leatherman
v. Tarranty County Narcotics Intelligence & Coordination Unit, 507 U.S. 163,
168-69 (1993) (rejecting court-imposed heightened pleading standards for cases
involving claims of constitutional rights violations where qualified immunity de-
fense is anticipated).
342. FED. R. Civ. P. 8(a)(2).
343. Swierkiewicz, 534 U.S. at 512 (quoting Conley v. Gibson, 355 U.S. 41, 47 (1957)).
344. Pleading with particularity is, however, still required in a narrow group of cases.
These include cases alleging common law fraud, where particularity is demanded
by FED. R. CIv. P. 9(b), and in federal securities litigation, where significantly
detailed pleading is required due to recent efforts to reform federal securities
laws to eliminate specious suits. See, e.g., In re Nice Sys., 135 F. Supp. 2d 551,
569 (D.N.J. 2001) (holding that the level of detailed pleading required to state
sufficient federal securities law claim included not only information about the
alleged fraudulent acts of the defendant but also the identity of defendant's for-
mer employees from whom the information regarding defendant's action was
obtained).
345. A survey conducted by the Federal Judicial Center concluded that forty-five of
the ninety-four federal district courts opted out of the mandatory disclosure re-
quirements, but eighteen of the forty-five districts that opted out allowed individ-
ual judges to adopt mandatory disclosure if they so desired. DONNA STIENSRA,
FEDERAL JUDICIAL CENTER, IMPLEMENTATION OF DISCLOSURE IN THE UNITED
STATES DISTRICT COURTS, WITH SPECIAL ATTENTION TO COURTS' RESPONSES TO SE-
LECTED AMENDMENTS TO FEDERAL RULE OF CIvIL PROCEDURE 26, at 5 (1996).
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trict courts. 346 Thus, mandatory disclosure appears to be a perma-
nent feature on our legal landscape, assuming, as previously noted,
that judges are honoring these requirements in their local rules of
court and in their standing and case-specific orders.
At least two other important clarifications were achieved by the
2000 amendments to Fed. R. Civ. P. 26(a). First, the internally incon-
sistent requirement that information "relevant to disputed facts plead
with particularity" was eliminated. Instead, the rule simply requires
disclosure of "discoverable information."347 Second, the rule no longer
requires disclosure of all "relevant" information, but rather narrows
the category to "information that the disclosing party may use to sup-
port its claims or defenses."348 Thus, a party is no longer obligated to
anticipate information in its possession that might be relevant to their
opponent's claims or defenses.
With the above parameters in mind, all parties must now disclose
"the name and, if known, the address and telephone number of each
individual likely to have discoverable information";3 49 identify the
subjects on which the identified individuals may have information; 350
provide copies of, or a description of, documents and other tangible
items "that are in the possession, custody, or control of the [disclosing]
party";3 5 1 and render a "computation of any category of damages
claimed by the disclosing party,"35 2 accompanied by any non-privi-
leged documents and other evidentiary materials that support the
damage calculation.353 Disclosures "must be made in writing, signed,
and served" pursuant to other applicable rules.354 A party must also
seasonably update information and materials furnished to an adver-
sary during initial mandatory disclosures "if the party learns that in
some material respect the information disclosed is incomplete or
incorrect." 3 55
The 2000 amendments clarified Fed. R. Civ. P. 26(a), but they did
not resolve all questions relating to mandatory discovery. The most
important question, and one certainly outside the scope of this Article,
is whether attorneys and judges who have long participated in an ad-
versary process 356 will embrace rule changes that value cooperation
346. See FED. R. Civ. P. 26(a) advisory committee note, 2000 amendments.
347. FED. R. CIv. P. 26(a)(1)(A).
348. Id. (emphasis added).
349. FED. R. Civ. P. 26(a)(1)(A).
350. See id.
351. FED. R. Civ. P. 26(a)(1)(B).
352. FED. R. Civ. P. 26(a)(1)(C).
353. See id.
354. FED. R. Civ. P. 26(a)(4).
355. FED. R. Civ. P. 26(e)(1).
356. The adversary process is frequently analogized to a war, with opponents becom-
ing firmly moored in their respective trenches, employing various tactical devices
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over combativeness. Another threshold issue lurks in the requirement
that "discoverable information" be automatically disclosed. As dis-
cussed later in this Article, major discovery battles are frequently
waged over whether particular information or evidence is "discovera-
ble" or is shielded from discovery under privilege, work product, and
other doctrines.357
In short, numerous specific questions concerning the role of former
employees in discovery linger despite the 2000 revision of Fed. R. Civ.
P. 26(a). What information, if any, must a party provide to an adver-
sary about former employees during the initial disclosure phase of the
litigation? Is the former employer obligated to locate former employ-
ees and then turn the fruits of the investigation over to the adversary,
either at the commencement of the litigation or in supplemental re-
sponses? 358 Are documents, computer files, and other tangible mater-
ials retained by former employees "in the possession, custody, or
control" of the former employer? And, even more to the point, what
sanctions, if any, will a party face for failing to voluntarily disclose
information and materials held by former employees?
The advisory committee notes and the text of the 2000 version of
Fed. R. Civ. P. 26(a) do not directly answer these questions or provide
much guidance on the myriad issues presented by former employees.
The rule demands that the "party must make its initial disclosures
based on the information then reasonably available to it and is not
excused from making its disclosures because it has not fully completed
its investigation of the case."3 59 Again, the "reasonably available" lan-
guage adds another layer of ambiguity to the employer's responsibility
as cannon fodder, and using surprise attacks to cause the opponent to be the first
to wave the white flag. See, e.g., DAVID BARNHIZER, THE WARRIOR LAWYER (1998)
(stating that the litigation/war analogy is common but arguing that attorneys
achieve better results for clients by being less combative and more cooperative
throughout the litigation process, and especially by carefully thinking through
strategy before implementing it). In a more precise sense, the adversary process
utilized in the U.S. "is a unified concept that works by the use of a number of
interconnecting procedures." Stephan A. Landsman, A Brief Survey of the Devel-
opment of the Adversary System, 44 OHIO ST. L.J. 713, 714 (1983).
The central precept of adversary process is that out of the sharp clash of
proofs presented by adversaries in a highly structured forensic setting is
most likely to come the information from which a neutral and passive
decision maker can resolve a litigated dispute in a manner that is accept-
able both to the parties and to society.
Id.
357. See Part VI, infra.
358. The rules impose a duty to supplement initial disclosures "at appropriate inter-
vals ... if the party learns that in some material respect the information dis-
closed is incomplete or incorrect." FED. R. Civ. P. 26(e)(1). The same requirement
applies to material obtained through formal discovery mechanisms. See FED. R.
Civ. P. 26(e)(2).
359. FED. R. Civ. P. 26(a)(1)(E).
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to locate and identify information retained by former employees. At a
minimum, the inherent ambiguity as to the rule's applicability to for-
mer employees suggests that a candid discussion with the judge, and
possibly opposing counsel, on the topic of former employees and dis-
covery is warranted at the outset of the litigation.
Broaching the subject of former employees at the commencement
of litigation essentially destroys a party's ability to use former employ-
ees (either their own or those of an opponent) as secret weapons in the
litigation process. That deprivation is not insignificant, but the forfei-
ture of any litigation strategy must always be weighed against the
possibility of the tactic backfiring. If a court ultimately decides that a
party was without "substantial justification" for failing to disclose in-
formation from or about a former employee, the offending party faces
sanctions including being denied use of the former employee's infor-
mation "as evidence at a trial, at a hearing, or on a motion."3 60 In
addition to excluding a party's key evidence, the court "may impose
other appropriate sanctions," including the payment of attorneys fees,
the designation of certain facts as established for the remainder of the
litigation, "informing the jury of the failure to make the disclosure,"
dismissal of all or part of the offending party's claims for relief, and
stripping the offending party of certain defenses or entering default
judgment.361
3. Initial Pretrial Conference and Resultant Scheduling Order
The Federal Rules outline a process where the parties and the
court take timely and focused control over the litigation. The initial
requirement is the meeting, "as soon as practicable," of parties to dis-
cuss discovery and other issues portended by the case, followed within
fourteen days by a joint submission of a written proposal detailing the
timing and substance of initial mandatory disclosures and subsequent
formal discovery. 3 62
The second step is a meeting of the litigants and the judge to dis-
cuss the parties' proposal. 36 3 Agreements reached and decisions ren-
dered during this initial pretrial conference are memorialized in a
360. FED. R. Civ. P. 37(c)(1). In Jakob v. Champion International Corp., No. 01 C
0497, 2001 U.S. Dist. LEXIS 19010 (N.D. Ill. Nov. 14, 2001), the court recognized
that the defendant should have voluntarily disclosed the identities and locations
of former employees with knowledge of plaintiffs termination and resultant
claim of retaliatory discharge, but did not impose sanctions because defendant
agreed, prior to the hearing on this and related discovery disputes, to provide the
information and to hire a private investigator if necessary to help locate the for-
mer employees with knowledge. Id. at *4 n.1, *5 n.2.
361. Id. (incorporating sanctions provided in FED. R. Civ. P. 37(b)(2)(A)-(C)).
362. FED. R. Civ. P. 26(f); see supra text accompanying notes 320-31.
363. See FED. R. Civ. P. 16(b).
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court order establishing case-specific discovery rules and deadlines. 364
Expediency remains a priority during this phase, as the rules require
the initial scheduling order be issued "as soon as practicable," and, "in
any event within 90 days of the appearance of a defendant and within
120 days after the complaint has been served on a defendant."3 6 5 The
court may also issue, either as part of the initial scheduling order 36 6
or as a separate decree, protective orders that limit the nature and
sources of discovery, including access to former employees of the
litigant.3 67
Court orders become the law of the case, superseding discovery di-
rectives, standards, and timetables set forth in general and local civil
rules and in other authorities that govern attorney conduct. 368 Thus,
any rules established in court orders for informal or formal contact
with former employees of a party must be scrupulously obeyed. 36 9
Counsel are, of course, free to seek modification of an initial or sub-
sequent court order governing discovery, and such motions may be
pursued jointly or individually. 370 Counsel should be aware, however,
that issuance of a court order seriously impedes if not defeats the
364. See id.
365. FED. R. Civ. P. 16(b). Of course, the timetable for the initial pretrial conference
that the rules purportedly impose on courts cannot be enforced by the parties.
Indeed, the rule changes aimed as redefining judges as aggressive case managers
are for the most part advisory. Individual district courts also have internal rules
and procedures, established and administered by the chief judge, governing
judges' duties related to case management and timely disposition of cases. But
neither court administrative rules nor the rules of procedure provide litigants
with a remedy when judges disregard the rules. In an extreme case, a party
might resort to filing an extraordinary writ with an appeals court or a complaint
that a judge violated the Judicial Code of Ethics by disregarding the rules. The
likely result of either tactic, however, is that the litigants will become embroiled
in an extended collateral adversarial proceeding, and the judge (and perhaps his
or her colleagues) will be deeply offended by the attack. Neither result advances
the client's interests or the attorney's future prospects for success in that court.
366. FED. R. Civ. P. 16(b)(6) authorizes the judge to include in the initial court order
"any other matters appropriate in the circumstances of the case."
367. FED. R. Civ. P. 26(c) empowers a court to resolve discovery disputes by entering
protective orders that set discovery boundaries appropriate for the particular
case. See also infra subsection V.B.4.f.
368. For an example of how comprehensive a pretrial order might be, see Northern
Indiana Public Service Co. v. Certain Underwriters at Lloyd's of London, No.
1:95-CV-331, 1996 WL 115466 (N.D. Ind. Mar. 5, 1996) (governing all aspects of
formal and informal discovery and other aspects of pretrial litigation, including
placing limits on ex parte communications with former employees of adversaries).
369. As amended in February 2002, the comment to Model Rule 4.2 advises that ob-
taining a court order is appropriate for a "lawyer who is uncertain whether a
communication with a represented person is permissible." MODEL RULES OF
PROF'L CONDUCT R. 4.2 cmt. 6 (2002).
370. FED. R. Civ. P. 16(b), for example, states that the initial discovery order entered
by the court "shall not be modified except upon a showing of good cause and by
leave of the district judge or . . . by a magistrate judge." FED. R. Civ. P. 26(c)
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power litigants otherwise possess to modify the "procedures governing
or limitations placed upon discovery"3 71 by entering into a written
stipulation with opposing counsel. In addition, penalties for violating
a court order are traditionally harsher than those imposed for violat-
ing a rule of procedure. 3 72
4. Formal Discovery Devices
All rules of civil procedure require parties to exhibit reasonable,
good faith efforts to provide accurate and complete information when
responding to formal discovery requests. When parties respond to in-
terrogatories, requests for production of documents, deposition no-
tices, and other formal discovery devices, a critical issue arises as to
what, if any, control a former employer/litigant has over its former
employees and the information they possess.
Is it appropriate, for example, for the former employer's counsel to
"advise" a former employee not to speak to other counsel "under any
circumstances"? 37 3 Must an employer seek information from former
employees to fully respond to interrogatories or document requests?
Does the former employer have standing to move to quash a subpoena
duces tecum issued to a former employee? Can counsel for the former
employer defend the former employee during a deposition? The law
remains unclear on these issues.
One of the few set rules in the otherwise ambiguous jurisprudence
surrounding former employees is that information about them must
be relevant to the lawsuit before it is discoverable.374 Another is that
an attorney cannot unilaterally establish an attorney-client relation-
allows a party from whom discovery is sought to move the court for an order
decreeing that discovery not be had or only be had under specific circumstances.
371. FED. R. Civ. P. 29.
372. Sanctions for failure to respond to discovery in the manner required by applicable
procedural rules include an award of expenses including attorney fees, entry of
an order compelling disclosure, and entry of a protective order detailing what is
to be disclosed and what is privileged. See FED. R. Civ. P. 37(a)(4). In contrast,
failure to comply with a court order compelling or otherwise governing discovery
may result in more severe sanctions that include designating certain facts as es-
tablished, excluding evidence, dismissal of some or all of the offending party's
claims, exclusion of specific defenses, and entry of default judgment. FED. R. Crv.
P. 37(b)(2)(A)-(D).
373. In Brown v. St. Joseph's County, 148 F.R.D. 246, 248 (N.D. Ill. 1993), for example,
defense counsel "advised" a former employer not to speak to opposing counsel
'under any circumstances." The court did not comment on the propriety of coun-
sel's "advice."
374. See, e.g., Spina v. Our Lady of Mercy Med. Ctr., No. 97 CIV 4661 (RCC), 2001
U.S. Dist. LEXIS 7338, 86 Fair Empl. Prac. Cas. (BNA) 246 (S.D.N.Y. June 7,
2001) (rejecting sexual harassment plaintiffs motion to compel additional infor-
mation about defendant's former employee who was terminated eighteen months
before plaintiff was hired by defendant).
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ship with a client's former employees. 3 75 Thus, it cannot be assumed
that the former employer has standing to move to quash a subpoena
issued to a former employee, or that the former employer's attorney
has the right to object to questions its client finds objectionable during
a former employee's deposition. These and related topics are dis-
cussed below.
a. Interrogatories
The initial mandatory disclosure of information under the Federal
Rules arguably requires a former employer/litigant to at least identify
former employees with information relevant to the employer's claims
or defenses. 3 76 Parties are also routinely asked in subsequent inter-
rogatories 37 7 to identify any persons with knowledge about the facts of
the case and are entitled to complete responses to this question.3 78 As
375. A corporate defendant was unsuccessful in arguing that its former employees
were "parties" within the meaning of Model Rule 4.2 by virtue of its insurance
company's retention of an a litigator to represent the corporation and all current
and former employees. The court held that the attorney-client relationship,
which is generally determined by contract and agency principles, cannot be estab-
lished absent the express or at least implied consent of those involved in the rela-
tionship. Brown, 148 F.R.D. at 250-53. Accordingly, former employees who
never requested nor accepted the legal services of their former employer's legal
counsel were not "represented by counsel" within the meaning of Model Rule 4.2.
Id. at 253.
376. See supra subsection V.B.2.
377. FED. R. Civ. P. 33 governs the use of interrogatories in federal court. Interrogato-
ries are relatively easy to prepare, and thus constitute one of the most frequently
used and least expensive discovery devices available to a litigant. R. LAWRENCE
DESSEM, PRETRIAL LITIGATION, LAW, POLICY & PRACTICE 290-91 (3d ed. 2001).
Except for the standard limitations required under various privilege doctrines,
see infra Part VI, a party can use interrogatories to discover factual information
and to inquire as to opinions and legal contentions held by a party. FED. R. Civ.
P. 33(c) (clarifying that an interrogatory is not subject to objection "merely be-
cause the answer ... involves an opinion or contention that relates to fact or the
application of law to fact"); Iain D. Johnston & Robert G. Johnston, Contention
Interrogatories in Federal Court, 148 F.R.D. 441 (1993). The utility of interroga-
tories to fully flesh out an opponent's evidence and legal theories was substan-
tially curtailed in federal courts, however, by the 1993 amendments limiting each
party to twenty-five interrogatories, including subparts, unless the proponent ob-
tains leave of court or written stipulation from the responding party allowing a
larger number. FED. R. Civ. P. 33(a). And, even prior to the 1993 amendments to
the general rule, the vast majority of federal district courts had, through local
rules of court, limited the number of interrogatories available without leave of
court. See Daniel R. Coquillette, Mary P. Squiers & Stephen N. Subrin, The Role
of Local Rules, A.B.A. J., Jan. 1989, at 62, 65 (reporting limitations on interroga-
tories in 80% of federal courts).
378. Baker v. First Tenn. Bank Nat'l Ass'n, No. 96-6740, 1998 WL 136560, at *5 (6th
Cir. Mar. 19, 1998) (noting that two former employees were named in defendant's
response to interrogatories asking defendant to identify persons with knowledge);
Robbins v. Camden Bd. of Ed., 105 F.R.D. 49, 58 (D.N.J. 1985) (recognizing the
parties are "clearly entitled to know the identity of persons having knowledge of
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emphasized throughout this Article, former employees of a party fre-
quently fall within the category of "persons with knowledge."3 79
Courts have also compelled counsel to identify the former employees
of an adversary from whom documents and information were obtained
as a sanction for inappropriately contacting those individuals. 38 0 A
related issue is whether the former employer has a duty to consult
with former employees to provide full answers to interrogatories pro-
pounded by an opponent.
The debate over identifying former employees in interrogatory re-
sponses arose in Houck v. Hardee's Food Systems, Inc.38 1 Plaintiff
was a former vice president of Hardee's who sued to recover severance
pay.38 2 One of the plaintiffs interrogatories asked his former em-
ployer to provide the names and last known addresses of all Hardee's
officers terminated on a particular date.38 3 Hardee's provided the
names, but not the addresses of four former officers. Defendant's rea-
son for excluding the addresses was that it was inappropriate for
plaintiff to interview these former corporate officers ex parte. 38 4
The court compelled production of the former employees' addresses
based on ethics opinions issued by North Carolina and the ABA al-
lowing for contact with former employees of a party, even where those
employees had occupied managerial positions.385 The court held that
factual information willingly provided by defendant's former employ-
ees could be appropriately harvested by plaintiff via informal discov-
ery, but cautioned plaintiffs counsel "that they may not communicate
ex parte with "any [former] employee regarding matters protected by
the attorney-client privilege."38 6
the facts pertaining to the incident at issue" in response to interrogatories inquir-
ing of same).
379. Cases where interrogatories were propounded asking a party specifically to iden-
tify former employees with knowledge include Houck v. Hardee's Food Sys., Inc.,
No. 5:98-CV-373-BR(2), 1999 U.S. Dist. LEXIS 6856, at *2-3 (E.D.N.C. Mar. 23,
1999); Camden v. Maryland, 910 F. Supp. 1115, 1117 (1996); Godby v. Electrolux
Corp., 62 Fair Empl. Prac. Cas. (BNA) 1147 (N.D. Ga. 1993); Hanntz v. Shirley,
Inc., 766 F. Supp. 258, 259 (D.N.J. 1991); Hoffman v. United Telecomm., Inc., 117
F.R.D. 440, 443 (D. Kan. 1987).
380. See, e.g., Clark v. Beverly Health & Rehab. Serv., Inc., No. 99-0163B, 2002 Mass.
Super. LEXIS 138, at *5-6 (Mass. Super. Ct. Feb. 26, 2002).
381. No. 5:98-CV-373-BR(2), 1999 U.S. Dist. LEXIS 6856 (E.D.N.C. Mar. 23, 1999).
382. Id. at *2.
383. See id.
384. See id. at *2-3.
385. See id. at *3-5 (citing 97 N.C. Formal Ethics Op. 2 (Jan. 16, 1998) and ABA
Comm. on Ethics and Profl Responsibility, Formal Op. 95-396 n.47 (1995)).
386. Id. at *5; cf. Wein v. Williamsport Hosp. & Med. Ctr., 45 Pa. D. & C.4th 537, 540
(Pa. Commw. Ct. 2000) (requiring defendant to provide names and last-known
telephone numbers and addresses of former employees with knowledge relevant
to plaintiffs malpractice claim, but not requiring defendant to update the infor-
mation unless it had already done so in preparing for the case; court placed no
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Given the high degree of relevance in many cases of the informa-
tion held by former employees of a litigant, it appears disingenuous for
a party to refuse to identify former employees in the "persons with
knowledge category." However, the response of Hardee's counsel in
providing names but not addresses was appropriate, as counsel
presented a good faith, legally supported argument, well grounded in
ethical rules, that opposing counsel's ex parte contact with defendant's
former employees might be inappropriate. Even though ultimately
compelled to provide the addresses, the defendant obtained a court
order clarifying that opposing counsel could not invade any privileged
information while interviewing the former employees. Thus, while not
winning the war, counsel for the former employer won an important
battle by clarifying and entrenching applicable discovery principles
and ethics rules in a case-specific court order governing opposing
counsel's communication with the former employees.
The issue of whether a former employer must consult with former
employees to fully answer interrogatories is a more difficult matter,
with no guidance readily available from case law. 38 7 The Federal
Rules and analogous state rules require that, absent an express and
detailed objection, "each interrogatory shall be answered separately
and fully in writing under oath."388 If a party fails to respond to an
interrogatory, opposing counsel may, after making a good faith effort
to persuade the offending party to respond, move to compel an an-
swer. 38 9 "An evasive or incomplete" answer constitutes a failure to
respond. 390 In addition to ordering a full response to the interro-
gatory, the court can require the offending party to pay her opponent's
expenses, including attorney fees, related to compelling the motion.39 1
Mandatory consultations with former employees to formulate com-
plete responses to interrogatories may be obvious in some cases, as
where the only persons with knowledge are former employees. 3 92 And
it is undoubtedly contrary to the spirit, if not the letter, of modern
discovery rules for a party who has an ongoing relationship with for-
mer employees 3 93 to harvest the former employees' knowledge about a
disputed matter and then refuse to share discoverable facts with an
specific restrictions on plaintiffs ex parte contact with defendant's former
employees).
387. Extensive manual and computer-based research located no court opinions di-
rectly on point.
388. FED. R. Civ. P. 33(b)(1).
389. FED. R. Civ. P. 37(a)(2)(B).
390. FED. R. Civ. P. 37(a)(3)
391. FED. R. Civ. P. 37(a)(4)(A).
392. Jakob v. Champion Int'l Corp., No. 01 C 0497, 2001 U.S. Dist. LEXIS 19010, at *2
(N.D. Ill. Nov. 14, 2001).
393. The former employer could reap the information as part of a formal relationship
created through a consulting arrangement, or through an informal process such
as inviting the former employee to the company's annual golf outing or holiday
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opponent seeking such information through interrogatories. 39 4 As
with any discovery dilemma, the effort a party must put forth to con-
tact former employees to fully answer interrogatories can only be de-
termined on a case by case basis. A counsel's resolution of this
dilemma, however, must take into account the heightened standards
of good faith and cooperation to which her conduct will be held under
modern civil rules governing discovery, local rules of court, and the
standing and case-specific orders of the judicial officer presiding over
the case.
b. Depositions
Following the exchange of initial mandatory disclosures, 395 the
Federal Rules allow a party to "take the testimony of any person, in-
cluding a party, by deposition upon oral examination without leave of
court."396 Deposition of a party is effectuated by giving "reasonable
notice in writing" to all parties to the litigation, specifying the time
and place for the deposition, the identity of the deponent, and informa-
tion on how the deposition is to be recorded. 39 7 A subpoena duces te-
cum may also be served, requiring the deponent to produce materials
designated in the subpoena at or before commencement of the
deposition. 398
The importance of depositions cannot be understated. The re-
corded exchange between examining attorney and deponent provides
critical factual information supporting or undermining the claims and
defenses asserted in the case and provides the sworn materials needed
to support dispositive motions. Equally important, the live deposition
allows counsel to assess the demeanor and thus the relative credibility
of potential trial witnesses as they relay information under conditions
similar to those at trial, including the possibility of being penalized for
perjured testimony. Settlement is commonly inspired by a deposition
of a witness who either remains calm and convincing or who crumbles.
And, as previously noted, formal depositions of a party's former em-
party with instructions to a current employee to talk to the former employee
about the case.
394. One court labeled such tactics as the "Stalingrad Defense," that is, yielding "not a
single inch, and eventually the opposition may be beaten down into submission
by not only by the cold, unforgiving winter, but also by the sheer tenacity and
persistence of the defenders." In re GMC Corp., 110 F.3d 1003, 1008 (4th Cir.
1996 ), cert denied, 522 U.S. 814 (1997). The court also sanctioned the defenders
who employed the Stalingrad strategy. Id.
395. FED. R. Civ. P. 30(a)(2)(C).
396. FED. R. Civ. P. 30(a)(1). The 1993 amendments to the Federal Rules impose a
limit of ten depositions per side, although this number can be increased by order
of the court. FED. R. Civ. P. 30(a)(2)(A). Also, absent court order, each "deposi-
tion is limited to one day of seven hours." FED. R. Civ. P. 30(d)(2).
397. FED. R. Civ. P. 30(b)(1) & (2).
398. Id.; see also infra subsection V.B.4.d (Subpoenas and Subpoenas Duces Tecum).
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ployees may be required when informal ex parte communications have
been deemed improper.399
At least two scenarios commonly arise regarding depositions of for-
mer employees of a party. One scenario, addressed later in this Arti-
cle,400 involves a former employee who has previously sued the
employer and entered a confidential settlement agreement. The key
issue present in that situation is whether the former employee can be
deposed for the purpose of learning the details of the settled case. A
second common topic is closely intertwined with the previous discus-
sion of Model Rule 4.2 and the legal classification of the former em-
ployee and employer as either a single unified entity or as separate
autonomous beings. The specific question raised in this second scena-
rio is whether the former employee is sufficiently aligned with the for-
mer employer so that (1) the former employer is responsible for
securing the former employee's attendance at the deposition and (2)
whether the former employer's counsel has standing to assert objec-
tions and otherwise defend the former employee during the deposition.
Controversies surrounding subpoenas of former employees are dis-
cussed in a separate subsection of this Article.401 The remaining is-
sues of securing the former employee's attendance and defending the
deposition are addressed directly below.
Responsibility for attendance at a deposition turns in large part on
the current relationship between the former employee/deponent and
the former employer/party. For example, the court made a domestic
corporate plaintiff produce a former employee for a telephone deposi-
tion where the person was currently employed by plaintiffs European-
based parent company. 40 2 In contrast, a court denied a plaintiffs mo-
tion to compel defendant to produce former employees for deposition
where the employees had no continuing relationship with the
defendant.403
The "current relationship" factor is likely determinative of whether
an employer is responsible for securing the attendance of a former em-
ployee specifically named in a notice of deposition, or producing one or
399. See, e.g., Castano v. Am. Tobacco Co., 908 F. Supp. 378 (E.D. La. 1995) (affirming
order requiring plaintiffs' counsel to depose key former employee of defendant
rather then informally interviewing him).
400. See infra section VI.G (Court Settlements Mandating Confidentiality).
401. See infra subsection V.B.4.d (Subpoenas and Subpoenas Duces Tecum).
402. Rehau, Inc. v. Colortech, Inc., 145 F.R.D. 444 (W.D. Mich. 1993).
403. Gucci America, Inc. v. Costco Co., No. 98CIV.5613 (RLC)(FM), 2000 U.S. Dist.
LEXIS 602, at *14 (S.D.N.Y. Jan. 24, 2000) (requiring former employer only to
provide last known address and telephone number of former employee even
though former employee possessed key information regarding the litigation); Nor-
ris v. Fotomat Corp., No. Civ.A.86-3624, 1987 WL 5202, at *3 (E.D. Pa. Jan. 5,
1987); Flair Communication Agency, Inc. v. McCann-Erickson, Inc., No. 84-
C6598, 1985 WL 3919, at *3 (N.D. Ill. Nov. 19, 1985).
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more former employees in response to a Fed. R. Civ. P. 30(b)(6) deposi-
tion notice.40 4
The court in Peralta v. Cendant Corp. squarely confronted the is-
sue of whether the former employer's counsel can assert objections
and otherwise defend the former employee's deposition. 40 5 In that
employment discrimination case, plaintiffs counsel subpoenaed a for-
mer employee of defendant, Randi Klaber, who was plaintiffs immedi-
ate supervisor and a key actor in the events that lead to the
lawsuit.40 6 Defendant did not object to the subpoena; in fact, the dep-
osition was scheduled through defendant's human resources
department. 40 7
During a break in Klaber's deposition, defense counsel conferred
with Klaber 4O8 and subsequently objected and instructed Klaber not
to answer questions from plaintiffs counsel about the content of those
communications. 40 9 Although defense counsel did not represent
Klaber during the deposition or otherwise, defendant claimed that the
content of the communications between defense counsel and any for-
mer employee of the defendant was shielded from discovery by the at-
torney-client privilege. 4 10 Plaintiff contested defendant's privilege
claim, and the parties turned to the court to referee their dispute.
Finding no authority directly on point, the court scoured authori-
ties including Supreme Court and lower court opinions, ethical rules,
and legal treatises for guidance on the extension of the attorney-client
privilege to former employees. 4 1' Not surprisingly, the court found
vague and conflicting advice. 4 12 Relying heavily on the Supreme
Court's decision in Upjohn Co. v United States,4 13 the Peralta court
created the following test for determining when communications be-
tween a party's former employees and the party's counsel constitute
404. FED. R. Civ. P. 30(b)(6) requires a litigant to designate and produce for deposition
one or more officers, managing agents, or other persons with knowledge of the
matters described with particularity in the notice. Courts have required a corpo-
rate defendant to produce former employees for deposition in response to a FED.
R. Ctv. P. 30(b)(6) notice where no current employees could provide the relevant
information as specified in the deposition notice. See, e.g., Jakob v. Champion
Int'l Corp., No. 01 C 0497, 2001 U.S. Dist. LEXIS 19010, at*3 (N.D. Ill. Nov. 14,
2001); Canal Barge Co. v. Commonwealth Edison Co., No. 98-C0509, 2001 WL
817853 (N.D. Ill. July 19, 2001).
405. 190 F.R.D. 38 (D. Conn.1999).
406. See id. at 39.
407. See id.
408. See id.
409. See id.
410. See id.
411. See id. at 39-42.
412. See id. at 41 (stating that the conclusions reached by the court after reviewing
various authorities "does not completely resolve the parties' current dispute"); see
also infra section VI.A (Attorney-Client Privilege).
413. 449 U.S. 383 (1981).
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privileged communication that cannot be inquired into during the for-
mer employee's deposition:
[Did the communication relate to the former employee's conduct and knowl-
edge, or communication with defendant's counsel, during his or her employ-
ment? If so, such communication is protected from disclosure by defendant's
attorney-client privilege under Upjohn. As to any communication between de-
fendant's counsel and a former employee whom counsel does not represent,
which bear on or otherwise potentially affect the witness's testimony, con-
sciously or unconsciously, no attorney-client privilege applies. 4 1 4
The Peralta court raised sua sponte the applicability of the work
product doctrine, concluding that it also might limit Klaber's deposi-
tion testimony to the extent that testimony might reveal defense coun-
sel's mental impressions and opinions regarding the case.4 15 The
court concluded that "[wihile plaintiffs counsel will therefore be pre-
cluded from asking Ms. Klaber explicitly about [defense attorney] Ms.
Bresnan's legal conclusions or legal opinions that reveal defendant's
legal strategy, the work product doctrine will not preclude inquiry into
the other non-privileged communications as set out above."4 16 The
court ordered Klaber's deposition resumed in accordance with its
opinion.417
Peralta is troubling in that defense counsel appeared to get the
best of both worlds by maintaining inherently inconsistent positions.
That is, defendant was able to distance itself from its former employee
(Klaber), a major actor in the dispute, by not undertaking her legal
defense or formally representing her in the deposition.418 At the same
time, defendant was able to shield to a significant degree the contents
of communications between its attorney and its former employee from
discovery.
On the other hand, the Peralta court made a valiant effort to clar-
ify the bounds of appropriate deposition questions posed by plaintiffs
counsel to a former employee of defendant, and, perhaps most impor-
tantly, came up with a workable standard. The standards espoused in
Peralta respect the necessity of holding privileged the communications
between a former employee and the former employer's counsel so that
factual information will flow freely to the former employer's attorney.
As recognized in Upjohn, this factual flow is critical to the attorney's
ability to provide sound legal advice to the employee. 4 19
414. 190 F.R.D. at 41-42.
415. See id. at 42.
416. Id.
417. See id.
418. For instance, defendant's non-representation of its former employee would likely
prove beneficial as the case proceeded to settlement negotiations, summary judg-
ment, or trial because defendant's distance from its former employee would make
more credible a defense portraying Klaber as a lone actor responsible for the dis-
crimination against plaintiff, thus negating the corporate defendant's liability.
419. Upjohn Co. v. United States, 449 U.S. 383, 389 (1981).
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The sagacity of Peralta is that its designation of specific attorney-
client communications as off limits to the plaintiffs counsel in no way
interferes with a key premise of all privilege doctrines, namely, that
the facts underlying the communications remain subject to discov-
ery.4 20 Thus, the sanctity of the attorney-client and work product
privileges is preserved while the adversary can still obtain the factual
information from the former employee being deposed. In addition, op-
posing counsel is always authorized to ask a deponent about the
sources of the deponent's factual information, and to inquire about po-
tential influences that might bias the deponent's testimony.4 21 Pe-
ralta reiterates that right and makes explicit that deposing counsel
may inquire as to the role the former employer's counsel played in
helping the deponent formulate responses to deposition questions. 42 2
c. Requests for Production of Documents and Tangible
Things
The Federal Rules and state counterparts provide for the liberal
exchange of documents and other tangible evidence during the discov-
ery process. The Federal Rules mandate automatic disclosure-or at
least identification and description-of "all documents, data compila-
tions, and tangible things ... that the disclosing party may use to
support its claims or defenses."42 3 Evidentiary material supporting
"any category of damages claimed by the disclosing party"42 4 and any
insurance agreement that may indemnify or reimburse a party for lia-
bility determined in the action 4 25 must be provided to the adversary
as well. Once initial disclosures are made, parties can use the very
broad authority of Fed. R. Civ. P. 34 to request additional documents
420. The practical import of the decision is that Peralta's attorney would be able to
inquire freely of Klaber about the circumstances surrounding plaintiffs employ-
ment with defendant, including the specific facts which support or undermine
plaintiffs discrimination claims and defendant's corresponding defenses. Plain-
tiffs counsel would not, however, be able to solicit information by asking ques-
tions of Klaber such as "what did defense counsel ask you about Peralta's
employment, and what did you tell counsel?" Because Klaber's responses to such
questions not only reveal facts but also implicate counsel's thought processes and
opinions about the litigation, they are clearly barred by the court's order.
421. In the context of Peralta, for example, plaintiffs counsel might properly inquire
about whether the deponent/former employee has independent knowledge of the
facts constituting her testimony or whether she obtained that information from
other sources including defense counsel. Counsel might inquire as to any poten-
tial for bias on the part of the former-employee deponent, such as promised re-
wards or threatened retaliation by her former employer based on the content of
her testimony.
422. 190 F.R.D. at 41-42.
423. FED. R. Civ. P. 26(a)(1)(B); see also supra subsection V.B.2 (Initial Mandatory
Disclosures).
424. FED. R. Civ. P. 26(a)(1)(C).
425. FED. R. Civ. P. 26(a)(1)(D).
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and tangible evidence from opponents. Once again, neither the Fed-
eral Rules nor the accompanying advisory committee notes provide
guidance on whether a party must consult with former employees
before representing that it has fully and fairly complied with the dis-
covery rules.
Two provisions in the Federal Rules suggest that a party need not
consult with its former employees prior to providing initial disclosures
or responding to document requests. First, parties are only required
to produce documents and things that are within the party's "posses-
sion, custody, or control."42 6 Absent a consulting or other continuing
relationship with its former employees, a party cannot be said to con-
structively own or manage materials that their former employees pos-
sess. Second, the rules offer explicit mechanisms for parties to obtain
documents and materials from persons who are not parties 4 27-a cat-
egory that includes most former employees.
Consistent with the general supposition that each side must pre-
pare its own case, the burden technically falls on the former em-
ployer's adversary-rather than the former employer-to seek out
information and materials held by non-party former employees. From
a strategic view, however, counsel for the former employer is generally
well advised to conduct her own discovery, formal or otherwise, of for-
mer employees to ferret out any materials that support or undermine
her client's position. Such discovery is, however, a double-edged
sword: once the former employer's attorney obtains copies of materials
from her client's former employees, the materials are within her cli-
ent's "possession, custody or control." The materials obtained from
former employees are thus subject to production if they fall within the
categories requested by the opponent. The materials may even war-
rant automatic disclosure to the adversary under the duty to supple-
ment found in the initial disclosure rules.428
A party would be ill advised to try to exploit the rules by shipping
off boxes of relevant documents to former employees and then claim-
ing that it has no responsive materials within its possession. Such
426. FED. R. Civ. P. 26(a)(1)(B) (applying to initial disclosures); FED. R. Civ. P. 34(a)
(governing subsequent requests for production of documents and things).
427. FED. R. Civ. P. 34(c) (stating that discovery of documents and items from non-
parties is accomplished though use of FED. R. Civ. P. 45); FED. R. CIv. P. 45 (set-
ting forth detailed requirements for obtaining testimony and materials from non-
party witnesses); see also infra subsection V.B.4.d (Subpoenas and Subpoenas
Duces Tecum).
428. FED. R. Civ. P. 26(e)(1) (creating a duty to supplement initial disclosures "if the
party learns that in some material respect the information disclosed is incom-
plete"). But see Intel Corp. v. VIA Techs., Inc., 204 F.R.D. 450, 451-52 (N.D. Cal.
2001) (holding that declaration obtained by defendant from plaintiffs former em-
ployee and used to support defendant's summary judgment motion was not a
"document" that should have been disclosed pursuant to Fed. R. Civ. P.
26(a)(1)(B)).
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deviousness would violate the literal language as well as the spirit of
modern discovery rules that demand good faith compliance and coop-
eration. It would also perpetrate a fraud on the court subject to the
most severe contempt sanctions.
d. Subpoenas and Subpoenas Duces Tecum
Subpoenas are commonly used to exact nonparties' participation in
the discovery process. 4 29 Federal and analogous state rules allow
nonparties to be compelled not only to provide deposition testimony,
but also to produce documents and other tangible things in response
to a subpoena.4 30 Thus, former employees who prefer not to be in-
volved in litigation may find themselves compelled, under penalty of
perjury, to provide information and materials critical to the outcome
of the case.
In some jurisdictions, including all federal district courts, attor-
neys may issue subpoenas in their capacity as officers of the court. 43 1
The rules for issuing subpoenas, including highly specific notice re-
quirements for nonparties, are quite detailed, but not particularly
burdensome. 43 2 A subpoena may require the person served to appear
for deposition (subpoena ad testificandum), to produce tangible items
(subpoena duces tecum), or to do both. Subpoenas duces tecum effec-
tively extend formal discovery available from parties, including pro-
429. See generally Richard C. Placey, Developing Evidence from Nonparties, 25 LITIG.
32 (1999) (providing detailed explanation of use of subpoenas).
430. See, e.g., FED. R. Civ. P. 45(a)(1) (providing that "[a] command to produce evi-
dence... may be joined with a command to appear at... deposition, or may be
issued separately."). The use of a subpoena to require a former employee or other
nonparty to produce tangible materials parallels the adversary's right to obtain
documents and other materials from a party under FED. R. Civ. P. 34. See gener-
ally Jeffrey F. Liss, Formal Discovery from Nonparties, reprinted in THE LITIGA-
TION MANUAL 149 (John G. Koetl ed., 2d ed. 1989) (explaining the utility of
subpoenas to obtain information from nonparties).
431. See, e.g., FED. R. Civ. P. 45(a)(3)(A)-(B) (empowering an attorney to issue a sub-
poena on behalf of any federal district court "in which the attorney is authorized
to practice" and on behalf of any court "for a district in which a deposition or
production is compelled by the subpoena," provided the discovery "pertains to an
action pending in a court in which the attorney is authorized to practice").
432. Under the Federal Rules, for example, the person subject to the subpoena must
be personally served. FED. R. Civ. P. 45(b)(1)(A). Where attendance at a deposi-
tion is required, a check must be tendered when the subpoena is served that
fairly compensates the respondent for mileage and one day's attendance fees. Id.
Service of a subpoena is effective within the issuing district, or outside the dis-
trict, if served within a 100 mile radius of the place where the deposition is to
take place or as otherwise provided by the state court rules for the place in which
the subpoena is served. FED. R. Civ. P. 45(b)(2). In addition to providing infor-
mation about where and when the deposition will take place, the subpoena must
contain the exact language of FED. R. Civ. P. 45(c) and (d), detailing the person's
rights and responsibilities in responding to the subpoena. FED. R. Civ. P.
45(a)(1)(A).
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duction of documents under Fed R. Civ. P. 34, to nonparties. 4 33 Thus,
a subpoena duces tecum may properly command a nonparty to pro-
duce a wide category of materials including charts, photographs, per-
sonal and business calendars, audio and video recordings, e-mails,
computer files, drafts, non-identical copies of documents, and even
"the now ubiquitous yellow 'post-its"' notes.4 34
Because a subpoena is a court order, contempt sanctions await per-
sons who fail to respond appropriately.4 35 The rules are somewhat
solicitous of nonparties, however, requiring attorneys to "take reason-
able steps to avoid imposing undue burden or expense" on the person
being subpoenaed.436 The rules also place the burden on the issuing
attorneys to obtain an order to compel production of documents and
tangible things if the person subject to the subpoena provides a timely,
written objection to the issuing attorney.4 37
The power vested in attorneys to issue subpoenas, especially sub-
poenas compelling former employees to produce documents and other
tangible items in her possession, yields tremendous returns. As one
experienced litigator observed, "a judge or jury will often believe the
barest scrap of paper over the memory of any witness."438 Accord-
ingly, "[o]btaining documents through discovery is the heart of the
lawsuit; knowing the rules of the discovery game is vital for successful
litigation."439 The former employer/litigant may already be immersed
in responding to requests for production of documents from other par-
ties and monitoring like requests it has propounded to its adversaries.
A wildcard production by a former employee in response to an adver-
433. "A person not a party to the action may be compelled to produce documents and
things.., as provided in Rule 45." FED. R. Civ. P. 34(c).
434. Elliot G. Sagor, Victory is in the Documents, 23 LITIG. 36, 39 (1997); see also FED.
R. Civ. P. 34(a) (providing an extensive, illustrative list of discoverable
materials).
435. See, e.g., FED. R. Civ. P. 45(e) (providing that "[flailure by any person without
adequate excuse to obey a subpoena ... may be deemed a contempt of the court
from which the subpoena issued"); see also FED. R. Civ. P. 45 advisory committee
note, 1991 amendments, subdivision (a) (advising that "[a]lthough the subpoena
is in a sense the command of the attorney who completes the form, defiance of a
subpoena is nevertheless an act of defiance of a court order and exposes the defi-
ant witness to contempt sanctions").
436. FED. R. Civ. P. 45(c)(1).
437. FED. R. Civ. P. 45(c)(2)(B). Stated differently, this rule requires an attorney at-
tempting to subpoena a nonparty to obtain the court's cooperation in enforcing a
subpoena duces tecum, rather than requiring a nonparty subject to the subpoena
to file a motion to quash with the court under FED. R. Civ. P. 45(c)(3). If the
person is compelled to produce the materials, the court must protect the nonparty
from bearing "significant expense" related to the production, FED. R. Civ. P.
45(c)(2)(B). Presumably this is achieved by ordering the party issuing the sub-
poena to pay costs incurred in assembling, copying, and transporting the
documents.
438. Sagor, supra note 434, at 36.
439. Id.
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sary's subpoena inevitably causes serious disruption of even the best
formulated litigation strategy.
The power delegated to an attorney to issue orders on behalf of the
court, and the corresponding potential for abuse, necessitate that ade-
quate notice be given to all parties prior to the date of the commanded
production or testimony from the nonparty.44 0 Failure to provide ade-
quate notice injures a party by denying the right to use the safeguard
provided in the rule for objecting to release of the information sought
prior to disclosure, 44 1 and also harms the public because failure to ob-
serve the rules "compromises the integrity of the court's processes."
44 2
Accordingly, a court may issue sanctions for failing to notify parties of
the issuance of subpoenas to nonparties even when no actual prejudice
is demonstrated. 4 43
Today, many employees work at least part of the time at home,
often creating computer records and files in the process. The growing
potential for individual liability in corporate settings may also inspire
employees to create their own paper or electronic files of the em-
ployer's documents for later defensive use. The possibility that dis-
gruntled employees will utilize the same strategy to amass evidence to
support an eventual offensive claim against the employer is equally
obvious. Accordingly, the dreaded "smoking gun" and other telling
documents may lie smoldering in a former employee's personal files.
In short, it is the rare case when a party welcomes an adversary's
subpoenaing of the party's former employees to testify, and subpoenas
duces tecum directed to former employees are even less well received.
The issue of whether the former employer has standing to move to
quash a subpoena served on a former employee, however, remains a
highly disputed topic.
Certainly, the former employee being subpoenaed may move the
court to modify or quash the subpoena on a variety of grounds, includ-
ing the argument that compelled testimony or production will invade
a privilege owned by that person.4 44 Notice of a subpoena must be
given to all parties to afford them "an opportunity to object to the pro-
440. Requirements that all parties receive notice of subpoenas directed to nonparties
are set forth in FED. R. Civ. P. 30(b)(1)-(3) and FED. R. Crv. P. 45(b)(1).
441. Spencer v. Steinman, 179 F.R.D. 484, 489 (E.D. Pa. 1998).
442. See id.
443. In Spencer v. Steinman, for example, the offending attorney was publicly admon-
ished by the court, required to file an affidavit that all documents obtained pursu-
ant to the non-party subpoena had been turned over to opposing counsel, and
directed to pay legal fees associated with the adversary's motion that brought the
matter to the court's attention. Id.
444. The recipient can seek to quash or modify because the subpoena does not allow
adequate time to respond, requires travel beyond that specified in the rule, re-
quires disclosure of privileged information, or imposes undue burden. FED. R.
Crv. P. 45(c)(3)(A)(i)-(iv).
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duction or inspection."445 A court can modify or quash a subpoena to
avoid disclosure of privileged information (including trade secrets) be-
longing not only to the subpoenaed person but also any person (includ-
ing a party) "affected by" the subpoena.446
Case law demonstrates, however, that providing a person "affected
by" a subpoena "an opportunity to object" is not the same as bestowing
standing to object. Rather, "[tihe injury in fact element of standing
requires the complainant to have suffered an invasion of a legally pro-
tected interest which is concrete and particularized."447 Therefore, a
party generally "has no standing to seek to quash a subpoena issued to
someone who is not a party to the action unless the party claims some
personal right or privilege with regard to the documents sought."448
Identifying whether a party has a "personal right or privilege" at
stake is especially challenging when the subpoena is issued on a for-
mer employee of a party. Westside-Marrero Jeep Eagle, Inc. v.
Chrysler Corp.449 represents one court's attempt to answer that ques-
tion. This case also provides general guidance on the propriety of us-
ing a subpoena duces tecum to obtain information from an adversary's
former employee.
In Westside-Marrero Jeep Eagle, plaintiffs sued Chrysler for al-
leged extraction of cash payments in exchange for an increased alloca-
tion of new automobiles for plaintiffs' automobile dealership. A
former employee of Chrysler, Alfred S. Stevens, Jr., was a key actor in
the events leading to the litigation and had originally been named as a
defendant in the lawsuit.450 Chrysler had rejected Stevens' request
that Chrysler defend and indemnify him, and the former employee en-
tered into a settlement agreement with the plaintiffs.45 1
Chrysler and the plaintiffs each served Stevens with subpoenas
duces tecum. 4 52 Chrysler advised plaintiffs' counsel that it was mov-
ing for a protective order to prevent Stevens from producing privileged
documents to plaintiffs. Prior to Chrysler's filing of the motion, Ste-
vens provided plaintiffs with the documents they requested. 45 3
445. FED. R. Crv. P. 45(b)(1) advisory committee note, 1991 amendments, subdivision
(b).
446. FED. R. Civ. P. 45(c)(3)(B)(iii).
447. Weider Sports Equip. Co., Ltd. v. Fitness First, Inc., 912 F. Supp. 502, 504 (D.
Utah 1996) (citing Clajon Prod. Corp. v. Petera, 70 F.3d 1566, 1570-71 (10th Cir.
1995)).
448. 9A CHARLES ALAN WRIGHT & ARTHUR R. MILLER, FEDERAL PRACTICE AND PROCE-
DURE § 2459, nn.15-16 (citing cases) (2d ed. 1994).
449. Westside-Marrero Jeep Eagle, Inc. v. Chrysler Corp., No. CIV.A.97-3012, 1998
WL 186705 (E.D. La. Apr. 17, 1998).
450. See id. at *1.
451. See id. at *1-2.
452. See id. at *2.
453. See id.
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Plaintiffs moved to quash Chrysler's subpoena, or, in the alterna-
tive, to obtain a protective order limiting the information Chrysler
could obtain from Stevens through the subpoena process. 45 4 Chrysler
moved, inter alia, for an order requiring plaintiffs to provide to
Chrysler all the documents Stevens provided to plaintiffs pursuant to
plaintiffs' subpoena duces tecum.
By entertaining plaintiffs' motion, the court implicitly held that
plaintiffs had standing to move to quash Chrysler's subpoena directed
at Stevens insofar as plaintiffs challenged (1) Chrysler's right to ob-
tain information about the settlement agreement between the former
employee and plaintiffs and (2) the overly broad and burdensome na-
ture of one of the requests. 4 55 However, the court held that the plain-
tiffs had no standing to object to Chrysler's four document requests
that sought financial and other personal information from Stevens be-
cause plaintiffs' counsel neither represented Chrysler's former em-
ployee Stevens in the matter nor had any "conceivable interest"4 56 in
the information. In addition, the court held that the Stevens' relin-
quishment of all relevant documents in his possession to plaintiffs in
response to plaintiffs' subpoena did not absolve Stevens of the obliga-
tion to respond to Chrysler's subpoena.4 57 "This argument is irrele-
vant and does not relieve Stevens of his obligation to respond to a
subpoena," 458 the court opined. "If he has no responsive documents,
he must say so under oath and explain what happened to any respon-
sive documents that he formerly possessed."45 9
Similarly, the court entertained Chrysler's challenge to plaintiffs'
use of a subpoena duces tecum to obtain from Chrysler's former em-
ployee Stevens potentially privileged and propriety information owned
by Chrysler.460 The court also ordered that the former employee con-
sult with his own attorney or a Chrysler attorney before revealing any
information that might breach a privilege owned by Chrysler,46 1 and
ordered plaintiffs to immediately produce the documents Stevens had
provided to them pursuant to the plaintiffs' subpoena.4 62 The court
further chastised plaintiffs' counsel for accepting the documents from
Chrysler's former employee before Chrysler had adequate notice to ob-
ject to plaintiffs' subpoena.4 63
454. See id.
455. See id. at *2-4.
456. Id. at *4.
457. See id. at *2
458. Id.
459. Id.
460. See id. at *6-8.
461. See id. at *6.
462. See id. at *7-8.
463. See id. at *7.
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In sum, subpoenas and subpoenas duces tecum may be the most
effective formal discovery mechanism for obtaining testimony and tan-
gible evidence from a litigant's former employees. As with every de-
vice, care must be taken to observe not only the letter but also the
spirit of the rules governing these powerful discovery tools. Failing to
provide adequate notice to parties, placing undue burdens on former
employees in responding to the subpoenas, and abusing the process to
bully non-parties into cooperating on harsh terms is, and will un-
doubtedly remain, grounds for imposition of sanctions on the offending
attorney.
e. Consultants and Expert Witnesses
There is nothing improper, or even unusual, about an employer re-
taining its former employees as expert witnesses and consultants for
an individual case or series of litigated matters.4 64 Modern federal
procedural rules and many of their state counterparts, however, se-
verely limit an adversary's ability to obtain discovery from a former
employee serving as a non-testifying trial consultant, while allowing
liberal discovery of an expert witness designated as a trial witness.
These important differences are explained briefly here.
The Federal Rules governing mandatory initial disclosure require
parties to identify experts they anticipate calling at trial.46 5 Disclo-
sure of testifying experts is made "at the times and in the sequence
directed by the court."4 66 Disclosure must be accompanied by a writ-
ten report containing "a complete statement of all opinions to be ex-
pressed and the basis and reasons therefor."467 The expert's signed
report must also include the data underlying the witness's opinions,
the qualifications of the witness including a list of publications au-
thored in the past decade, an explanation of the expert's compensation
arrangement, any exhibits the witness will use to support her conclu-
sions, and a list of all cases in which the witness has testified as an
expert, either in deposition or at trial, during the previous four
years.4 68 Counsel for the opposing party may depose the expert after
the report is furnished,469 provided that counsel pays the expert a
464. Potential improprieties arising when a litigant retains its adversary's former em-
ployees as consultants and experts are discussed infra subsection VI.F.2.b (Turn-
coat Agreements).
465. FED. R. Civ. P. 26(a)(2).
466. FED. R. CIv. P. 26(a)(2)(C). Accordingly, the subject of expert witnesses should be
broached with opposing counsel at the FED .R. Civ. P. 26(f) conference and with
the court at the initial pretrial conference. See supra subsections V.B.1-3 (Meet-
ing with Opposing Counsel, Initial Mandatory Disclosures, and Initial Pretrial
Conference and Resultant Scheduling Order).
467. FED. R. Civ. P. 26(a)(2)(B).
468. See id.
469. FED. R. Civ. P. 26(b)(4)(A).
[Vol. 81:868
DISCOVERY AND FORMER EMPLOYEES
"reasonable fee for time spent" related to the deposition.4 70 An expert
who refuses to answer deposition questions based on claims of privi-
lege or work product must be sufficiently specific regarding the mater-
ials or information being withheld to "enable other parties to assess
the applicability of the privilege or protection."4 71
In contrast, discovery from a non-testifying expert or consultant is
rarely allowed. 47 2 The use of deposition or interrogatories to "discover
facts known or opinions held" by a non-testifying individual retained
by an adversary "in anticipation of litigation or preparation for
trial"4 73 is not completely forbidden. Discovery of such a witness is
allowed, however, only "upon a showing of exceptional circum-
stances"4 74 where it is "impracticable for the party seeking discovery
to obtain facts or opinions on the subject by other means."4 7 5 This
restriction, paired with the significant restraints imposed on discovery
of materials classified as work product,4 76 generally make the non-
testifying former employee/consulting expert off limits to the former
employer's adversaries. This is true in many state as well as federal
courts.
4 7 7
A perhaps unintended consequence of the different standards for
testifying and non-testifying experts is that the rules allow, if not en-
courage, a former employer to keep former employees out of the dis-
covery limelight by retaining them as "trial consultants." This
practice may also shield from discovery any work product shared with
the former employee-consultant. 4 78 A party's use of this tactic to mo-
nopolize the market of potential experts with knowledge relevant to a
case or series of lawsuits may, however, backfire. In an effort to pre-
empt adversaries from retaining a party's former employees, the for-
mer employer may create the situation where information is not
available from any other source. In that scenario, the former em-
470. FED. R. Civ. P. 26(b)(4)(C)(i).
471. FED. R. Civ. P. 26(b)(5).
472. Michael E. Plunkett, Discoverability of Attorney Work Product Reviewed by Ex-
pert Witnesses: Have the 1993 Revisions to the Federal Rules of Civil Procedure
Changed Anything?, 69 TEMP. L. REV. 451, n.1 (1996).
473. FED. R. Crv. P. 26(b)(4)(B).
474. Id.
475. Id.
476. See infra section VI.B (Work Product).
477. See, e.g., ILL. S. CT. R. 201 (limiting discovery of a non-testifying litigation con-
sultant or expert). See generally Stephen D. Easton, Can we Talk?: Removing
Counterproductive Ethical Restrains upon Ex Parte Communication Between At-
torneys and Adverse Expert Witnesses, 76 IND. L.J. 647 (2001) (explaining the
many restrictions on informal and formal discovery of adverse experts and advo-
cating for more open access to experts for opposing counsel).
478. Plunkett, supra note 472, at 451 n.1 (explaining that work product shared with
testifying expert witnesses is likely subject to discovery, while non-testifying con-
sultants are almost immune from discovery).
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ployer's adversaries would be able to make a showing of undue hard-
ship and impracticality, ,thus persuading a court to allow discovery of
the former employee-consultants.
f Protective Orders
As previously explained, all federal district courts and some state
courts now require counsel to negotiate the scope, timing, and limita-
tions on discovery at the outset of the litigation, and to memorialize
their agreement in a proposed discovery plan presented to the court
prior to the first pretrial conference.479 Where potential for discovery
disputes loom large, the plan should propose entry of a comprehensive
protective order that sets appropriate boundaries regarding the mat-
ters to be discovered, identifies the sources from whom discovery may
be sought, and acknowledges the appropriate discovery mechanisms
to be used.48o As previously advised, modern procedural rules provide
counsel with the opportunity, while simultaneously imposing the
duty, to bring to the court's attention anticipated issues concerning
the discovery of information from former employees, and to reach a
court approved resolution of the issues.
After the initial pretrial conference, litigants are authorized to
seek additional protective orders further clarifying the scope of discov-
ery.4 8 ' Despite the argument that protective orders provided for in
Fed. R. Civ. P. 26(c) explicitly only apply to "formal" discovery,482
courts have frequently entertained a party's request that a protective
order be entered to regulate informal, ex parte contact between an at-
torney and former employees of an adversary.483 Even if Fed. R. Civ.
P. 26(c) is not directly applicable, entry of a protective order is author-
479. See discussion of FED. R. Civ. P. 26(f), supra subsection V.B.1.
480. FED. R. Civ. P. 26(f)(4).
481. See FED. R. Civ. P. 26(c) and analogous state rules. In cases where identical or
similar claims are filed by the same plaintiffs against the same defendants in
several state and federal courts, a party may also seek a preliminary injunction
from a federal court, pursuant to the All Writs Act, 28 U.S.C. § 1651 (2001), or
FED. R. Civ. P. 65, staying or limiting discovery and other proceedings in the
related cases. See, e.g., G-I Holdings, Inc. v. Baron & Budd, 199 F.R.D. 529
(S.D.N.Y. 2001).
482. Holdren v. Gen. Motors Corp., 13 F. Supp. 2d 1192, 1193 n.1 (D. Kan. 1998) (rec-
ognizing that both FED. R. Civ. P. 26(c) and the court's inherent power to regulate
attorney conduct empowered it to enter a protective order even though no formal
rules of discovery were violated).
483. See, e.g., Schwartz v. Camp Robin Hood, No. CIV.A.01-12032-RWZ, 2002 U.S.
Dist. LEXIS 8342 (D. Mass. May 8, 2002); In re Bank of La./Kenwin Shops, Inc.,
No. 1193, 1998 WL 788776 (E.D. La. Nov. 10, 1998): In re Prudential Ins. Co. of
Am., 911 F. Supp. 148 (D.N.J. 1995); Aiken v. Business & Indus. Health Group,
Inc., 885 F. Supp. 1474 (D. Kan. 1995).
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ized by the court's "inherent power to require adherence by counsel to
applicable disciplinary rules,"4 84 including Model Rule 4.2.485
As a threshold matter, a party offended by an opponent's discovery
tactics must make a good faith effort "to confer with other affected
parties in an effort to resolve the dispute without court action."48 6 If
resolution cannot be achieved, the party or a nonparty from whom the
challenged discovery is sought may seek judicial intervention. 48 7 The
burden remains on the movant to justify the requested restrictions on
an adversary's discovery strategy.488 The movant must demonstrate
that the adversary's past or planned conduct violates specific procedu-
ral rules or ethical standards. Bluntly stated, "[s]peculation does not
constitute an adequate basis for a protective order."48 9
Once that burden is satisfied, the trial judge or magistrate has tre-
mendous discretion to fashion a protective order that balances the ac-
tual or potential harm resulting if the discovery is allowed against the
rights and duties of an adversary to zealously search out relevant
facts and legal theories.490 The court may rule that the discovery not
be allowed, 491 that it only be made under specified terms or condi-
tions,492 that it be accomplished by a method other than the one pur-
sued by the adversary, 493 that inquiry not be made regarding certain
topics 494 including trade secrets and other confidential informa-
tion,495 and that certain people be present when discovery is had.496
484. Turnbull v. Topeka State Hosp., 185 F.R.D. 645, 651 (D. Kan. 1999).
485. Id.; see also Holdren, 13 F. Supp. 2d at 1193, n.1; supra sections IV.A-D (discuss-
ing Model Rule 4.2).
486. FED. R. Civ. P. 26 (c). While parties are free to resolve their differences and con-
tinue with discovery in accord with their agreement, a split of authority exists as
to whether the parties can stipulate to an entry of a specific protective order or
whether an order is only appropriately entered by a court upon a finding of good
cause. See, e.g., Citizens First Nat'l Bank v. Cincinnati Ins. Co., 178 F.3d 943
(7th Cir. 1999) (recognizing that the First, Third, and Eleventh Circuits allow
entry of a protective order by stipulation, but siding with the Sixth, Eighth,
Ninth, and D.C. Circuits that require the district courts to find good cause).
Those cases, however, focus on the appropriateness of stipulated umbrella orders
denying public access to discovery materials, rather than to disputes between
parties as to how a specific type of discovery should proceed.
487. FED. R. Civ. P. 26(c).
488. Turnbull, 185 F.R.D. at 651; see also G-I Holdings, Inc. v. Baron & Budd, 199
F.R.D. 529, 533 (S.D.N.Y. 2001) (explaining that FED. R. Civ. P. 26(c) requires the
movant to show good cause for issuance of a protective order).
489. Turnbull, 185 F.R.D. at 652.
490. G-I Holdings, Inc., 199 F.R.D. at 533.
491. FED. R. Civ. P. 26(c)(1).
492. FED. R. Civ. P. 26(c)(2).
493. FED. R. Civ. P. 26(c)(3).
494. FED. R. Civ. P. 26(c)(4).
495. FED. R. Civ. P. 26(c)(7).
496. FED. R. Civ. P. 26(c)(5).
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A combination of these and additional requirements may also be or-
dered by the court.4 97
Protective orders may prove especially useful when discovery is
sought from an adversary's former employees. In G-I Holdings, Inc. v.
Baron & Budd,498 for example, the defendants in a personal injury
asbestos case sought a protective order barring plaintiffs counsel from
directing its investigators to conduct ex parte interviews with defen-
dant's former employees. After considering the parties' respective ar-
guments, the court expressed substantial concern that the ex parte
interviews might uncover information that should be protected under
the attorney-client privilege.499
Balancing the "time-honored"5 00 right of counsel to interview will-
ing nonparty witnesses against the possibility of invading the attor-
ney-client privilege presented a situation in which the court found it
"very difficult to craft a true compromise."501 The court's decision was
not aided by the parties, as they respectively argued only extreme,
bright line positions allowing or denying the ex parte interviews.502
Utilizing its discretion to fashion an equitable solution, the court en-
tered a protective order allowing two alternatives. First, the inter-
views of defendant's former employees could continue, with prior
notice to defense counsel and the right of counsel to be present. 50 3 Al-
ternatively, the interviews could be conducted in the presence of a spe-
cial master agreed upon by the parties, with costs shared equally. 50 4
Of the various lessons taught by G-I Holdings, Inc., the most im-
portant is perhaps one of the most subtle. That is, the attorneys did a
disservice to themselves and their clients by advocating absolute posi-
tions that the discovery of former employees was either permitted or
prohibited. Had the attorneys been more flexible and creative, they
might have offered solutions to the court more favorable to their re-
spective positions. Defense counsel might have urged, for example,
that they be allowed to speak with each former employee prior to the
497. FED. R. Civ. P. 26(c).
498. 199 F.R.D. 529 (S.D.N.Y. 2001).
499. Id. at 535. The court was especially concerned because neither the individuals
conducting the interviews nor any of the former employees being interviewed
were attorneys. "It is unrealistic to expect even the best-intentioned lay person to
be able to safeguard the attorney-client privilege," the court held. "The danger of
inadvertent disclosure is compounded by the fact that the investigators ... are in
little better position than the interviewees to assess whether privileged material
is being disclosed." Id.
500. Id. at 533.
501. Id. at 535.
502. See id.
503. See id.
504. See id. The judge further advised that he would designate a special master from
a list of names submitted by the parties if they could not agree on a person to
fulfill that role. Id.
[Vol. 81:868
DISCOVERY AND FORMER EMPLOYEES
plaintiffs interviews to determine whether the employee possessed
privileged information of any kind. Plaintiffs attorney might have of-
fered to record the interviews for in camera inspection should an issue
of attorney-client privilege arise. In the end, of course, the court
would exercise its discretion to draft an appropriate protective order,
and even with additional input from counsel, it may have issued an
order identical to the protective order it fashioned without the aid of
counsel. What the attorneys forfeited in G-I Holdings, Inc. was an
important opportunity to influence the court's decision in a matter of
great importance to their clients and possibly to the outcome of the
litigation.505
VI. APPROPRIATE BREADTH OF INFORMAL AND FORMAL
DISCOVERY OF FORMER EMPLOYEES
The seven major categories of considerations addressed in this Part
are not necessarily exhaustive of all other legal complications that
arise when discovery is sought from litigants' former employees. They
do, however, represent the most common conundrums for attorneys
representing and opposing former employers and for the courts
charged with refereeing these discovery bouts. Except where ex-
pressly stated, the limitations on communications with, and discovery
of, former employees as discussed in this Part apply to both informal,
ex parte contact and contact pursuant to formal discovery devices.5O6
505. See generally supra sections IV.A-D (discussing informal discovery and Model
Rule 4.2); see also infra sections VI.A-E (discussing privilege doctrines).
506. This Article provides an in-depth analysis of the privileges most commonly impli-
cated when discovery is sought from litigants' former employees, such as attor-
ney-client privilege, trade secrets, and work product doctrine. Based on the
unique circumstances surrounding a particular case, however, an attorney may
also encounter other barriers, such as the ubiquitous physician-patient privilege,
and privileges not universally recognized. These privileges include the account-
ant-taxpayer privilege, see, e.g., IRS Restructuring and Reform Act of 1998, Pub.
L. No. 105-206, 112 Stat. 685 (creating narrow accountant-client privilege); In re
Am. Rest. Operations, 957 P.2d 473 (Kan. 1998) (recognizing very broad account-
ant-client privilege), corporate ombudsman privilege, see, e.g., Shabazz v. Scurr,
662 F. Supp. 90 (S.D. Iowa 1987) (recognizing this privilege); Carman v. McDon-
nell Douglas Corp., 114 F.3d.790 (8th Cir. 1997) (rejecting existence of such a
privilege), executive or governmental privilege, see, e.g., United States v. Reyn-
olds, 345 U.S. 1 (1952); 5 U.S.C. § 301 (2001) (shielding from discovery secrets of
military or diplomatic nature), Fifth Amendment privilege against self-incrimi-
nation, see, e.g., United States v. Fla. Cities Water Co., No. 93-281-CIV-FTM-21,
1995 U.S. Dist. Lexis 7921 (M.D. Fla. 1995) (holding that former employees could
be subject to criminal liability under the Clean Water Act based on their commu-
nications with the Department of Justice attorneys); Mark W. Williams, Pleading
the Fifth in Civil Cases, 20 LITIG. 31 (1994), the informer's privilege, see, e.g., Dole
v. Local 1942, Int'l Bd. of Elec. Workers, 870 F. 2d 368 (7th Cir. 1989) (covering
communications with persons who offer assistance to government investigations),
medical peer review privilege, see, e.g., Virmani v. Novant Health Inc. 259 F.3d
284 (4th Cir. 2001); Pardo v. Gen. Hosp. Corp., No. 98-2714, 2000 Mass. Super.
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A. Attorney-Client Privilege
"The attorney-client privilege is one of the oldest recognized privi-
leges for confidential communications,"507 and remains "ubiquitous in
contemporary American litigation."5 08 It arises "in every imaginable
situation with all possible permutations."5 09 Attorney ethical rules do
not purport to define or enforce the doctrine of attorney-client privi-
lege. 5 10 Rather, the doctrine finds both its genesis and continued vi-
tality in federal511 and state5 1 2 common law.51 3
LEXIS 536 (Mass. Super. 2000), the newsperson's privilege, see, e.g., Branzburg
v. Hayes, 408 U.S. 665 (1972), or qualified journalists' privilege, see, e.g., Gonza-
les v. Nat'l Broad. Co., 186 F.3d 102 (2d Cir. 1998) (opinion as amended August
27, 1999); Gregg D. Thomas & David S. Bralow, The Reporter's Privilege, 20 Li-
TIG. 27 (1994), priest-penitent privilege, see, e.g., Seidman v. Fishburne-Hudgins
Educ. Found., Inc., 724 F.2d 413 (4th Cir. 1984), psychotherapist-patient privi-
lege, see, e.g., Jaffee v. Redmond, 518 U.S. 1 (1996), quasi attorney-client privi-
lege, see, e.g., State ex rel. Allstate Ins. Co. v. Gaughan, 1508 S.E.2d 75 (W. Va.
1998) (concluding that the contents of the insurer's claim file generated during an
investigation are protected from disclosure in a third-party bad faith action), se-
curity sensitive information privilege, see, e.g., Essex County Jail Annex Inmates
v. Treffinger, 18 F. Supp. 2d 418 (D.N.J. 1998) (holding that attorney's disclosure
of officer staffing information to inmates and disclosure of other "security sensi-
tive information" compelled disqualification of attorney), and spousal privilege,
see, e.g., Trammel v. United States, 445 U.S. 40 (1980).
507. Swidler & Berlin v. United States, 524 U.S. 399, 403 (1998) (citing Upjohn Co. v.
United States, 449 U.S. 383, 389 (1981), and Hunt v. Blackburn, 128 U.S. 464,
470 (1888)). Foundations for this privilege were laid during the sixteenth century
reign of Queen Elizabeth I. See Julia Thomas-Fishburn, Attorney-Client Confi-
dences: Punishing the Innocent, 61 U. CoLO. L. REV. 185, 186 (1990).
508. EDNA SELAN EPSTEIN, THE ATTORNEY-CLIENT PRIVILEGE AND THE WORK-PRODUCT
DOCTRINE 1 (3d ed. 1997).
509. See id.
510. For example, the introductory material in the ABA's Model Rules of Professional
Conduct makes clear that "these Rules are not intended to govern or affect judi-
cial application of either the attorney-client or work product privilege." MODEL
RULES OF PROF'L CONDUCT, Scope (2002). However, there are many ethical rules
and code sections that require lawyers to maintain the confidences of clients that
extend past the protections afforded by the privilege itself See generally Richard
A. Corwin, Ethical Considerations: The Attorney-Client Relationship, 75 TUL. L.
REV. 1327 (2001). In addition, a state attorney disciplinary board may use inva-
sion of attorney-client privilege as grounds to sanction an attorney. See, e.g.,
ABA Comm. on Ethics and Profl Responsibility, Formal Op. 91-359, 6 (1991) (ad-
vising that "the potentially-communicating adversary attorney must be careful
not to seek to induce the former employee to violate the privilege attaching to
attorney-client communications to the extent his or her communications as a for-
mer employee with his or her former employer's counsel are protected by the priv-
ilege"); Virginia State Bar Standing Comm. on Legal Ethics, Op. 1749 (2001)
(advising that it is unethical for attorney to talk to corporate adversary's former
employees regarding discussions employees had with corporate counsel while still
employed).
511. See generally PAUL R. RICE, ATTORNEY-CLIENT PRIVILEGE IN THE UNITED STATES
(2d ed. 1999).
512. See generally PAUL R. RICE, ATTORNEY-CLIENT PRIVILEGE: STATE LAw (2000).
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The purpose of the privilege "is to encourage full and frank commu-
nication between attorneys and their clients and thereby promote
broader public interests in the observance of law and administration
of justice."5 14 "The practical consequence of the privilege is that there
can be neither compelled nor voluntary disclosure by the lawyer of
matters conveyed to the lawyer in confidence by a client for the pur-
pose of seeking legal advice."515
A federal district court provided this thorough and still accurate
description of attorney-client privilege more than half a century ago:
The privilege applies only if (1) the asserted holder of the privilege is or sought
to become a client; (2) the person to whom the communication was made (a) is
a member of the bar of a court, or his subordinate, and (b) in connection with
this communication is acting as a lawyer; (3) the communication relates to a
fact of which the attorney was informed (a) by his client, (b) without the pres-
ence of strangers, (c) for the purpose of securing primarily either (i) an opinion
on law, or (ii) legal services, or (iii) assistance in some legal proceeding, and
not (d) for the purpose of committing a crime or a tort; and (4) the privilege
has been (a) claimed, and (b) not waived by the client.5 1 6
In sum, the attorney-client privilege shields from disclosure com-
munications made between privileged persons-that is, from client to
attorney as well as from attorney to client-if the oral or written ex-
changes were made in confidence and for the purpose of obtaining or
providing legal advice for a client or prospective client. The client, not
the attorney, owns the privilege and therefore has the right to assert
it517 and the power to waive it.518
Application of the attorney-client privilege has proven especially
difficult when the client is a legal fiction, such as a corporation or
513. The skeleton of the attorney-client privilege is occasionally codified in state stat-
utes, but the substantial body of law that fully animates the doctrine is found in
common law. See, e.g., OHIO REV. CODE ANN § 2317.02 (2001) (prohibiting an
attorney from testifying "concerning a communication made to [him] by [his] cli-
ent in that relation or [his] advice to [his] client," except where the client ex-
pressly consents to the testimony, but providing no further details as to the
definition or application of the doctrine). In federal courts, privileges are "gov-
erned by the principles of the common law as they may be interpreted by the
courts of the United States in the light of reason and experience." FED. R. EVID.
501. In federal civil cases in "which State law supplies the rule of decision....
privilege ... shall be determined in accordance with State law." Id.
514. Upjohn Co. v. United States, 449 U.S. 383, 389 (1981).
515. EPSTEIN, supra note 508, at 13.
516. United States v. United Shoe Mach. Corp., 89 F. Supp. 357, 358-59 (D. Mass.
1950). This definition of the privilege has been more recently affirmed by cases
such as Upjohn Co. v. United States, 449 U.S. 383 (1981). See generally EPSTEIN,
supra note 508, at 34-233.
517. EPSTEIN, supra note 508, at 28.
518. Id. at 164. However, because the client is rarely aware of the existence and/or
modus operandi of the privilege, the attorney is obligated to raise the privilege on
the client's behalf. Id. at 28, 165. And, "in most instances, it is through the ac-
tions taken (or not taken) by counsel that courts find a waiver has occurred." Id.
at 165.
2003]
NEBRASKA LAW REVIEW
partnership, rather than a human being. In the context of a corpora-
tion or other entity, "[t]he attorney-client privilege applies to commu-
nications between corporate employees and counsel, made at the
direction of corporate superiors in order to secure legal advice, and
employees are aware that they are being questioned so that the corpo-
ration can obtain legal advice."5 19 The Supreme Court has clarified
that, in federal courts, the privilege is not limited to upper echelon
and mid-level managerial employees of a corporation who constitute
the entity's "control group." 5 2 0 Rather, the privilege extends to any
employee who provides information to the corporation's attorney so
the attorney can provide appropriate legal counsel to the
corporation. 52 1
The attorney-client privilege is implicated in at least five situa-
tions involving a former employee of a party: (1) where the former em-
ployee is a lawyer and served the former employer in that capacity,
52 2
(2) where the former employee communicated with the employer's
counsel during her period of employment, 523 (3) where the former em-
ployee was privy to attorney-client privileged information during her
period of employment, 52 4 (4) where an attorney-client relationship is
established between the former employee and her employer's counsel
after termination of employment, 52 5 and (5) when communications be-
tween a party's counsel and a former employee of that party result in
waiver of the attorney-client privilege. 5 26
The first situation described above-ex parte contact between an
attorney formerly employed by a party and opposing party's counsel-
is almost guaranteed to invade the former employer's attorney-client
privilege, resulting in the harshest of sanctions being imposed on the
attorney who initiated the ex parte contact. 5 27 The second and third
519. Upjohn Co., 449 U.S. at 394.
520. Id. at 390-92.
521. See id. at 391-92.
522. See, e.g., Zachair, Ltd. v. Driggs, 965 F. Supp. 741 (D. Md. 1997); Spencer v.
Steinman, 179 F.R.D. 484, 490-91 (E.D. Pa. 1998) (determining that communica-
tions with a former lawyer/employee of an opposing counsel was appropriate be-
cause no privileged matters were revealed).
523. See, e.g., Peralta v. Cendant Corp., 190 F.R.D. 38 (D. Conn. 1999).
524. See, e.g., Amatuzio v. Gandalf Sys. Corp., 932 F. Supp. 113 (D.N.J. 1996).
525. See supra sections IV.A-D (discussing Model Rule 4.2).
526. See, e.g., Verschoth v. Time-Warner, Inc., No. CIV.1339(AGS)(JCF), 2001 U.S.
Dist. LEXIS 3174, 85 Fair Empl. Prac. Cas. (BNA) 733 (S.D.N.Y. 2001).
527. See, e.g., Zachair, 965 F. Supp. at 752-55 (D. Md. 1997) (disqualifying counsel
due to counsel's extensive ex parte contacts with nonparty who had been em-
ployed as opponent's in-house counsel; court found that both counsel and the for-
mer employee/attorney had violated several ethical rules as well as the attorney-
client privilege). Application of the attorney-client privilege to in-house counsel
poses many complexities beyond the scope of this Article. One of the most press-
ing concerns is that in-house counsels often advise corporate boards and execu-
tives on issues that are non-legal or quasi-legal in nature, thus falling outside of
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scenarios are covered by the Ninth Circuit's observation that "the at-
torney-client privilege is served by the certainty that conversations
between the attorney and client will remain privileged after the em-
ployee leaves."5 28 The fourth scenario is a common one, but exists
only where the former employee expressly agrees to representation by
her former employer's counsel: representation will not be assumed.
5 29
Clearly, "an attorney-client relationship cannot be created unilater-
ally or imposed upon the employees without their consent."530 The
fifth and final scenario-waiver created by counsel's communication of
his client's former employees-is one that should strike fear into the
heart of every attorney.5 3 1
The existence and extent of the attorney-client privilege in all for-
mer employee situations requires highly fact-specific examinations of
the circumstances surrounding the communications for which the
privilege is claimed. Obviously, "[tihe attorney-client privilege cannot
be used to justify an absolute proscription against ex parte communi-
cations with [or formal discovery of] former employees. The attorney-
client privilege exists only to the extent that attorney-client confi-
dences are implicated."5 3 2 But each situation as explained above
gives rise to the possibility that the former employer's adversary may
the privilege's reach. See generally Amy L. Weiss, Student Note, In-house Coun-
sel Beware: Wearing the Business Hat Could Mean Losing the Privilege, 11 GEo.
J. LEGAL ETHICS 393 (1998). And, "[a]lthough it is clear that the attorney-client
privilege does not protect business advice, distinguishing between legal advice
and business advice in corporate communications is often a difficult and fact-
intensive task." Id. at 398 (footnote omitted).
528. Coordinated Pretrial Proceedings in Petroleum Prod. Antitrust Litig., 658 F.2d
1355, 1361 n.7 (9th Cir. 1981).
529. Courts require proof that the former employee consented to representation rather
than assuming that the attorney-client relationship was established merely by
counsel's contact with the former employee. See, e.g., Brown v. St. Joseph's
County, 148 F.R.D. 246, 250 (N.D. Ind. 1993); see also Michaels v. Woodland, 988
F. Supp. 468, 472 (D.N.J. 1997) (recognizing that offer of representation by corpo-
rate counsel to current employees does not constitute "automatic representa-
tion"); Carter-Herman v. City of Philadelphia, 897 F. Supp. 899, 903 (E.D. Pa.
1995) (concluding that city employee is not automatically represented by city's
counsel, and that there must be a showing of some "initiative on the part of the
employee to obtain legal help from the City").
530. Brown, 148 F.R.D. at 251.
531. In Verschoth v. Time-Warner, Inc., No. CIV.1339(AGS)(JCF), 2001 U.S. Dist.
LEXIS 3174, at *8-11, 85 Fair Empl. Prac. Cas. (BNA) 733 (S.D.N.Y. 2001), for
example, the court held that defendants waived the attorney-client privilege cov-
ering conversations between defense counsel and a former employee because the
former employee had no need to know the details of defendants' litigation strat-
egy and defendants should have anticipated that former employee would commu-
nicate the information to plaintiff.
532. Terra Int'l, Inc. v. Miss. Chem. Corp., 913 F. Supp. 1306, 1316 (N.D. Iowa 1996).
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access attorney-client privileged information through informal or for-
mal discovery of former employees. 5 33
Various courts, the ABA, and other authorities have warned that
even when contact with a former employee of an adversary is other-
wise appropriate, care must be taken to avoid breaching any walls of
attorney-client privilege that shield information the employee has
from discovery. 534 Former employees should not divulge privileged in-
formation they possess. 53 5 It is equally well settled that attorneys are
"not free to raid" their adversary's "roster of former employees where
those employees, during their tenure, have become privy to matters
protected by the attorney client or work product privilege."5 36 Stated
differently, an attorney may contact former employees to "investigate
the underlying facts leading up to the disputed matter, but he must
forgo inquiry into attorney-client communication during the con-
tact."5 37 This is because the attorney-client privilege, once estab-
lished, exists essentially in perpetuity,5 38 and "[a]n organization has
no less interest in protecting its confidences when an employee who
once shared those confidences leaves the company fold."539
533. Amatuzio v. Gandalf Sys. Corp., 932 F. Supp. 113 (D.N.J. 1996) (resolving dis-
pute concerning former employee's disclosure of attorney-client privileged infor-
mation to opposing counsel of former employer).
534. In re Bank of La.fKenwin Shops, Inc., 1998 WL 788776, at *3 (E.D. La. Nov. 10,
1998); Hanntz v. Shiley, Inc., 766 F. Supp. 258, 271 (D.N.J. 1991); ABA Comm. on
Ethics and Profl Responsibility, Formal Op. 91-359 (1991) (concluding that
"[w]ith respect to any unrepresented former employee, of course, the potentially
communicating adversary attorney must be careful not to seek to induce the for-
mer employee to violate the privilege attaching to attorney-client communica-
tions to the extent his or her communications as a former employee with his or
her former employer's counsel are protected by the privilege"); Pa. Bar. Ass'n
Comm. on Legal Ethics & Profl Responsibility, Formal Op. 90-142 (Dec. 7 1990)
(recognizing that "[i] f there is a real or perceived risk of disclosure of confidential
information protected by the privilege which is or may be damaging to the party
in interest, due process considerations may prohibit ex parte contact by adverse
counsel with a current or former employee").
535. Orlowski v. Dominick's Finer Foods, Inc., 937 F. Supp. 723, 728 (N.D. Ill. 1996),
cited with approval in In re Bank of La. /Kenwin Shops, Inc., 1998 WL 788776, at
*3.
536. Biocore Med. Techs., Inc. v. Khosrowshahi, 181 F.R.D. 660, 673 (D. Kan. 1998)
(quoting Data Gen. Corp. v. Antitrust Litig., 5 Fed. R. Serv. 3d (West) 510 (N.D.
Cal. 1986)).
537. In re Bank of Louisiana/Kenwin Shops Inc., 1998 WL 788776, at *3 (citation
omitted).
538. Swidler & Berlin v. United States, 524 U.S. 399 (1998) (holding that communica-
tions initiated by White House lawyer Vincent Foster to obtain legal representa-
tion related to alleged wrongdoing in the White House travel office survived
Foster's suicide). See generally Richard C. Wydick, The Attorney-Client Privilege:
Does it Really Have Life Everlasting, 87 Ky. L.J. 1165 (1998) (discussing the Swi-
dler & Berlin case).
539. Camden v. Maryland, 910 F. Supp. 1115, 1120-21 (D. Md. 1996).
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Even though "the attorney client privilege is a rule of evidence
more than a rule of ethics,"540 invasion of the privilege through inap-
propriate contact with a former employee may serve as grounds for
disqualification of counsel or other disciplinary action. 54 1 Such an in-
vasion may be construed as a violation of Model Rule 4.2542 and as a
violation of Model Rule 4.4, which bars attorneys from using "methods
of obtaining evidence that violate the legal rights of' others. 543 It is
also grounds for a protective order 544 and the imposition of
sanctions.5 45
Amatuzio v. Gandalf Systems Corp.546 presents an interesting sce-
nario regarding a former employee and the limits of the attorney-cli-
ent privilege. In Amatuzio, several terminated employees sued their
former employer, Gandalf Systems Corporation ("GSC"), claiming that
GSC's reduction of severance agreements violated state and federal
law. Plaintiffs' counsel served a deposition subpoena on GSC former
employee Vincent Messina. When employed by GSC, Messina re-
ported directly to the director of human resources and attended sev-
eral meetings during which GSC officials and their legal counsel
discussed reduction of the severance agreement. The night before the
scheduled deposition, and without any prompting from plaintiffs'
counsel, Messina contacted plaintiffs' counsel and told them he
wanted to join the lawsuit and wanted plaintiffs' counsel to represent
him. Plaintiffs' counsel agreed.
GSC moved to disqualify plaintiffs' counsel on the grounds that
Messina had disclosed attorney-client privileged information gener-
ated during the meetings between GSC officials and their attorneys
where severance packages had been discussed. The court denied the
motion to disqualify for both practical and legal reasons.
540. Amatuzio v. Gandalf Sys. Corp., 932 F. Supp. 113, 115 (D.N.J. 1996).
541. See id. (stating that "because the right of a client to communicate confidentially
with his attorney goes to the very core of the litigation process, the court can
disqualify an attorney if necessary to protect this fundamental value"); see also
Rentclub Inc. v. Transamerica Rental Fin. Corp., 811 F. Supp. 651 (M.D. Fla.
1992), affd, 43 F.3d 1439 (11th Cir.1995) (disqualifying plaintiffs counsel for en-
tering consulting agreement with former employee of defendant which presuma-
bly resulted in breach of former employer's confidences).
542. Camden, 910 F. Supp. at 1119 (determining whether ex parte contact with former
employee of opposing party is appropriate in a particular case "requires consider-
ation of a legal concern separate from but closely related to Rule 4.2, namely the
attorney-client privilege").
543. MODEL RULES OF PROF'L CONDUCT R. 4.4 (2002); see also Amatuzio, 932 F. Supp.
at 115.
544. FED. R. Civ. P. 26(c); see also supra subsection V.B.4.f (Protective Orders).
545. Sanctions for discovery abuses can be imposed pursuant to FED. R. Civ. P. 37 and
the trial court's inherent powers as recognized in Chambers v. NASCO, Inc., 501
U.S. 32 (1991).
546. 932 F. Supp. 113 (D.N.J. 1996).
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As a practical matter, the court observed "that the problem raised
in this case will not go away even if [plaintiffs' counsel] Mattioni does,
since there will always remain the question of Messina's right to dis-
close to any attorney he might hire the contents of the communica-
tions now claimed to be privileged."5 47
Turning to the legal issues, the court found that neither the ethical
rules applicable in cases involving disclosure by former employees,
specifically Model Rules 4.2 and 4.4, nor the common law principles of
attorney-client privilege squarely fit the case before it. Recognizing
that the attorney-client privilege should be narrowly construed when
"it has the potential to frustrate the court's truth-seeking function,"5 48
the Amatuzio court articulated a rule intended to balance the right of
a corporate employer to seek legal advice in confidence with the right
of a former employee to breach that confidence if necessary to vindi-
cate a legal right asserted against the corporation:
[C]ommunications with a corporation's attorney made by, to, or in the pres-
ence of a non-attorney employee who later becomes adverse to the corporation
are not protected by RPC 4.2, RCP 4.4, or the attorney-client privilege from
disclosure by the former employee to his litigation counsel if (i) the litigation
involves an allegation by the employee that the corporation breached a statu-
tory or common law duty which it owed to the employee, (ii) the communica-
tion disclosed involves or relates to the subject matter of the litigation, and
(iii) the employee was not responsible for managing the litigation or making
the corporate decisions which led to the litigation. 5 4 9
The court recognized that its rule might at times invade a corpora-
tion's expectation of privacy in its communications with legal counsel,
but declared that "the strong public policy embodied in laws which
protect employees must trump the need for confidentiality."5 50 The
court also held that the same or similar rule would "apply with respect
to disputes that have not yet resulted in litigation."5 5 1
Applying its rule to the case before it, the Amatuzio court found
nothing inappropriate in plaintiffs' counsel's representation of defen-
dant's former employee Messina. The court further opined that defen-
dant-and all other corporate employers-could protect themselves
from disclosure of attorney-client communications by being more se-
lective about the employees present in meetings with corporate legal
counsel. The court advised that a former employee such as Messina,
who was present only to provide factual information and who was
likely to be terminated under the plan being discussed by defendant's
officials, should be excluded from meetings where legal strategies sur-
rounding the terminations are discussed if the employer wishes to en-
547. Amatuzio, 932 F. Supp. at 116.
548. Id. at 117.
549. Id. at 118.
550. Id.
551. Id.
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joy the protection otherwise afforded by the attorney-client
privilege.5 52
Where the attorney-client privilege applies, only the written or oral
communications between the attorney and her client are protected:
the facts underlying the subject of the communication are not.55 3
Simply put, "[t]he revelation of damaging facts ... does not implicate
the attorney-client privilege."5 54 As one judge noted, "[a] corporation
cannot bring former employees back into the fold for purposes of a
lawsuit merely because there is a risk that the former employee might
disclose unfavorable facts."555 Unless those facts, however damaging,
are protected under another privilege, "they may be discovered
through any means other than a question of the form 'what did you
say to your attorney?"'556
Waiver furnishes a sharp sword for an adversary attempting to
pierce the attorney-client shield.557 As a general proposition, a party
cannot "waive" any legal rights without intentionally and knowingly
renouncing those rights.558 With the attorney-client privilege, how-
ever, "the fact of waiver may follow from an inadvertent disclosure or
from any conduct by the client that would make it unfair for the client
thereafter to assert the privilege."559 And even though the client owns
the privilege, "in most instances, it is through actions taken (or not
taken) by counsel that courts find a waiver has occurred."56o Care-
lessness often lies at the heart of such inadvertent disclosures.561
552. Id. at 119 (holding that "[wihen a corporation chooses to make a potential target
of an adverse employment action privy to communications with its lawyer, the
corporation has no right to expect that those communications will be kept secret
if the employee should sue the corporation regarding the legality of that adverse
action").
553. Upjohn Co. v. United States, 449 U.S. 383 at 395-96 (1981); Lirette v.
Delchamps, Inc., 1996 WL 267991, at *2, 33 Wage & Hour Cas. 2d (BNA) 959
(E.D. La. May 20, 1996); Terra Int'l, Inc. v. Miss. Chem. Corp., 913 F. Supp. 1306,
1316 (N.D. Iowa 1996) (quoting Hanntz v. Shiley, Inc., 766 F. Supp. 258, 270-71
(D.N.J.1991)).
554. Hanntz, 766 F. Supp. at 265. The Supreme Court has noted that the attorney-
client privilege "only protects disclosure of communications; it does not protect
disclosure of the underlying facts by those who communicated with the attorney."
Upjohn, 449 U.S. at 395.
555. Nalian Truck Lines, Inc. v. Nakano Warehouse & Transp. Corp., 92 Daily Jour-
nal D.A.R. 7189, 7190 (Cal. Ct. App. 1992).
556. PAUL R. RICE, BEST-KEPT SECRETS OF EVIDENCE LAw 196 (2001) (footnote
omitted).
557. See EPSTEIN, supra note 508, at 167-224 (discussing the various ways in which
parties inadvertently waive the attorney-client privilege).
558. Id. at 158.
559. Id.
560. Id. at 165.
561. See id. at 185.
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Verschoth v. Time-Warner, Inc.56 2 teaches an important lesson on
avoiding inadvertent waiver of the attorney-client privilege when com-
municating with former employees about pending litigation. In Ver-
schoth, the plaintiff was a fulltime employee who became a freelance
writer under contract with Sports Illustrated, a magazine owned and
published by defendant Time-Warner. 563 One of plaintiffs areas of
expertise was Olympic events. 564 Time-Warner informed plaintiff
that her contract would not be renewed, and plaintiff retained legal
counsel who sent a letter to Time-Warner in January 1999, threaten-
ing employment discrimination litigation. 565
Shortly after Time-Warner received the letter, five of its managing
editors met to discuss advice from Time-Warner's legal department
that plaintiff should not be given any additional assignments.566 One
of the attendees at that January meeting, Craig Neff, was directed to
communicate the content of the editors' discussions about legal coun-
sel's advice to Jeffrey Kirshenbaum, a former editor who continued to
do freelance editing for Sports Illustrated on stories about the
Olympic Games and other events. 567 Neff did S0.568
In March 1999, plaintiff filed a complaint alleging sex and age dis-
crimination under federal and state laws. She also sought a prelimi-
nary injunction prohibiting Time-Warner from not renewing her
freelance contract.569 Plaintiff supported her motion with an affidavit
in which she recounted a conversation between herself and Kir-
shenbaum in early February 1999, during which Kirshenbaum re-
vealed the details of the editors' January 1999 meeting in which
corporate counsel's legal advice was discussed. 570 Plaintiffs motion
was denied and she voluntarily dismissed her suit without prejudice,
but refiled less than a year later.571
During discovery in the second action, plaintiff sought additional
information regarding the communications that occurred among the
five editors in the January 1999 meeting as well as the subsequent
conversation about that meeting between current Time-Warner em-
ployee Neff and former Time-Warner employee Kirshenbaum. 572
Time-Warner argued that because the editors' meeting focused on ad-
562. No. CIV.1339(AGS)(JCF), 2001 U.S. Dist. LEXIS 3174, 85 Fair Empl. Prac. Cas.
(BNA) 733 (S.D.N.Y. 2001).
563. See id. at *1-2.
564. See id. at *4.
565. See id. at *2.
566. See id. at *3-4.
567. See id. at *4.
568. See id.
569. See id. at *2.
570. See id. at *2-3.
571. See id. at *3.
572. See id. at *4.
[Vol. 81:868
DISCOVERY AND FORMER EMPLOYEES
vice provided by its in-house counsel, the content of the meeting and
subsequent communications about the meeting were shielded from
discovery by the attorney-client privilege. 5 73 The court disagreed.
Examining the attorney-client privilege in the corporate context,
the court recognized that the privilege only applies when legal advice
is shared with persons responsible for the matter that is the subject of
the advice.574 "Furthermore, the originator of the communication
must have intended that it be kept confidential, and it may not be
circulated beyond those employees with a need to know the informa-
tion."5 75 Persons with a need to know, the court further explained,
are executives such as vice presidents for design and safety engineers
trying to remedy a design defect that has created liability for an auto-
mobile manufacturer; workers on the assembly line, in contrast, have
no need to know the legal basis for a chance in production even though
the change directly affects their employment.57 6
The Verschoth court classified defendant's former employee Kir-
shenbaum as an assembly line worker rather than a vice president or
safety engineer. 577 Even though Kirshenbaum had worked for Sports
Illustrated for thirty years and continued working for the magazine as
a freelance editor, the court found that Kirshenbaum had no manage-
rial responsibilities in general and had no duties specifically related to
hiring and firing of others.578 "Mr. Kirshenbaum, like the autoworker
on the assembly line, needed to be told what procedure to follow [i.e.,
not to accept any more articles from plaintiff], but he had no reason to
be informed of any legal analysis that went into the formulation of the
procedure."579
Moreover, the court held that the defendant's editors who attended
the January 1999 meeting during which the legal advice was dis-
cussed possessed the authority to determine whether the information
should be kept confidential or whether confidentiality should be
waived. 58 0 By directing Neff to share the content of the communica-
tions between defendant's editors and legal counsel with former editor
Kirshenbaum, defendant "lost any privilege with respect to that
advice."5s1
Attorneys should take to heart Verschoth's lesson on the conse-
quences of inadvertent waiver. Simply put, attorneys and their clients
should share the content of attorney-client privileged communications
573. See id.
574. Id. at *5.
575. Id. at *6 (citations omitted).
576. See id. at *7.
577. See id. at *8.
578. See id.
579. Id. at *9.
580. See id. at *9.
581. Id.
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only with employees who "need to know"-a category that rarely, if
ever, includes former employees. Convincing a court that former em-
ployees were privy to details of litigation strategy and that corporate
counsel intended to protect confidentiality while sharing this private
information with former employees is a battle rarely won, and thus,
best avoided.
B. Work Product Doctrine
The work product doctrine articulated in Hickman v. Taylor58 2 and
its progeny, including Upjohn Co. v. United States,58 3 is codified in the
Federal Rules of Civil Procedure and analogous state rules. The doc-
trine shields from discovery "documents and tangible things"58 4 that
were "prepared in anticipation of litigation or for trial by or for an-
other party or by that party's representative (including the other
party's attorney, consultant, surety, indemnitor, insurer, or
agent)."5 8 5 Work product materials may be discoverable "only upon a
showing that the party seeking discovery has substantial need of the
materials.., and.., is unable without undue hardship to obtain the
substantial equivalent of the materials by other means."586
Despite its codification, the common law borne of Hickman v. Tay-
lor still plays a critical role in the application of the work product doc-
trine. One commentator identified the following trilogy of
propositions culled from Hickman as critical to resolving modern work
product disputes:
(1) Material collected by counsel in the course of preparation for possible liti-
gation is protected from disclosure in discovery.
(2) That protection is qualified, in that the adversary may obtain discovery on
showing sufficient need for the material.
(3) The lawyer's thinking-theories, analysis, mental impressions, beliefs, and
so on-is at the heart of the adversary system, and privacy is essential for the
lawyer's thinking; thus the protection is greatest, if not absolute, for materials
that would reveal that part of the work product.
5 8 7
The work product doctrine encourages "careful and thorough prep-
aration by the lawyer."58 8 "Unlike the attorney-client privilege, dis-
closure to third parties does not necessarily waive work-product
protection,"589 but waiver may be found in that situation.59 0 In addi-
tion, objections to discovery based on work product must be asserted
582. 329 U.S. 495 (1947).
583. 449 U.S. 383 (1981).
584. FED. R. Civ. P. 26(b)(3).
585. Id.
586. Id.
587. EPSTEIN, supra note 508, at 291.
588. Id. at 287.
589. Colonial Gas Co. v. Aetna Cas. & Sur. Co., 144 F.R.D. 600, 609 (D. Mass. 1992).
590. Verschoth v. Time-Warner, Inc., 2001 U.S. Dist. LEXIS 3174, at *9-11.
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separately, because work product objections are not automatically
subsumed by objections based on attorney-client privilege. 5 9 1
A party seeking discovery of work product bears an extraordinarily
high burden of showing that the information cannot be obtained by
other means.59 2 And even where the burden is met, courts overseeing
discovery must "protect against disclosure of the mental impressions,
conclusions, opinions, or legal theories of an attorney or other repre-
sentative of a party concerning the litigation."593
The work product doctrine ingratiates itself into discovery of for-
mer employees in at least two ways. First, where communications be-
tween opposing counsel and former employees of a litigant are
appropriate, the doctrine may shield interview notes and other mater-
ials generated by the contacting attorney from discovery.59 4 Second,
former employees may possess or have knowledge of work product pre-
pared by or for the former employer. In that case, actual or potential
invasion of this work product through contact between the former em-
ployee and counsel for the former employer's adversary may provide
grounds for the entry of protective orders or imposition of sanctions on
the contacting counsel. 5 95
Application of the work product doctrine in the first scenario de-
scribed above has been discussed at length elsewhere596 and need not
be recounted here. In short, the work product doctrine may, but does
not always, shield from discovery notes and memoranda prepared by a
party's representatives during and after interviews with former em-
ployees, 59 7 witness statements signed by former employees, 598 the
identity of documents discussed at interviews,599 and even oral com-
591. EPSTEIN, supra note 508, at 401.
592. In Upjohn, for example, the Court refused to order production of work product,
even though the I.R.S., as the party seeking discovery, would literally have to
travel around the world to obtain the "substantial equivalent" of the materials
sought regarding the corporation's overseas activities. 449 U.S. at 399.
593. FED. R. Civ. P. 26(b)(3).
594. See, e.g., Westside-Marrero Jeep Eagle v. Chrysler Corp., No. CIV.A.97-3012,
1998 WL 186705, at *3 (E.D. La. Apr. 17, 1998) (accepting counsel's argument
that statement former employee gave to them under oath was work product, but
holding statement discoverable due to purported waiver of the work product
doctrine).
595. See, e.g., In re Bank of La./Kenwin Shops, Inc., No. 1193, 1998 WL 788776, at *6,(E.D. La. Nov. 10, 1998) (deciding that where party claims adversary's counsel
improperly obtained work product from party's former employees, contacting at-
torney must submit contested materials to court to determine whether work
product rule was violated).
596. See Becker, supra note 27, at 291-310.
597. Id. at 294-95.
598. Id. at 295-300; Intel Corp. v. VIA Tech., Inc., 204 F.R.D. 450, 452 (N.D. Cal.
2001) (holding that statement of plaintiffs former employee obtained by defen-
dant constituted work product of plaintiffs counsel).
599. See Becker, supra note 27, at 300-06.
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munications between counsel and an opposing party's former
employees. 60 0
The application of the work product doctrine to the second scena-
rio-i.e., to prevent or punish inappropriate informal or formal discov-
ery of former employees-deserves further discussion. In a fraud
class action against an insurance company, 60 1 for example, plaintiffs
properly (though ultimately unsuccessfully) invoked the work product
doctrine to challenge a protective order defining the procedures for
contacting former employees of the defendants. The court allowed
plaintiffs' counsel liberal contact with the defendant insurance com-
pany's former employees, 60 2 but required, among other things, that
"each side must inform opposing counsel, within ten days of such an
ex parte interview, of its intention to take that person's deposition or
introduce that person's testimony at trial."603 Plaintiffs complained
that disclosing this information would reveal its legal strategy in con-
travention of the letter and spirit of the work product doctrine.
The trial court rejected plaintiffs' objection to the order for two rea-
sons. First, requiring plaintiffs to reveal information that would
"eventually be disclosed anyway" did not, in the court's view, consti-
tute a violation of the doctrine. 60 4 Second, the court found "the strong
competing interest in a case of this nature in efficient, cost-effective
discovery"6 05 warranted disclosure.
The court's first rationale is more credible than its second. Cer-
tainly, the court's conclusion that it was not compelling the discovery
of otherwise protected information, but simply accelerating the time
line for certain required disclosures, has some validity. 60 6 But the
court's secondary rationale-i.e., that such disclosure is warranted be-
cause it serves the interests of efficiency and cost containment-can-
600. Id. at 306-10; Haga v. L.A.P. Care Servs., Inc., No. 1:01CV00105, 2002 U.S. Dist.
Lexis 1605 (W.D. Va. Feb. 1, 2002) (holding that content of interviews conducted
by plaintiffs counsel of defendant's former employees were work product not sub-
ject to discovery). But see Schwartz v. Camp Robin Hood, No. 01-12032-RWZ,
2002 U.S. Dist. LEXIS 8342, at *5 (D. Mass. May 8, 2002) (allowing plaintiffs
counsel to conduct ex parte telephone interviews of defendant's former employees
provided that counsel conducting interviews provide "detailed and complete notes
of the interviews"-i.e., plaintiffs work product-to defense counsel).
601. In re Prudential Ins. Co. of Am., 911 F. Supp. 148 (D.N.J. 1995).
602. See id. at 152-53.
603. Id. at 153.
604. Id.
605. Id.
606. Requiring early disclosure of this information is problematic to the extent that it
reveals counsel's thoughts and opinions of the case as they are evolving; such
revelations are generally prohibited by the higher level of protection accorded the
so-called "opinion work product." Courts are instructed by the Federal Rules and
state counterparts to take special care to shield from disclosure "mental impres-
sions, conclusions, opinions, or legal theories of an attorney." FED. R. Crv. P.
26(b)(3).
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not stand on its own. To the contrary, the Supreme Court made clear
in Upjohn that the privilege should not be pierced even where a party
has to travel around the globe to obtain the information already con-
tained in an opponent's work product. 60 7
The work product doctrine also played a critical role in the resolu-
tion of the heated discovery dispute surrounding a former employee in
Westside-Marrero Jeep-Eagle, Inc. v. Chrysler Corp.60 8 In that case,
plaintiffs obtained a statement under oath and documents from a for-
mer employee of Chrysler named Alfred S. Stevens, Jr. Stevens was
originally named as a co-defendant and had briefly consulted with
Chrysler regarding the lawsuit. Chrysler refused to pay Stevens' at-
torney's fees or to indemnify him for any judgment. Stevens resigned
from Chrysler, settled with the plaintiffs, and provided plaintiffs'
counsel with a sworn statement and documents obtained during his
employment with Chrysler.
Chrysler and plaintiffs both served subpoenas duces tecum on Ste-
vens. Chrysler sought the statement and documents Stevens had pro-
vided to plaintiffs' counsel and plaintiffs sought additional documents
from Stevens related to his employment with Chrysler. Each party
moved for protective orders effectively quashing their opponent's
subpoenas.
Plaintiffs argued that Stevens' sworn statement was work product.
The court rejected this argument by construing the statement as the
property of Stevens and further noted that the work product doctrine
did not apply because Stevens was not a party, representative, con-
sultant, or agent of a party when he made the statement. 60 9
The court also rejected Chrysler's argument that contact by plain-
tiffs' counsel with Stevens was inappropriate because Stevens might
disclose some of the work product Chrysler had developed in defend-
ing this case. Relying on Louisiana case law that interpreted Rule 4.2
of the Louisiana Code of Professional Conduct to allow contact with
former employees, the court refused to sanction past contacts or pro-
hibit future ones between plaintiffs' counsel and Stevens.6 1o The
court, however, instructed plaintiffs' counsel meticulously to avoid any
intrusion on materials protected by the work product doctrine and to
avoid the breach of any other privileges that attached to the informa-
tion Stevens possessed.6 11
607. Upjohn v. United States, 449 U.S. 383, 399-401 (1981).
608. No. CIV.A.97-3012, 1998 WL 186705 (E.D. La. Apr. 17, 1998).
609. Id. at *3.
610. See id. at *5-6
611. See id. at *6; see also supra text accompanying notes 449-63 (discussing issues
surrounding subpoenas in this case).
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As with the attorney-client privilege, waiver often delineates the
availability and extent of work product protection.6 12 Waiver of work
product protection will not, however, necessarily be found in the same
situations that constitute waiver of the attorney-client privilege. This
is especially true with disclosure to non-parties or so called "third per-
sons," categories that include virtually all former employees of a
litigant.
Disclosure of attorney-client communications to third persons in-
validates the attorney-client protection of those communications be-
cause the principle of confidentiality served by the privilege is tainted
if not destroyed by that disclosure. 61 3 "Selective and strategic disclo-
sure"614 of work product, in contrast, remains consistent with its gen-
esis principle of "implementing the adversary process, not just
encouraging confidential communications." 6 15 Thus, disclosure to
third parties waives work product protection only if it "substantially
increases the likelihood that the work product will fall into the hands
of the adversary."616
Such was the situation in the previously discussed Verschoth
case.6 17 In that case, all attorney-client and work product protections
that would have encompassed the meeting of defendant's current edi-
tors to discuss plaintiffs anticipated litigation were waived by the edi-
tors' subsequent disclosure of the meeting's content to former editor
Kirshenbaum. 6 18 The editors either knew or should have known that
Kirshenbaum was friends with the plaintiff and would convey infor-
mation about the meeting to her.6 19
Waiver could have been avoided in Verschoth (and in any similar
situation) by "selectively and strategically" sharing the information
only with current employees who need to possess the information to
fully perform their regular duties and to help their employer effectu-
ate its litigation strategy. Once again, effective use of the protections
afforded by the legal doctrine requires a delicate balancing of the costs
and benefits of disclosing information beyond the "need to know"
group, the exercise of sound legal judgment, and the engagement of
that most elusive of attributes, basic common sense.
612. See generally EPSTEIN, supra note 508, at 401-26.
613. See id. at 403.
614. Id.
615. Id.
616. Verschoth v. Time-Warner, Inc., No. CIV.1339(AGS)(JCF), 2001 U.S. Dist. LEXIS
3174, at *10, 85 Fair Empl. Prac. Cas. (BNA) 733 (S.D.N.Y. 2001) (quoting Bank
Brussels Lambert v. Credit Lyonnais, 160 F.R.D. 437, 448 (S.D.N.Y. 1995)).
617. See discussion of Verschoth, supra notes 562-81 and accompanying text.
618. Verschoth, 2001 U.S. Dist. LEXIS 3174, at *10.
619. See id.
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C. Trade Secrets and Confidential Commercial Information
The rights and duties arising from the employer-employee relationship are
the context of the great majority of reported trade secret cases.6 2 0
Protection for trade secrets and other confidential commercial in-
formation 6 2 1 is maintained through a network of legal authorities that
includes state and federal statutes, duties implied by common law,
and express agreements between employees and employers. 62 2 Mone-
tary damages, injunctive relief, and other remedies are available to
persons and entities whose trade secrets and proprietary information
have been misappropriated. This Article, however, is purposefully
limited to the role played by trade secrets and proprietary information
in hobbling the discovery of information possessed by former employ-
ees. The primary focus here is not the misuse of trade secrets per se,
but rather the revelation of trade secret or proprietary information in
the prosecution or defense of an action such as an employment dis-
crimination matter or a personal injury claim.
620. 1 ROGER M. MILGRIM, MILGRIM ON TRADE SECRETS 5.02[1] (1996).
621. Courts and litigants generally use the terms "trade secrets" and "proprietary in-
formation" interchangeably, although, as explained in this and the following sec-
tion of this Article, they are distinct categories of information afforded different
levels of protection.
622. For example, improper capture and use of trade secrets and propriety informa-
tion forms the basis for a civil lawsuit grounded in tort or intellectual property
law. See generally Robert G. Bone, A New Look at Trade Secret Law: Doctrine in
Search of Justification, 86 CAL. L. REV. 241 (1998) (providing a comprehensive
history of trade secret doctrine and its current status, as well as offering critical
analysis of the various policy justifications for its continued existence); MELVIN F.
JAGER, TRADE SECRETS LAw § 2.01 (1985) (tracing the evolution of trade secrets
law from its early English common law roots to its modern permutation in the
United States). Trade secrets and proprietary information also frequently form
the nucleus of litigation over enforceability of restrictive employment covenants.
See, e.g., Jay's Custom Stringing, Inc. v. Jonghwan Yu, 144 Lab. Cas. (CCH) 359,
393 (S.D.N.Y. 2001) (determining rights of former employer to enforce restrictive
covenant to prevent former employee from disclosing trade secrets to plaintiffs
competitor); DDS, Inc. v. Lucas Aerospace Power Transmission Corp., 182 F.R.D.
1 (N.D.N.Y. 1998) (litigating former employee's alleged breach of confidentiality
agreement with former employer that forbid use of proprietary information).
Other possible causes of action for misappropriation of trade secrets by former
employees or third parties are found in common law remedies accompanying
claims of breach of fiduciary duty, unfair competition, fraud and misrepresenta-
tion, conversion, unjust enrichment, constructive trusts, and even civil conspir-
acy. Robert Unikel, Bridging the "Trade Secret" Gap: Protecting "Confidential
Information" Not Rising to the Level of Trade Secrets, 29 Loy. U. CHI. L.J. 841,
859-67 (1998). Federal criminal penalties are available for theft of trade secrets
in certain limited cases. See Economic Espionage Act of 1996, 18 U.S.C.
§§ 1831-39 (2001); see also Marina Lao, Federalizing Trade Secrets Law in an
Information Economy, 59 OHIO ST. L.J. 1633, 1666-68 (1998) (discussing limita-
tions of federal criminal trade secrets law). Protection of trade secrets is also
established by international law; see, e.g., North American Free Trade Agree-
ment, Dec. 19, 1992, U.S.-Can.-Mex., 32 I.L.M. 605.
2003]
NEBRASKA LAW REVIEW
Trade secrets and propriety information do not enjoy the presump-
tion of non-disclosure that closely guards classes of protected informa-
tion such as work product and attorney-client communications.
Rather, a party advocating non-disclosure based on trade secrets and
proprietary information must usually identify such materials with ut-
most particularity, present a convincing argument that the materials
constitute trade secrets, make a further compelling argument as to
why the materials should not be disclosed, and convince the court that
secrecy creates no public harm.623 Often, a court order is required
before such information is considered off limits to an adversary con-
ducting formal or informal discovery.624 Sanctions may be available
for invading trade secrets and confidential information, however, even
if no order is in place.625
The Federal Rules of Civil Procedure and their state procedural
rules and common law counterparts empower courts to sculpt discov-
ery in a given case so "that a trade secret or other confidential re-
search, development, or commercial information not be revealed or be
revealed only in a designated way."626 Such sculpting is usually re-
flected in a protective order. Sanctions for disregarding the order in-
clude designation of certain facts established for the purposes of the
action, 62 7 the exclusion of improperly gained evidence,628 the dismis-
sal of claims or entry of default judgment,629 and the assessment of
penalties for contempt of court.6 30
Attorneys often invoke the trade secrets doctrine in an effort to bar
their adversaries from obtaining formal and informal discovery from
former employees of their clients. The first challenge is convincing the
court that information possessed by former employees meets the defi-
623. See, e.g., Union Pac. R.R. Co. v. Mower, 219 F.3d 1069 (9th Cir. 2000) (reversing
district court injunction prohibiting former employee from disclosing certain in-
formation to adversary of former employer because employer had not met burden
of proof that information deserved trade secret protection).
624. If the information sought by an adversary is relevant to the claims or defenses in
a particular case, discovery is not denied merely because the information might
be classified as trade secrets. See United States v. United Fruit Co., 410 F.2d
553, 556 (5th Cir. 1969).
625. See, e.g., Davidson Supply Co. v. P.P.E., Inc., 986 F. Supp. 956 (D. Md. 1997)
(resolving plaintiffs motion for disqualification of counsel or other sanctions due
to defense counsel's contacts with plaintiffs former employee who had access to
plaintiffs trade secret information). Lao, supra note 622, at 1666-68 (discussing
limitations of federal criminal trade secrets law); see also supra subsection
V.B.4.f (Protective Orders).
626. FED. R. CIv. P. 26(c)(7).
627. FED. R. Civ. P. 37(b)(2)(A).
628. FED. R. Civ. P. 37(b)(2)(B).
629. FED. R. Civ. P. 37(b)(2)(C).
630. FED. R. Civ. P. 37(b)(2)(D).
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nition of "trade secret."6 3 1 The term is subject to numerous interpre-
tations, making the success of any particular argument largely
dependent upon the jurisdiction in which it is lodged. 63 2
In its broadest sense, "[a] trade secret can be anything used in
one's business which gives an advantage over competitors who do not
know or use it."633 More precise definitions of "trade secrets" vary
from state to state6 34 and may be defined statutorily.6 35 Some states
rely upon common law trade secret principles reflected in the Restate-
ment (First) of Torts, while others have adopted the Uniform Trade
Secrets Act with significant modifications that reflect each state's phi-
losophy on trade secret protection. 63 6
Section 757 of the Restatement (First) of Torts, promulgated by the
American Law Institute ("ALI") in 1939, represented the "first major
effort at synthesis of the developing U.S. law of trade secrets."6 37 Still
used by a handful of states,6 38 the Restatement defines trade secret as
"any formula, pattern, device or compilation of information which is
used in one's business, and which gives him an opportunity to obtain
an advantage over competitors who do not know or use it."639 The
631. An in-depth discussion of the struggle for recognition of trade secrets as property
of an employer is provided in Catherine L. Fisk, Working Knowledge: Trade
Secrets, Restrictive Covenants, and the Rise of Corporate Intellectual Property,
1800-1920, 52 HASTINGS L.J. 441 (2001).
632. The Supreme Court found a fundamental privacy right at the heart of trade se-
cret doctrine. Kewanee Oil Co. v. Bicron Corp., 416 U.S. 470 (1974). However,
each state is free to assess the value of trade secrets to its business and industry
and to determine how much protection to afford such information.
633. Julie Research Labs., Inc. v. Select Photographic Eng'g, Inc., 810 F. Supp. 513,
517 (S.D.N.Y. 1992) (citation omitted).
634. The variations among states in defining and enforcing trade secret law have led
commentators to call for a federal statutory standard preempting the field. See,
e.g., Lao, supra note 622, at 1633 (1998) (arguing that the lack of uniformity
among states was once acceptable but is now problematic due to the impact of
trade secrets law on interstate commerce and international transactions and the
complex choice of law problems non-uniform standards present); Christopher Re-
bel J. Pace, The Case for a Federal Trade Secrets Act, 8 HARv. J.L. & TECH. 427
(1995).
635. See William E. Hilton, What Sort of Improper Conduct Constitutes Misappropria-
tion of a Trade Secret?, 30 IDEA 287, 290-91, app. B (1990) (reporting that thirty-
nine states have statutes creating civil remedies for trade secret misuse and that
most of the statutes are based on the UNIFORM TRADE SECRETS ACT, 14 U.L.A. 433
(1985), drafted by the National Conference of Commissioners on Uniform State
Laws, and approved by the American Bar Association in 1979).
636. Lao, supra note 622, at 1635.
637. JAMES POOLEY, TRADE SECRETS § 2.02[1] (1998).
638. The seven states still using the Restatement (First) of Torts definition are Massa-
chusetts, Michigan, New York, New Jersey, Pennsylvania, Tennessee, Texas and
Wyoming. Lao, supra note 525, at 1650 n.99.
639. RESTATEMENT (FIRST) OF TORTS § 757 cmt. b (1939); see also Julie Research Labs,
810 F. Supp. at 517 (using this definition). Trade secrets were not covered in the
Restatement (Second) of Torts; rather, this topic was shifted to the RESTATEMENT
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Restatement finds trade secret protection primarily applicable "to the
production of goods," but also holds it applicable "to the sale of goods
or to other operations in the business," such as formulas for determin-
ing prices, "or a list of specialized customers, or a method of bookkeep-
ing or other office management" techniques.640
The Uniform Trade Secrets Act ("UTSA") was developed by the Na-
tional Conference of Commissioners on Uniform State Law ("NC-
CUSL") in 1979641 and revised in 1985.642 The UTSA has been
adopted in a variety of forms in forty-two states.6 43 The UTSA's defi-
nition of trade secrets is broader than section 757 of the Restatement
(First) of Torts, and has been incorporated into the ALI's Restatement
(Third) of Unfair Competition.644 Trade secrets covered by the UTSA
include the following:
[Ilnformation, including a formula, pattern, compilation, program, device,
method, technique, or process that: (i) derives independent economic value,
actual or potential, from not being generally known to, and not being readily
ascertainable by proper means by, other persons who can obtain economic
value from its disclosure or use, and (ii) is the subject of efforts that are rea-
sonable under the circumstances to maintain its secrecy. 6 4 5
"The UTSA's definition of trade secret information focuses on the
value of the information to the owner, rather than the type of informa-
tion sought to be protected."s" 6 In addition to providing a more com-
prehensive definition of trade secret than section 757 of the
Restatement (First) of Torts,647 the UTSA also eliminated the Restate-
ment (First)'s requirement "that a trade secret be 'continually used in
one's business"' to be worthy of protection. 648 The UTSA thereby ex-
tended protection to information that the Restatement (First) does not
(THIRD) OF UNFAIR COMPETITION §§ 38, 45 (1995). The most recent restatements
are largely consistent with the Uniform Trade Secrets Act. Lao, supra note 622,
at 1365 n.8.
640. RESTATEMENT (FIRST) OF TORTS § 757 cmt. b (1939).
641. See Ramon A. Klitzke, The Uniform Trade Secrets Act, 64 MARQ. L. REV. 277(1980) (explaining the history and purpose of the Uniform Trade Secrets Act).
642. First enacted in 1979, the UTSA "was amended in 1985 primarily to clarify ambi-
guities in the original Act and to strengthen its remedial provisions." Lao, supra
note 622, at 1653, n.118. The 1985 amendments, however, "do not significantly
modify the scope or philosophy of the original Act." Id.
643. See UNIF. TRADE SECRETS ACT, 14 U.L.A. 433 (1985) (providing "Table of Jurisdic-
tions Wherein Act has Been Adopted").
644. RESTATEMENT (THIRD) OF UNFAIR COMPETITION § 39 cmt. a (1993).
645. UNIF. TRADE SECRETS ACT § 1(4).
646. Benjamin A. Emmert, Comment, Keeping Confidence with Former Employees:
California Courts Apply the Inevitable Disclosure Doctrine to California Trade
Secret Law, 40 SANTA CLARA L. REV. 1171, 1182 (2000).
647. One court concluded that the trade secret definition used in the UTSA provides
protection for almost all business information that is maintained in confidence.
U.S. West Communications, Inc. v. Office of Consumer Advocate, 498 N.W.2d
711, 714 (Iowa 1993).
648. UNIF. TRADE SECRETS ACT § 1 cmt.
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cover, including "the terms of secret bids and impending business an-
nouncements," other "information that an innovator has not had an
opportunity to exploit," and even negative information-"i.e. informa-
tion about what not to do" in running a successful enterprise. 6 49
Sharing the fate of many other "uniform" laws, "the UTSA never
won the support of all the states, and even the states that did adopt
the UTSA modified it, sometimes substantially, before enactment."65 0
Versions of the Act adopted in Alabama and in North Carolina, for
example, "deviate so radically from the UTSA that they are hardly
recognizable as adoptions of the uniform act."65 1 Some states that
adopted the UTSA continued to develop and rely on common law stan-
dards, thus frustrating the purpose of adopting uniform statutory
standards.652 Moreover, "[s]everal states have materially altered the
definition of trade secret,"6 53 with some states expanding and others
constricting the USTA definition.6 54 The ALI's attempt to clarify
trade secret law by enacting the Restatement (Third) of Unfair Compe-
tition in 1995655 made little impact because so few states still rely on
common law. The possibility of other unifying reforms has not yet
649. Lao, supra note 622, at 1658-59. See also Emmert, supra note 646, at 1181-83.
While the RESTATEMENT (THIRD) OF UNFAIR COMPETITION §§ 36-39 (1993), seeks
to provide the most expansive protection of trade secrets available to date, see id.
§ 39 cmt. a, the existing statutes enacted by the vast majority of states negate the
possibility of wholesale adoption of the Restatement by the courts. It is possible,
of course, that state legislators could be inspired by the Restatement to amend
(and therefore expand) their respective trade secret laws, or that courts could use
the Restatement provisions to fill in gaps in current trade secret legislation.
650. Lao, supra note 622, at 1649-50.
651. Id. at 1657; see also Emmert, supra note 646, at 1190-92 (explaining California's
deviations from key UTSA provision).
652. See, e.g., Brandon B. Cate, Case Note, Saforo & Associates Inc. v. Porocel Corp.:
The Failure of the Uniform Trade Secrets Act to Clarify the Doubtful and Con-
fused Status of Common Law Trade Secret Principles, 53 ARK. L. REV. 687 (2000)
(reporting on the unsettled state of trade secret law in Arkansas since its adop-
tion of the UTSA in 1981).
653. Lao, supra note 622, at 1662.
654. Id. at 1661-63. For a comprehensive compilation of state trade secret statutes,
see Lao, supra note 622, at 1657 nn. 143-44. See also Linda B. Samuels & Bryan
K. Johnson, The Uniform Trade Secrets Act: The States' Response, 24 CREIGHTON
L. REV. 49 (1990).
655. RESTATEMENT (THIRD) OF UNFAIR COMPETITION (1995).
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come to fruition.6 56 Thus, "the law on trade secret misappropriation
continues to vary from jurisdiction to jurisdiction."6 5 7
While trade secrets defy a single definition, one scholar offers this
apt generalization of trade secrets law found among the various
states: "To qualify as a trade secret, information must meet three re-
quirements: (1) it must confer a competitive advantage when kept se-
cret; (2) it must be secret in fact; and (3) in many states, it must be
protected by reasonable secrecy safeguards."6 58
The "competitive advantage" requirement is quite broad.659 While
many cases hinge on the technology underlying the product at issue,
"such as the formula for Coca-Cola, a process for making methanol, or
the dimensions of a robot-operated machine,"660 just about anything
with potential to generate commercial value can qualify as a trade se-
cret. 66 1 "Courts have protected subject matter as varied as customer
lists, pricing information, business methods and plans, and marketing
research data."6 62
The second requirement of "actual secrecy" lies at the heart of
trade secret protection.6 63 Interestingly, the "[slecrecy need not be ab-
solute."6 64 The owner of the secrets can share them with employees
and others as needed to develop a product's commercial value, pro-
vided that some precautions are taken to prevent disclosure to unau-
thorized persons. "However, if information is known by most of a
656. See, e.g., Rochelle Cooper Dreyfus, Do you Want to Know a Trade Secret? How
Article 2B will Make Licensing Trade Secrets Easier (But Innovation More Diffi-
cult), 87 CAL. L. REV. 191 (1999) (elaborating on a joint effort of the ALI and
NCCUSL to promulgate Article 2B of the Uniform Commercial Code covering
"transactions in information" and other commercial transactions that, among
other things, would include a uniform definition of trade secrets). Unfortunately,
major disagreements between Article 2B co-sponsors ALI and NCCUSL caused
their joint project to be scuttled and replaced with a NCCUSL proposed draft that
offers little hope of creating a uniform definition of trade secrets. To date the
NCCUSL has only been adopted in Virginia and Maryland. See generally Ajay
Ayyappan, Note, UCITA: Uniformity at the Price of Fairness?, 69 FORDHAM L.
REV. 2471 (2001) (explaining NCCUSL's Uniform Computer Information Trans-
actions Act).
657. Loa, supra note 622, at 1650.
658. Bone, supra note 622, at 248 (footnote omitted). Another scholar offers this simi-
lar conclusion: "Although there is no single definition of the term 'trade secret' or
'misappropriation,' trade secret law fundamentally proscribes taking from an-
other, through 'improper means,' an item of information that has value, so long as
the possessor of the information has taken reasonable means to guard its se-
crecy." Lao, supra note 525, at 1642.
659. Bone, supra note 622, at 248.
660. Id. (footnotes omitted).
661. See id.
662. Id. (footnotes omitted).
663. Id.
664. Id. (footnotes omitted).
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firm's competitors, or can be easily discovered independently or by re-
verse engineering, it cannot qualify as a trade secret."6 65
The final requirement for trade secret protection is that the owner
has taken precautions reasonable under the circumstances to limit
disclosure. "Such precautions may include disclosing the secret only
under a confidentiality agreement and on a need-to-know basis
.... "666 Deficient efforts to maintain secrecy constitute a "fatal de-
fect" in assertions of the privilege. 6 67 "While absolute secrecy is not
necessary, a showing of substantial measures to protect the secret na-
ture of the process is required."66s The adequacy of protection is a fact
question for the jury, and even accidental or inadvertent disclosure
can doom a trade secret claim.6 69
When sanctions are sought for invasion of trade secrets during dis-
covery and no court order is in place, additional concerns arise. Of
course, identifying the relevant governing definition of "trade secret"
remains the threshold challenge. Another important prerequisite to
the imposition of sanctions for alleged invasion of trade secrets during
formal or informal discovery of an adversary's former employees is
that the alleged trade secrets divulged must be relevant to the subject
of the litigation, especially where the sanction sought is a limitation
on evidence introduced at trial.
In Davidson Supply Co. v. P.P.E., Inc.,670 for example, two compet-
itors in the beauty supply market litigated defendant's alleged viola-
tion of the Electronic Communications Privacy Act of 1986 and related
claims. Plaintiff claimed the violation occurred when two of the plain-
tiffs former employees, who had gone to work for the defendant,
wrongly accessed voice mail messages from the plaintiffs system and
used the information to defendant's competitive advantage. 6 71 The
court recognized that the former employee at issue, a marketer,
"might well have had access to certain trade-confidential informa-
tion,"672 but deemed such access "immaterial."6 73
The Davidson Supply court clarified that "the claims asserted have
to do with discrete illegal acts that allegedly violated specific federal
statutes, and they do not implicate broad issues of trade confidential-
ity."674 The court concluded that because the only relevant informa-
665. Id. at 249 (footnote omitted).
666. Id. at 249 (footnote omitted).
667. Julie Research Labs, Inc. v. Select Photographic Eng'g, Inc., 810 F. Supp. 513,
520 (S.D.N.Y. 1992).
668. Id. (citations omitted).
669. See id.
670. 986 F. Supp. 956 (D. Md. 1997).
671. See id. at 957.
672. Id. at 959.
673. Id.
674. Id.
2003]
NEBRASKA LAW REVIEW
tion gleaned from the former employee related to defendant's allegedly
illegal conduct, "there is no privilege . . . arising out of trade secrets
protection . . . that precludes the introduction of the evidence in
question."6 75
An employer may also inadvertently waive trade secret protection,
even while taking steps to safeguard such information. The Ninth
Circuit overturned a district court's injunction prohibiting a former
employee from testifying in a personal injury suit against the former
employer, for example, because the confidentiality agreement between
the former employer and employee had expired.6 76 The court held
that the express agreement requiring confidentiality superseded any
other legal obligations the former employee might have had to remain
silent. 677 Thus, the former employee was free to consult with plain-
tiff's attorney regarding a report he had prepared while employed by
the defendant former employer regarding injuries similar to the one
sustained by the plaintiff.678
D. Proprietary Protections
Proprietary or confidential information is data that the owner
desires to keep secret from others in the same industry and possibly
the general public. Courts and litigants frequently use the terms
"trade secrets" and "proprietary information" interchangeably, even
though they are discrete categories of protected information. It is pos-
sible, and even desirable, to divine distinct, exacting definitions for
each term since information classified as "trade secrets" is usually ac-
corded, as discussed above, a fairly sophisticated analysis when disclo-
sure is sought and given significant protection. In contrast,
information labeled merely "proprietary" or "confidential" has no set
analytical counterpart or protection.
The exercise of crafting fine-line distinctions and creating a corre-
sponding hierarchy of protection for different types of secret, commer-
cially valuable information has been competently undertaken
elsewhere and is beyond the scope of this Article.6 79 For the purposes
of this Article, proprietary or confidential information is simply a sub-
category of commercial information shielded from disclosure under the
umbrella of trade secrets law. One scholar provided this apt
definition:
675. Id.
676. Union Pac. R.R. Co. v. Mower, 219 F.3d 1069, 1074 (9th Cir. 2000).
677. Id.
678. Id. at 1078; see also infra section VI.F (Private Law).
679. See Unikel, supra note 622 (dividing commercial information into three distinct
categories and arguing for various levels of protection for each based on the rela-
tive secrecy required and competing policy interests served by protection com-
pared to disclosure).
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Confidential information roughly can be defined as data, technology, or know-
how that is known by a substantial number of persons in a particular industry
(such that its status as a technical "trade secret" is in doubt) but that, none-
theless, retains some economic and/or competitive value by virtue of the fact
that it is unknown to certain industry participants.
68 0
Confidential or proprietary information does not enjoy the highest
level of protection afforded information guarded by intellectual prop-
erty principles of copyright, patent, and trademark law, nor does it
benefit from the intermediate levels of protection afforded trade
secrets. Although propriety information is expressly recognized as a
distinct category of materials potentially shielded from an adversary
in discovery, 681 surprisingly little legislation and common law offer
clarity on what constitutes propriety information, when protection
from discovery is appropriate, and what sanctions are available when
a litigant intentionally or inadvertently invades an adversary's propri-
ety information.
Case law suggests that courts prefer to define what propriety infor-
mation is not, rather than what it is. In a case where the defendant
contracted to install air conditioning units in plaintiffs apartment
complex, for example, a dispute erupted regarding the quality of work
done and the validity of defendant's invoices. 68 2 As the litigation
progressed, plaintiff claimed that defense counsel improperly con-
ducted ex parte interviews of plaintiffs former employee. The specific
alleged impropriety was that the information defense counsel gained
regarding the serial numbers of the air conditioning units in certain
apartments and the disclosure that some of the units had been stolen
or moved was propriety to the plaintiff.68 3
The court rejected plaintiffs argument that defendant should not
be allowed to use this information as evidence. The court concluded
that because "the information here concerns facts, and is something
that could be obtained through reasonable research, it is not
proprietary."6 84
Proprietary information may be protected from disclosure under
the duty of loyalty owed by an employee to a current or former em-
ployer as well as the other standards discussed herein. The Restate-
ment (Second) of Agency, for example, recognizes an agent's duty of
loyalty to include confidentiality covering all information related to
680. Id. at 844.
681. FED. R. CIv. P. 26(c)(7), for example, empowers a court to bar or limit disclosure of
both trade secrets and other "confidential research, development or commercial
information" owned by a party. For the purposes of this Article, this type of infor-
mation is collectively categorized as "propriety information."
682. See Barron Builders & Mgmt. Co. v. J & A Air Conditioning & Refrigeration, Inc.,
1997 WL 685352 (E.D. La. Oct. 31, 1997).
683. See id. at *2, *4.
684. Id. at *4.
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the principal's business "unless the information is a matter of general
knowledge."685 These agency principles apply686 to the employer/em-
ployee relationship and survive termination of the employment.
In sum, nondisclosure of trade secrets and proprietary information
protects commercial inventors and entrepreneurs and ensures "stan-
dards of commercial ethics."687 Such safeguards are perhaps a neces-
sity in a capitalistic society, but an unfortunate byproduct of such
protection is the complications arising when trade secrets or proprie-
tary information are used to limit or prohibit discovery of information
relevant to the claims or defenses asserted in litigation. This is an
especially common occurrence when discovery is sought from former
employees of a party.
E. Self-Evaluative Privilege
The increase in federal, state, and local regulation of business and
industry and the proliferation of compliance litigation in recent de-
cades has inspired many entities to conduct internal audits. These
self-examinations ascertain levels of compliance with environmental
regulations, employment discrimination statutes, tax and accounting
rules, and a myriad of other legal standards portending liability. Ob-
viously, the value of such audits to the conducting entity and society
as a whole correlates directly to the degree of candor with which com-
pliance data is gathered and analyzed. Equally obvious are the devas-
tating consequences, from both public relations and legal perspectives,
when reports admitting an entity's shortcomings are made public.
To encourage self-examination, courts and legislators have devel-
oped, albeit reluctantly, the "self-evaluative privilege," also known as
the "privilege of critical self analysis."68 At least three criteria must
685. RESTATEMENT (SECOND) OF AGENCY § 395 (1957).
686. HENRY H. PERRITT, JR., TRADE SECRETS: A PRACTITIONER'S GUIDE 163-64 (1994).
687. Kewanee Oil Co. v. Bicron Corp., 416 U.S. 470, 481 (1974).
688. The privilege was first recognized in Bredice v. Doctors Hospital, Inc., 50 F.R.D.
249 (D.D.C. 1970). The medical malpractice plaintiff in Bredice was prohibited
from discovering the minutes of medical staff meetings because the purpose of
the staff meetings was "the improvement, through self-analysis," of medical care
rendered, and because of the "overwhelming public interest" in maintaining the
confidentiality of the staff meetings "so that the flow of ideas and advice can con-
tinue unimpeded." Id. at 250-51. See generally, Hon. Arlene R. Lindsay & Lisa
C. Solbakken, Dispelling Suspicions as to the Existence of the Self-Evaluative
Privilege, 65 BROOKLYN L. REV. 459 (1999); Brad Bacon, Note, The Privilege of
Self-Critical Analysis: Encouraging Recognition of the Misunderstood Privilege, 8
KAN. J.L. & PUB. POL'Y 221 (1999); Phillip Leahy, The Privilege for Self-Critical
Analysis in Statutory and Common Law, 7 DICK. J. ENVTL. L. POL'Y 49 (1998);
Note, The Privilege of Self-Critical Analysis, 96 HARv. L. REV. 1083 (1983). This
1983 Note in the Harvard Law Review has been described as "the alpha point for
many of the analyses conducted by district courts when considering the privi-
lege." Lindsay & Solbakken, supra, at 462 n.12.
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be met before information will be shielded from discovery under the
self-evaluative privilege:
First, the information must result from a critical self-analysis undertaken by
the party seeking protection; second, the public must have a strong interest in
preserving the free flow of the type of information sought; finally, the informa-
tion must be of the type whose flow would be curtailed if discovery were
allowed. 6 8 9
"The privilege is premised on the rationale that unimpeded self-
criticism serves a social good outweighing the cost of evidentiary ex-
clusion. '690 It limits the disclosure of an entity's critical self-analysis
in its compiled format as well as the conclusions drawn from the self-
auditing process. 691 "The privilege has been asserted, with varying
degrees of success, to prevent disclosure of internal investigatory re-
ports, equal employment opportunity studies, hospital committee re-
ports, and accident investigatory reports within the context of
personal injury suits."69 2
One would be mistaken, however, to assume that the self-evalua-
tive privilege is universally respected. Some courts will not honor the
privilege absent a showing that the information was gathered and an-
alyzed "with the expectation that it would be kept confidential, and
has in fact been kept confidential."693 Application of the privilege will
likely be denied when a government agency, rather than a private liti-
gant, seeks disclosure. 694 One court's explanation of the status of the
privilege more than two decades ago remains substantially apt today:
A number of courts have relied upon a 'self-evaluative' privilege in diverse
factual settings .... More recently, however, courts have appeared reluctant
to enforce even a qualified 'self-evaluative' privilege. They typically concede
its possible application in some situations, but then proceed to find a reason
why the documents in question do not fall within its scope.
6 9 5
689. Note, The Privilege of Critical Self Analysis, supra note 688, at 1086.
690. Bacon, supra note 688, at 223.
691. See, e.g., Flynn v. Goldman, Sachs & Co., No. 91-0035, 1993 WL 362380, at *2
(S.D.N.Y. Sept. 16, 1993) (holding that absent a compelling showing of need, dis-
trict court would not require disclosure of documents generated by a company
defendant hired to investigate and analyze barriers to equal employment oppor-
tunities with defendant).
692. Lindsay & Solbakken, supra note 688, at 461-62 (footnotes omitted).
693. See, e.g., Dowling v. Am. Haw. Cruises, Inc., 971 F.2d 423, 426 (9th Cir. 1992).
694. Leahy, supra note 688, at 56-58.
695. Fed. Trade Comm'n v. TRW, Inc., 628 F.2d 207, 210 (D.C. Cir. 1980); see also
Dowling v. Am. Haw. Cruises, Inc., 971 F.2d 423, 425 n.1 (9th Cir. 1992) (refusing
to recognize self-analysis privilege); Aramburu v. Boeing Co., 885 F. Supp. 1434
(D. Kan. 1995) (refusing to deny plaintiffs discovery requests based on defen-
dant's assertion of self-critical analysis privilege in Title VII employment dis-
crimination cases); cf. ASARCO, Inc., Tenn. Mines Div. v. NLRB, 805 F.2d 194,
199-200 (6th Cir. 1986) (recognizing privilege for self critical sections of an af-
firmative action plan in an employment discrimination case); Coates v. Johnson
& Johnson, 756 F.2d 524, 551 (7th Cir. 1985) (same).
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In federal courts, the sluggish development and acceptance of the
self-evaluative privilege is inspired, at least in part, by the Supreme
Court's admonition that privileges should not be "lightly created nor
expansively construed, for they are in derogation of the search for the
truth."6 96 State courts have, according to one commentator, "been
even more reluctant than federal courts to find the privilege for self-
critical analysis."697 A growing body of state legislation attests to a
warmer, though hardly universal, embracing of the self-evaluative
privilege in certain situations, most commonly in shielding environ-
mental self audits from disclosure. 6 98
Where the self-evaluative privilege is recognized, its utility is lim-
ited because, like the attorney-client and other privileges, it does not
shield the facts underlying the audit and analyses from disclosure
through use of depositions, interrogatories, and other standard discov-
ery devices.699 And, as with other privileges, the distinction between
"facts" and "analyses" often proves elusive. 0 0
The ongoing debate surrounding the viability and scope of the self-
evaluative privilege creates yet another potential landmine for an at-
torney seeking discovery from an adversary's former employees. The
potential application of the privilege to limit or defeat a party's ability
to obtain information from former employees who helped gather and/
or analyze information for a self-evaluative report is a concern, as is
the possibility that former employees could possess, either in paper
copy or electronic format, sections, drafts, or final versions of an ad-
versary's self-evaluative report.
F. Private Law
Employees frequently enter confidentiality agreements as an ini-
tial condition of employment, as part of a severance package, or under
a settlement agreement avoiding or resolving litigation following ter-
mination of employment. The scope of such agreements varies widely,
696. United States v. Nixon, 418 U.S. 683, 710 (1974). The Supreme Court has never
addressed the self-evaluative privilege per se, but its refusal to shield confiden-
tial peer review information about college professors from disclosure in Univer-
sity of Pennsylvania v. EEOC, 493 U.S. 182 (1990), and tax accrual workpapers in
United States v. Arthur Young & Co., 465 U.S. 805 (1984), suggests that the
Court would not be receptive to the self-evaluative privilege.
697. Leahy, supra note 688, at 58.
698. See Bacon, supra note 688, at 226-28.
699. See, e.g., Wylie v. Mills, 478 A.2d 1273, 1277-78 (N.J. Super. Ct. App. 1984) (hold-
ing that evaluative and critical portions of defendant's investigatory report on
employee's motor vehicle accident were privileged, but ordering disclosure of facts
underlying the report).
700. Note, The Self-Critical Analysis Privilege and Discovery of Affirmative Action
Plans in Title VII Suits, 83 MICH. L. REV. 405, 417-18 (1994); see also Note, The
Privilege of Self-Critical Analysis, supra note 688, at 1093-96 (examining and
critiquing the factual-evaluative dichotomy).
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but a common fixture is a promise by the employee not to reveal any
trade secrets or other confidential information about the employer's
policies and practices. 70 1
Former employees also commonly enter consulting relationships
with former employers. Such agreements may obligate the employee
to work on discrete projects or to assist in the prosecution or defense of
litigation. 70 2 These consulting arrangements often entail promises of
confidentiality. 70 3 The confidentiality clause, in turn, may render the
former employee unavailable to opposing counsel seeking informal
discovery and possibly formal discovery as well. 70 4 The tables are
turned and additional complexities added when an attorney retains an
adversary's former employee as a consultant to help prepare for the
litigation or to testify as a fact or expert witness.
Courts are reluctant to enforce private law borne of confidentiality
and consulting agreements when enforcement impedes the former em-
ployees' ability to engage in their chosen professions or restrains com-
petition in a particular market.70 5 "Accordingly, these agreements
are limited or prohibited by statute in some states, and closely ex-
amined in others."70 6 Even where non-compete clauses are honored,
"courts typically scrutinize these agreements carefully to ensure that
their terms, including in particular their duration and geographic
scope, are fair and reasonable."7 0 7
701. See, e.g., Kitchen v. Aristech Chem., 769 F. Supp. 254, 255 (S.D. Ohio 1991)
(resolving discovery dispute involving environmental systems consultant who
signed agreement with employer "acknowledging that he would have access to
confidential information and agreeing not to reveal that information").
702. See, e.g., Centennial Mgmt. Servs., Inc. v. Axa Re Vie, 193 F.R.D. 671 (D. Kan.
2000) (involving former employee retained by defendant re-insurer as litigation
consultant); Goldstein v. Exxon Research & Eng'g. Co., No. CIV. 95-2410, 1997
U.S. Dist. LEXIS 14600 (D.N.J. 1997) (focusing on former employer of plaintiff in
age discrimination lawsuit who retained plaintiffs retired supervisor as litigation
consultant).
703. See, e.g., Union Pac. R.R. Co. v. Mower, 219 F.3d 1069, 1071 (9th Cir. 2000) (refe-
reeing discovery dispute concerning employer and former employee who entered
a resignation and consulting agreement forbidding former employee from com-
municating confidential business information to third parties and consulting
with persons with potential claims against the former employer).
704. An explanation of the different rules for obtaining discovery of information from
expert witnesses as compared to non-testifying consultants is provided supra, in
subsection V.B.4.e. (Consultants and Expert Witnesses).
705. See generally Lawrence I. Weinstein, Revisiting the Inevitability Doctrine: When
Can a Former Employee Who Never Signed a Non-Compete Agreement nor
Threatened to Use or Disclose Trade Secrets be Prohibited from Working for a
Competitor?, 21 Av. J. TRIAL. ADvoc. 211, 212-15 (1997) (discussing the public
policy favoring an employee's right to change jobs to improve her station in life
and the conflicting policy of protecting a former employer's trade secrets).
706. Terry Morehead Dworkin & Elletta Sangrey Callahan, Buying Silence, 36 AM.
Bus. L.J. 151, 156 (1998) (footnotes omitted).
707. Weinstein, supra note 705, at 213 (footnote omitted).
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Jurisdictions that generally disfavor non-compete agreements
may, however, honor discrete provisions requiring former employees
to maintain the former employers' confidences.708 Selective enforce-
ment is achieved by severing the unenforceable non-compete clause
and honoring the remaining clauses, including confidentiality provi-
sions. 70 9 Consulting/confidentiality agreements that are independent
of non-compete agreements are upheld in toto.
Whatever the origin of the confidentiality pact, judges take a dis-
tinctively dim view of agreements between former employees and em-
ployers that infringe, either intentionally or inadvertently, on the
public's right to know of past or present harmful conduct by the for-
mer employer.710 Courts also disfavor confidentiality agreements
that purport to limit an adversary's ability to obtain from former em-
ployees factual information relevant to a litigated matter.7 1 1 Thus,
clients should not be advised to enter contracts with their former em-
ployees with the expectation that private law will prevent-or at least
rigidly control-discovery by adversaries of information held by for-
mer employees.712
The courts' reticence to honor confidentiality agreements does not,
however, give attorneys impunity to disregard those agreements when
seeking discovery from an opponent's former employees. Courts have
upheld some confidentiality and consulting agreements between em-
ployers and their former employees as a legitimate generation of pri-
vate law that, among other things, prescribes the appropriate
contours of discovery in certain situations.713 For example, "[flormer
employees acting as trial consultants or otherwise actively and exten-
sively working with the corporations [sic] attorney in marshaling evi-
dence and preparing for litigation may be off limits to ex parte contact
708. See id.
709. See Baxter Int'l, Inc. v. Morris, 976 F.2d 1189 (8th Cir. 1992).
710. Dworkin & Callahan, supra note 706, at 152-53 (discussing the growth and im-
portance of whistleblowers and the negative ramifications of confidentiality
agreements between individuals and their former employers that silence would-
be whistleblowers).
711. See, e.g., Uniroyal Goodrich Tire Co. v Hudson, 873 F. Supp. 1037, 1049 (E.D.
Mich. 1994), affd, 97 F.3d 1452 (6th Cir. 1996) (recognizing the important public
policy against limiting flow of information in private litigation, but holding that
agreement at issue did not violate that policy because persons other than former
employee were available to testify).
712. See generally Dworkin & Callahan, supra note 706.
713. See, e.g., Uniroyal Goodrich Tire Co., 873 F. Supp. at 1049 (honoring confidential-
ity agreement by issuing permanent injunction prohibiting former employee from
testifying as an expert witness for plaintiff in cases where his former employer is
a defendant, but allowing former employee to testify as an expert in cases where
former employer is not a party, provided that confidential information belonging
to former employer is not disclosed).
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by an attorney for an adverse party."714 Restrictions may also apply
when information is sought from those former employees through for-
mal discovery channels.
1. Confidentiality Agreements
Confidentiality agreements create and define reciprocal rights and
duties of the former employee and employer. Therefore, a breach of
contract action is the most obvious remedy for a former employer
when a former employee has wrongly disclosed information. 7 15 Con-
tractual remedies include the possibility of monetary judgment and
injunctive relief preventing additional disclosures of the confidential
information. 7 16 Pursuing a civil claim in contract or tort against the
attorney or party who induced the former employee to breach the
agreement, or at least joining the information seekers as defendants
in the injunction phase of the action, is another viable option.717
In addition to basic contract law considerations, other legal doc-
trines and principles previously discussed in this Article are pulled
into the fray when the validity of private confidentiality agreements
are asserted or challenged. Ethical rules requiring attorneys to pre-
serve the confidences and secrets of their own clients and to respect
the confidences of other attorneys' clients, statutes and common law
protecting trade secret and propriety information, and the civil rules
of procedure that limit or prohibit discovery of privileged information
all portend legitimacy for private confidentiality agreements between
former employees and employers. Accordingly, failure to respect this
added layer of private law privilege may provoke imposition of discov-
ery or trial sanctions.
A confidentiality agreement lay at the heart of the court's analysis
of an allegedly improper ex parte communication between plaintiffs
714. Shoreline Computers, Inc. v. Warnaco, Inc., No. C.V. 9904228535, 2000 Conn.
Super. LEXIS 842, at *5 (Conn. Super. Ct. Apr. 3, 2000).
715. In re Prudential Ins. Co. of Am., 911 F. Supp. 148, 154 (D.N.J. 1995).
716. Dworkin & Callahan, supra note 706, at 155-56; see also Morgan Chu & David
Bridgeford, Litigating a Trade Secrets Case: The Employee's Case, in TRADE
SECRETS, RESTRICTIVE COVENANTS & OTHER SAFEGUARDS FOR PROTECTING Busi-
NESS INFORMATION 258, 268-72 (1986) (explaining elements for obtaining injunc-
tive relief and suggesting ways to defeat injunction); Union Pac. R.R. Co. v.
Mower, 219 F.3d 1069 (9th Cir. 2000) (reversing district court's permanent in-
junction prohibiting former employee from testifying in any lawsuits involving
former employer because contract requiring confidentiality had expired and no
implied duty of confidentiality existed).
717. Tortious interference with contract is one appropriate cause of action for the for-
mer employer to pursue in such a situation. See, e.g., DDS, Inc. v. Lucas Aero-
space Power Transmission Corp., 182 F.R.D. 1 (N.D.N.Y. 1998) (involving former
employer pursuing civil remedy against several corporate defendants for alleg-
edly encouraging former employee to divulge confidential information in violation
of former employee's confidentiality agreement with plaintiff).
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counsel and defendants' former employee in Kitchen v. Aristech Chem-
ical.7 18 In Kitchen, the defendants in a toxic tort case sought disquali-
fication of plaintiffs counsel because counsel engaged in ex parte
communications with defendants' former employee George Chada.719
Chada signed a confidentiality agreement when hired by defendants
as a senior environmental systems consultant,720 and was privy to at-
torney-client privileged information, work product (including some
that Chada himself authored), and other confidential information di-
rectly related to the toxic tort litigation while employed by defend-
ants.72 1 Defendants claimed that Chada's intimate knowledge of
defendants' litigation strategy and general operating procedures and
his execution of the confidentiality agreement made Chada a "party"
within the meaning of the ethical rules prohibiting ex parte contact
with a party represented by counsel. 7 22
The court held that disqualification of counsel might be an appro-
priate remedy for violation of an ethics rule,72 3 but further observed
that such motions "should be viewed with extreme caution for they
can be misused as a technique of harassment."724 The court used a
three-prong weighing test to determine if disqualification was war-
ranted, considering "1) the client's interest in being represented by
counsel of its own choice; 2) the opposing party's interest in a trial free
from prejudice due to disclosures of confidential information; and 3)
the public's interest in the scrupulous administration of justice."725
Because some of the information gathered from Chada by plaintiffs
attorney had already been placed in the public domain through
Chada's testimony before the Ohio Environmental Protection Agency,
and because Chada's personal attorney was present during the con-
tact, the court held that the conduct of plaintiffs counsel "was not
so egregious that it warrants the extreme sanction of dis-
qualification"726
The court relied primarily on the second prong of the test, finding
that defendants had not met their burden of showing prejudice from
the disclosures.727 The court viewed the "normal protections" pro-
vided by the rules of civil procedure and evidence as sufficient to pre-
718. 769 F. Supp 254 (S.D. Ohio 1991).
719. Id. at 255.
720. See id.
721. See id.
722. See id. at 256. The court was interpreting MODEL CODE OF PROF'L RESPONSIBIL-
iTY DR 7-104(A)(1), discussed supra notes 105 and 106.
723. See id. at 256.
724. Id. at 257 (quoting Panduit Corp. v. All States Plastic Mfg. Co., 744 F.2d 1564,
1577 (Fed. Cir. 1984)).
725. Id. at 258 (quoting Meat Price Investigators Ass'n v. Spencer Foods, 572 F.2d
163, 165 (8th Cir. 1978)).
726. Id. at 258.
727. See id. at 258-59.
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vent the confidential information from being inappropriately used at
trial or elsewhere.7 28 The court further observed that defendants
could continue to gather information from Chada and other sources
using formal discovery devices "with which they can test his credibil-
ity and the validity of his opinions."7 29
Defendants' argument that sanctions were warranted because
Chada violated his confidentiality agreement by talking with plain-
tiffs attorney did not influence the court's analysis. To the contrary,
the court characterized Chada's alleged breach of contract as essen-
tially irrelevant to the issue of disqualification of plaintiffs counsel.
The court stated:
Defendants argue that Chada violated his confidentiality agreement when he
contacted [plaintiffs counsel] Greenwald. Although this may be true, this vio-
lation does not support defendants' contention that Greenwald should be dis-
qualified, since Chada's alleged violation has no relationship with the three
competing interests . . .applicable to the analysis of defendants motion to
disqualify. 7 3 0
At first blush, Kitchen is troubling due to the court's reluctance to
impose sanctions where contact between counsel and an opposing
party's former employee arguably breached not only the walls of a con-
fidentiality agreement but also the barricades normally provided by
the attorney-client privilege and work product doctrine. But on closer
examination, the decision is rooted more in the court's judgment that
the defendants' requested sanction-disqualification of opposing coun-
sel-was much too severe given defendants' failure to demonstrate ac-
tual harm resulting from the former employee's alleged disclosures.
Thus, overreaching by defense counsel, rather than lack of respect by
the court for the confidentiality agreement, is the key to this case and
to future disputes resolved with reference to this decision.
2. Consulting Agreements
Discovery disputes involving the validity of consulting agreements
between former employees and litigants arise in at least three situa-
tions. The first situation occurs when the former employer retains its
own former employee as a consultant to assist in the prosecution or
defense of existing or anticipated litigation. Former employee/em-
ployer arrangements can be termed "Allegiance Agreements." A sec-
ond and more controversial scenario exists where a former employee is
retained as a consultant, or perhaps even as an expert witness, by an
adversary of the former employer. The former employee/adversary
728. See id.
729. Id. at 259.
730. Id.
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pacts are called "Turncoat Agreements."7 3 1 The third situation, repre-
senting a combination of the first two, presents when the former em-
ployee enters an Allegiance Agreement but then defects or attempts to
defect to an adversary's camp. These about-face situations will be
termed "Defector Agreements." All three situations are discussed
below. 73 2
a. Allegiance Agreements
Two primary concerns that arise when an attorney seeks discovery
of information from an adversary's former employee/consultant are
discussed elsewhere in this Article. These are: (1) whether the con-
sulting agreement between the former employee and employer is a
valid contract reflecting an appropriate exchange of financial compen-
sation for services rendered, or whether the litigant/former employer
is buying the former employee's loyalty and/or silence;73 3 and (2)
whether the former employee/consultant is a person "represented" by
the former employer's counsel, thus implicating the ethics rules' prohi-
bition against contacting a person or party represented by legal coun-
sel.734 This second issue deserves further discussion here.
Depending on the specific structure of the relationship, a former
employee retained as a consultant by the former employer could be
considered directly analogous to a current employee for the purposes
of informal contact or formal discovery. While the current employee
analogy does not automatically answer all questions as to the propri-
ety of specific discovery by opposing counsel, 73 5 it does suggest that
counsel exercise caution in approaching an adversary's former em-
ployee/consultant.
The situation calls for heightened caution for several reasons.
Courts generally provide more protection against ex parte contacts
with current employees of a party than they do former employees. 73 6
731. See generally Brad Bole, Former Employees as Adverse Witnesses, The Practical
and Ethical Implications of Retaining a Turncoat Employee, LITIG. NEWS, Mar.
1997, at 3.
732. The related topic of obtaining formal discovery from a trial consultant compared
to an expert witness is discussed supra, subsection V.B.4.e.
733. See supra text accompanying notes 464-78; infra text accompanying notes
824-57.
734. See Part IV, supra.
735. Although outside the scope of this Article, rules regarding contact with current
employees also vary from jurisdiction to jurisdiction. See Michaels v. Woodland,
988 F. Supp. 468, 470-72 (D.N.J. 1997) (discussing various tests used by courts to
determine if contact with current employees of a party is ethical); In re Air Crash
Disaster, 909 F. Supp. 1116 (N.D. Ill. 1995) (same); Joseph P. Beckman, Split
Decision: Ex Parte Communication with Adversary's Employees Still Trouble-
some, LITIG. NEWS, May 2001, at 8.
736. See, e.g., Wagner v. City of Holyoke, 183 F. Supp. 2d 289 (D. Mass. 2001) (al-
lowing interviews of defendant's current employees under specific and limited
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Thus, a violation of the ethical rules, specifically Model Rule 4.2 and
DR 7-104, is more probable when the former employee is also a cur-
rent consultant of a party.7 37
Additionally, the former employee may have been retained as a
consultant specifically for the purpose of supporting the former em-
ployer's litigation efforts. In this role, the former employee has signifi-
cant exposure to information privileged as attorney-client
communications, and work product relevant to the dispute. 7 38 Accord-
ingly, unauthorized contact by counsel with an adversary's former em-
ployee/trial consultant is likely to stir the court's wrath since such
communication defies not only rules of procedure and ethics, but also
breaches the time-honored stockades of attorney work product and at-
torney-client privilege. 73 9
There exists another key issue that relates to status and timing:
When does a former employee rise to the status of a "trial consultant"?
An express agreement, written or oral, between counsel and a client's
former employee no doubt confers that status. At the other end of the
spectrum are former employees with a few contacts with a former em-
ployee's counsel. As one court explained, "[a] few meetings and tele-
phone conversations with a former employee falls far short of the
extensive contact with counsel, substantial disclosure of attorney
work product and ongoing access to litigation materials and strategy
that signify a trial consultant."740 The mid-point of the spectrum is
occupied by former employees whose work while employed or follow-
ing termination by a party makes the employees de facto trial
consultants. 74 1
The critical threshold inquiry as to consultant status is answered
by common sense as well as case law because once again there is no
bright line of demarcation. Unfortunately, straying to the wrong side
conditions); NAACP v. Fla. Dept. of Corrections, 122 F. Supp. 2d 1335, 1341
(M.D. Fla. 2000) (observing that contact with current employees of a party "raises
additional ethical problems and a host of additional considerations" when com-
pared to contact with former employees). See generally George B. Wyeth, Talking
to the Other Side's Employees and Ex-Employees, 15 LITIG. 8 (1989); Eric Rieder,
Evidence from the Opposition, 22 LITIG. 17 (1995).
737. See supra sections IV.A-D (discussing these rules).
738. See, e.g., Shoreline Computers, Inc. v. Warnaco, Inc., No. C.V. 9904228535, 2000
Conn. Super. LEXIS 842, at *5 (Conn. Super. Ct. Apr. 3, 2000) (recognizing that
"the very purpose" an attorney initiates ex parte contact with an adversary's for-
mer employee/consultant "may be to obtain privileged information," and further
acknowledging that "at the very least there is a high risk of disclosure" of infor-
mation privileged as litigation strategy and work product).
739. See, e.g., United States v. Hous. Auth. of Milford, 179 F.R.D. 69 (D. Conn. 1997);
Camden v. Maryland, 910 F. Supp. 1115 (D. Md. 1996).
740. Shoreline Computers, Inc., 2000 Conn. Super. LEXIS 842, at *7.
741. See MMR/Wallace Power & Indus., Inc. v. Thames Assocs., 764 F. Supp. 712 (D.
Conn. 1991).
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of the line as the judge draws it can result in sanctions including at-
torney disqualification.
In MMR/Wallace Power & Industrial, Inc. v. Thames Associ-
ates, 74 2 for example, Richard Willett served as office manager for
plaintiff construction company, MMR/Wallace, as it performed
mechanical construction on a cogeneration power plant.74 3 In that ca-
pacity, Willett had extensive exposure to plaintiffs day-to-day opera-
tions on the project.7 44 When the general contractor, Thames,
terminated plaintiffs work on the project, plaintiff commenced prepa-
rations to sue Thames. Those preparations included reassigning Wil-
lett to work with MRR/Wallace's legal counsel, a role that Willett
continued to occupy after litigation commenced. 745 Willett set up
plaintiffs document control system and did extensive review and anal-
ysis of discovery materials, culminating in reports for attorneys and
meetings with counsel to discuss litigation strategy.746
After working for plaintiffs trial team for ten months, 747 Willett
was transferred to another project. 74 s Willett was terminated a few
months later when plaintiff filed for bankruptcy.749 Willett offered to
work as litigation consultant to plaintiff, but was unable to reach an
agreement with his former employer. 750 Willett then used a friend to
contact counsel for defendant Thames to inquire about working as a
trial consultant for his former employer's adversary.7 51
Defense counsel interviewed Willett.752 A technical consultant for
defendant was also present during this meeting that lasted several
hours.753 Defense counsel first confirmed that Willett had no current
consulting or employment agreement with plaintiff and then cau-
tioned Willett not to disclose any information about plaintiff protected
by the attorney-client privilege or that involved trade secrets. 754 De-
fense counsel subsequently hired Willett as a trial consultant.755 The
letter of agreement reiterated that Willett was not currently employed
742. 764 F. Supp. 712 (D. Conn. 1991).
743. Id. at 714.
744. See id.
745. See id.
746. See id. at 714-15.
747. See id. at 725.
748. See id. at 715.
749. See id. at 715 n.3.
750. See id. at 715.
751. See id.
752. See id.
753. See id.
754. See id.
755. See id. at 716. Willett was to receive a minimum of $15,000 for services rendered
to the defendant. Id.
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or retained by plaintiff and that any communications shielded by the
attorney-client privilege would not be divulged. 756
Plaintiff moved to disqualify defense counsel based on the consult-
ing agreement with the plaintiffs former employee Willett. 757 The
court granted plaintiffs motion.7 58 In so doing, the court character-
ized Willett as "an 'indispensable' member of his [former] employer's
litigation preparation efforts" 75 9 and as plaintiffs "de facto trial con-
sultant and/or paralegal." Defense counsel's contact with a person of
this status, the court held, violated numerous ethical norms and rules
that preclude "an attorney from acquiring, inadvertently or otherwise,
confidential or privileged information about his adversary's litigation
strategy."76 0
The court gave little credence to defense counsel's claim that ade-
quate safeguards were in place to prevent Willett from disclosing
plaintiffs confidential information. Indeed, the court found that de-
fense attorneys had no interest in hiring Willett other than obtaining
information from him to which they were not entitled since they could
obtain purely factual information simply by deposing former employ-
ees such as Willett.7 61 Willett's lack of sophistication as to the appro-
priate boundaries of legal privilege further convinced the court that
disclosure of privileged materials was inevitable during Willett's con-
sultation with defense counsel.7 62 Although the court was reluctant
to disqualify defense counsel, it found the case before it "one of those
'unusual situations' where the appearance of impropriety is clearly
sufficient to warrant so drastic a remedy."7 63
The former employee's status as plaintiffs de facto trial consultant
contributed substantially to the "unusual circumstances" warranting
disqualification of defense counsel in MMR / Wallace Power. Plaintiffs
former employee had no official title or special compensation related
to his trial consultant duties, but it was beyond peradventure that the
ten months he spent working as a member of plaintiffs litigation team
exposed him to privileged information. His assigned role was akin to
a novice legal assistant, and it appears he was given the assignment
primarily to keep him employed as long as possible while plaintiff was
sliding into bankruptcy. These particulars were irrelevant to the
court, however, as it clearly viewed him as an integral part of plain-
tiffs litigation team prior to his termination. Thus, his initial role as a
756. The text of the letter is included in the opinion. See id. at 716-17 n.6.
757. See id. at 717.
758. See id. at 728.
759. Id. at 723 n.19.
760. Id. at 718.
761. See id. at 727.
762. See id.
763. Id. at 728.
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de facto consultant to plaintiff, and the duty of confidentiality attend-
ant that position, made any contact by defense counsel improper. 764
The same federal district court faced a very different situation in
United States v. Housing Authority of Milford.765 In Milford, defense
counsel had one meeting with his client's former employee after the
employee terminated his employment.766 According to defense coun-
sel, that discussion focused on "marshalling evidence to aid in the de-
fense" of pending and future litigation.767 The former employee also
spoke by phone with another member of the defense team.768
Due to the dearth of evidence that conversations between defense
counsel and their client's former employee addressed anything more
than non-privileged facts underlying the litigation,769 the court re-
fused to cast the former employee in the role of trial consultant im-
mune to plaintiffs discovery efforts.770 And even if the former
employee, though ill-suited for the role, was deemed a trial consultant,
the court found defense counsel's failure to specify the nature of the
privileged matters in jeopardy and to articulate the harms disclosure
would wreak on defendant's case as fatal to defendant's claim that
contact between plaintiffs counsel and the former employee should be
barred.771 The court did, however, caution plaintiffs counsel against
asking the former employee to divulge information gathered during
his term of employment with plaintiff that might be subject to attor-
ney-client or other privileges.772
b. Turncoat Agreements
It is not unusual for a person terminated from employment (either
voluntarily or otherwise) to secure a position with a business rival of
the former employer or to establish a new company that competes
with the former employer. As discussed previously, this often leads to
litigation centering on the former employee's alleged improper use or
disclosure of trade secrets and other confidential information to the
new employer773 This heated litigation commonly results in counter-
claims by the former employee claiming wrongful termination or other
actionable wrongs allegedly committed by the former employer.
764. This case is also a classic example of "Turncoat Agreements" discussed infra sub-
section VI.F.2.b.
765. 179 F.R.D. 69 (D. Conn. 1997).
766. See id. at 73.
767. Id. (citation to record omitted).
768. Id. at 72.
769. See id.
770. See id. at 73.
771. See id. at 72, 73.
772. See id. at 75.
773. See supra section VI.C (Trade Secrets and Confidential Commercial Information).
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Former employees who are not parties to this litigation may play
key roles in resolving such disputes. The involvement of these non-
party former employees may be voluntary, mandated by subpoena or
other court order, or, in the most controversial manner, through re-
cruitment by the former employer's adversary. Creation of a "turn-
coat" consulting agreement between the former employee and an
adversary of the former employer may have significant rewards, 774
but it is also skates on thin ethical ice.775
In Biocore Medical Technologies, Inc. v. Khosrowshahi,776 for ex-
ample, a battle raged between plaintiff, a corporation that researched
and marketed medical products, and a rival company that hired sev-
eral of plaintiffs former employees. 777 Plaintiff former employer
claimed wrongful acts by the defendant former employees while em-
ployed and improper revelation of trade secrets after being hired by
the defendant new employer. 778 In a separate suit, the former em-
ployees claimed wrongful acts by plaintiff during the course of their
employment. 77 9 The cases were consolidated. 7 80
Plaintiff sought to disqualify defense counsel, Timothy Butler, on a
variety of grounds. The primary charge was that Butler had inappro-
priately recruited as a consultant a former executive administrative
assistant of plaintiff, Marilyn Johnson, who had worked for several of
plaintiffs highest ranking officials and had exposure to significant
confidential information.7 8 Butler hired Johnson at $10 an hour to
organize and discuss documents produced by plaintiff.7 8 2 Johnson
spent forty hours consulting with Butler. 78 3 Butler also agreed to re-
present Johnson free of charge during her deposition by plaintiffs
counsel.78 4
The court characterized Butler's relationship with Johnson as "un-
wise"78 5 and bordering so "closely on incompetence"7 86 that "it reflects
774. See, e.g., Carnival Corp. v. Romero, 710 So. 2d 690 (Fla. Dist. Ct. App. 1998)
(finding no ethical violations warranting disqualification in plaintiffs counsel's
retention of defendant's former security officers who had knowledge of defen-
dant's safety policies and procedures as consulting and testifying experts).
775. Bole, supra note 731, at 3, 11 (advising that turncoat agreements may violate
attorney-client privilege, work product doctrine, confidentiality agreements,
court orders from previous litigation, and various ethical rules).
776. 181 F.R.D. 660 (D. Kan. 1998); see also supra text accompanying notes 274-84
(discussing Biocore).
777. Biocore, 181 F.R.D. at 664.
778. See id.
779. See id.
780. See id.
781. See id. at 665.
782. See id.
783. See id.
784. See id.
785. Id. at 671.
786. Id. at 674.
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adversely on his fitness to practice before this Court."787 The court
also held that an attorney creates an appearance of impropriety "when
he hires a witness who has been exposed to substantial confidential
information, to assist in litigation against a former employer."78 In
soundly rejecting Butler's claim that his hiring of Johnson comported
with all relevant ethical standards, the court stated that "at best, he
has waded in the murky waters which separate right from wrong"7 8 9
and had "both violated procedural and ethical rules" in the process. 790
While finding "that Butler has walked a fine line regarding his
privilege to remain as counsel in this case,"79 1 the court declined to
disqualify him. In recognition of the defendants' desire to retain But-
ler as counsel, 7 92 and plaintiffs inability to demonstrate specific harm
from Butler's consulting arrangement with Johnson,793 the court held
"that defendants' right to choose their own counsel outweighs the need
for disqualification."7 94
In refusing the "blunt remedy"795 of disqualification, the court rec-
ognized that Butler's deeds would not go unpunished. First, the court
noted that the testimonial credibility of Butler's consultant, Johnson,
"is seriously diminished by the fact that plaintiffs can obviously use
her employment with Butler as evidence of bias in favor of defend-
ants."796 Second, the court ordered Butler to produce a mailing list for
every court in which he had been admitted so that the Clerk of Courts
could send a copy of the court's decision to each one of them.7 97 Fi-
nally, the court stated that any further violations would result in dis-
qualification, "because they will show that Butler has surpassed
ignorance and acted either incompetently.., or with a complete disre-
gard for the rules of this Court."798
Similarly, in Valassis v. Samelson,799 a former employee of defen-
dant's affiliate corporation, Mary Baer, obtained significant confiden-
tial and sensitive financial information during her six years with
defendant in positions ranging from accounting manager to control-
787. Id. In this respect Butler's actions violated the ethical rules that define "profes-
sional misconduct" as any conduct "that adversely reflects on the lawyer's fitness
to practice law." MODEL CODE OF PROF'L RESPONSIBILITY DR. 1-102(A)(6) (1980).
788. Biocore, 181 F.R.D. at 673 (citations omitted).
789. Id. at 675.
790. See id.
791. Id.
792. See id.
793. See id.
794. Id.
795. Id. at 663.
796. Id. at 671.
797. Id. at 676.
798. Id. at 675.
799. 143 F.R.D. 118, 124 (E.D. Mich. 1992).
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ler.80 0 Plaintiffs counsel offered Baer a job organizing and reviewing
documents produced by the defendant, her former employer. Defen-
dant asked the court to condemn the employment relationship, argu-
ing that plaintiffs use of Baer to review documents produced by
defendant constituted an improper attempt to elevate Baer to an ex-
pert witness. Defendant then cited cases prohibiting an expert who
has obtained confidential information from one corporation from being
subsequently retained by an adversary corporation.8 0
The court rejected defendant's argument by distinguishing the de-
cisions governing experts from the case before it. In the "expert"
cases, the Valassis court reasoned, the experts were exposed not only
to privileged factual information but also to litigation strategies.8 0 2 In
contrast, "a former employee like Ms. Baer, unlike an expert, pos-
sesses a plethora of information, only a portion of which may be privi-
leged."8 0 3 Viewed in this light, the Valassis court concluded that
"[tihe goals of open discovery and attorney client privilege can be
much better addressed through the entry of a particularized protec-
tive order covering only privileged information."8 0 4
In sharp contrast to Biocore and Valassis, the court did not hesi-
tate to disqualify the offending attorneys who initiated a turncoat
agreement in Rentclub, Inc. v. Transamerica Rental Finance Corp.8 0 5
In this breach of contract litigation, defendant financial corporation
Transamerica counterclaimed against the plaintiff corporation Rent-
club and against Michael and Maria McCaskey, two individuals who
executed unconditional guarantees of Rentclub's financial obligation
to Transamerica.806 The case was stayed due to Rentclub's bank-
ruptcy, but the court reopened the matter as to the McCaskey's liabil-
ity and to defendant's motion to disqualify McCaskey's attorneys due
to allegedly improper contact with Rafael Canales, Jr., a former Tran-
samerica employee.807
Attorneys for Transamerica's adversaries, the McCaskeys, re-
tained former Transamerica employee Canales as a "trial consultant,"
paying him $50 an hour with an advance payment of $5000.808 In its
motion to disqualify McCaskeys' counsel, Transamerica averred that
Canales had been employed for more than a decade as the chief finan-
cial officer ("CFO") of a division of Transamerica.8 0 9 As CFO, Canales
800. Id. at 120.
801. See id. at 124.
802. See id.
803. Id.
804. Id.
805. 811 F. Supp. 651 (M.D. Fla. 1992), affd, 43 F.3d 1439 (11th Cir. 1995).
806. Id. at 652-53.
807. Id. at 653.
808. See id.
809. See id.
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was privy to business information and documents that were both con-
fidential and propriety to Transamerica, and he retained some of
those documents after being discharged by Transamerica.8 10 Canales
also participated in company communications concerning Transamer-
ica's relationship with Rentclub and had been deposed while still em-
ployed by Transamerica in a lawsuit substantially related to the
current litigation.8 11
The trial court found numerous reasons to disqualify counsel. The
court held that the paid consulting agreement between Canales and
counsel for his former employer's adversary violated numerous ethical
rules, including the prohibition of creating even an "appearance of im-
propriety," the proscription against conduct "prejudicial to the admin-
istration of justice," and the ban on ex parte contact with an
adversary's former employee under Florida's version of Model Rule
4.2.812
The court found the payments to Canales especially offensive, as
they provided evidence that the attorneys were encouraging Canales
to disclose confidential information belonging to his former employer
in contravention of ethical rules requiring attorneys to respect the
confidential relationships created by others.81 3 In addition, the pay-
ments suggested that Canales was paid not for his consulting work,
but rather for factual testimony favorable to his benefactors.8 1 4 This
heightened the possibility that the attorney's relationship with their
adversary's former employee also violated the interdiction on attor-
neys "engaging in conduct involving dishonesty, fraud, deceit or
misrepresentation."8 15
The Rentclub court realized that disqualification is a sanction not
lightly imposed. Indeed, the trial court was bound by the Eleventh
Circuit's robust two-prong test for disqualification: "First, although no
proof of actual wrongdoing is required, there must exist a reasonable
possibility that some specifically identifiable impropriety in fact oc-
curred. Second, the likelihood of public suspicion must outweigh the
social interest that will be served by counsel's continued participa-
tion."816 The court had no difficulty, however, in concluding that the
laundry list of ethical violations committed by McCaskey's attorneys
constituted more than "a reasonable possibility" that improprieties
had occurred.8 17
810. See id.
811. See id.
812. Id. at 654 (citation omitted).
813. See id.
814. See id.
815. Id.
816. Id. (citing Norton v. Tallahassee Mem'l Hosp., 689 F.2d 938, 931 (11th Cir.
1982)).
817. Id. at 655-57.
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In addition, the court found that the probability that Canales had
improperly disclosed confidential material gave counsel an unfair ad-
vantage that significantly tainted the entire proceedings.8 1 8 Thus,
the "public suspicion" arising from the relationship between counsel
for plaintiff and defendant's former employee "necessarily outweighed
the social interest that would be served by counsel's continued partici-
pation" in the case.8 19
In sum, a turncoat consultant or witness may be a "uniquely credi-
ble expert or fact witnesses,"8 20 but the first-hand knowledge that
makes the turncoat so attractive is also what makes retaining the
turncoat so dangerous.8 2 1 At a minimum, an attorney considering
forming an allegiance with a turncoat should ask the individual about
any express agreements entered with the former employer during or
upon termination of employment that require continuing confidential-
ity, and any injunctions or settlement agreements prohibiting the
turncoat from revealing information about the former employer.8 2 2
Even where no such agreements bind the former employee, care must
be taken to avoid encroaching on any privileged information belonging
to the former employer.8 23
c. Defector Agreements
The pretrial slugfest that occurred in Centennial Management Ser-
vices, Inc. v. Axa Re Vie8 2 4 highlights the many ethical and legal is-
sues arising when a former employee/consultant defects to an
adversary's camp. Plaintiff Centennial Management was the sole
shareholder of an insurer that filed a breach of contract action against
three closely related reinsurers.8 2 5 The reinsurers/defendants filed
counterclaims against the plaintiff and brought a third-party claim
against two reinsurance brokers.8 26
818. Id. at 655-56.
819. See id. at 657. The Eleventh Circuit affirmed disqualification of counsel in a
short per curiam opinion in which the court concluded that "the district court did
not abuse its discretion in finding that there was the appearance of impropriety
in the payment to Canales." 43 F.3d at 1440.
820. Bole, supra note 731, at 3.
821. See id.
822. Id. at 11.
823. See id. In addition to a former employee of a litigant, an individual who offered
professional services to a party may be recruited to testify adversary to that
party. This also raises ethical implications for the recruiting attorney as well as
the professional. See, e.g., Carson v. Fine, 836 P.2d 223 (Wash. Ct. App. 1992)
(reversing jury verdict for defendant in medical malpractice action where plain-
tiffs former treating physician's testified for the defense).
824. 193 F.R.D. 671 (D. Kan. 2000).
825. See id. at 672.
826. See id.
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During discovery, a significant controversy arose regarding a de-
fendant/reinsurer's former employee, Daniel Grao.8 2 7 As a senior-vice
president of defendant, Grao negotiated the contested reinsurance
agreements and had direct supervision over defendant's reinsurance
program until defendant terminated Grao's employment in 1997.828
Grao "vigorously protested his dismissal."8 29 Litigation between the
plaintiff insurer and Grao's former employer (a reinsurer) commenced
shortly after Grao was terminated.8 30
When contacted by his former employer's defense counsel, Grao re-
fused to help with matters related to the litigation absent a consulting
agreement.8 31 The ensuing agreement required defendant to pay
Grao an hourly rate, ranging from $125 to $200 depending on the
task, to review documents, prepare for his deposition, testify at depo-
sition, and provide other litigation related services.8 32
After receiving more than $43,000 for his services,8 3 3 and while
bound by the consulting agreement with his former employer,8 3 4 Grao
contacted a third-party defendant.8 35 Unhappy with his former em-
ployer for allegedly interfering with his other business prospects, Grao
offered to sell to the third-party defendant and the plaintiff informa-
tion Grao believed would damage his former employer's case.8 36 Grao
also claimed that his former employer's counsel paid him to keep
quiet, coached him to limit his deposition testimony, and withheld im-
portant documents during Grao's deposition.8 3 7 Grao said he would
provide testimony adverse to his former employer, but only if a deal
could be struck providing Grao with financial compensation from
plaintiff and the third-party defendants.8 38
Armed with the information Grao had revealed in his sales pitch to
them, plaintiff and third-party defendants moved for sanctions includ-
ing entry of default judgment against the defendant, Grao's former
employer.S39 Movants claimed that defendant had schemed to buy
favorable testimony of its former employee, who was a critical witness
in the case, and that such conduct contravened common law and pub-
lic policy, the federal anti-gratuity statute, and Model Rule 3.4(b)'s
827. See id. at 673.
828. See id.
829. Id. at 674.
830. See id.
831. See id.
832. See id. at 674-76.
833. See id. at 677.
834. The agreement was to run until the earlier of the entry ofjudgment in the case or
July 1, 2000. Id. at 674-75.
835. See id. at 677.
836. See id. at 677-78.
837. See id.
838. See id. at 677.
839. Id. at 678.
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prohibition against providing or offering "an inducement to a witness
that is prohibited by law."8 40
Defendant vigorously denied that it (or its counsel) had engaged in
wrongful conduct and asked the court to impose substantial sanctions
against the plaintiff and third-party defendants. Defendant claimed
that its adversaries' communications with Grao and merely entertain-
ing Grao's offer to defect violated the attorney-client privilege between
Grao and defense counsel, Model Rule 4.2, and federal rules of proce-
dure governing discovery of trial consultants and expert witnesses. 8 41
After allowing additional discovery regarding the consulting agree-
ment between Grao and his former employer, and after considering
extensive briefs, affidavits, and other materials submitted by the par-
ties, the court denied all requests for sanctions. The court rejected all
the grounds offered to support the claim that the consulting contract
between Grao and his former employer constituted serious breaches of
ethics rules.
While agreeing that public policy forbids any litigant from paying a
fact witness for his testimony,8 42 the court concluded that the fees de-
fendant paid its former employee Grao pursuant to the consulting
agreement were appropriate based on the time commitment required
by Grao to assist defendant with the litigation.8 4 3 Specifically, the
court found "that the payments made to Mr. Grao were made solely for
the purpose of compensating Mr. Grao for the time he lost in order to
give testimony in the litigation, review documents produced in the liti-
gation, and otherwise consult with defendant Axa and its counsel on
matters related to the litigation."844 The court's factual conclusion
that the consulting fees defendant paid its former employee were
proper supported the court's further holdings that the defendant did
not violate the federal anti-gratuity statute8 45 or Model Rule 3.4(b).846
The court found equally unpersuasive the former employer/defen-
dant's argument that the plaintiff and third-party defendant had en-
gaged in sanctionable conduct by entertaining Grao's offer to defect.
The court relied on Kansas district court precedent and an ABA For-
mal Opinion to conclude that Grao, as a former employee of a party,
was not a "party" to the litigation.8 4 7 Thus, Model Rule 4.2's prohibi-
840. Id.
841. See id. at 672-73.
842. See id. at 679.
843. See id. at 679-81.
844. Id. at 679.
845. Id. at 681. The Federal Anti-Gratuity Statute, 18 U.S.C. § 210 (c)(2) (2001),
states in relevant part: "Whoever ... gives, offers or promises anything of value
to any person, for or because of the testimony given under oath.., shall be fined
under this title for not more than two years, or both."
846. Centennial Mgmt. Serus., 193 F.R.D. at 682.
847. Id. at 683.
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tion of contact between a "represented party" and adverse counsel was
not implicated.8 48 The court further rejected defendant's contention
that Model Rule 4.2 applied because defense counsel had formed an
independent attorney-client relationship with Grao. The court found
that defense counsel represented Grao only when Grao testified dur-
ing deposition or at trial, and not for all matters related to the current
reinsurance litigation.849
The court also extensively examined, but again rejected, defen-
dant's argument that opposing counsel's contact with the defecting
Grao violated Fed. R. Civ. P. 26(b)(4)(B)'s prohibition against ob-
taining discovery from an opponent's non-testifying expert/consult-
ant.8 50 Defendant initially designated its former employee Grao as an
expert witness who would testify at trial, but later withdrew that des-
ignation.8 51 Defendant argued that its withdrawal of Grao's expert
witness designation put opposing counsel on notice that Grao's status
had changed to that of a non-testifying consultant.8 52 Thus, defen-
dant's argued, opposing counsels' contact with Grao violated Fed. R.
Civ. P. 26(b)(4)(B).853 The court concluded that the defendant's mere
withdrawal of Grao as an expert witness did not provide sufficient no-
tice to opposing counsel that Grao should be considered anything
other than "a fact witness compensated for his time."8 54 Therefore, no
Rule 26(b)(4)(B) sanctions were appropriate.
The Centennial Management decision is reasonable, based in large
part on credibility determinations by the court8 5 5 that all lawyers ac-
ted in good faith in the case and that Grao, as a disgruntled former
employee of defendant, was inappropriately offering to defect from one
848. Id. See generally supra sections TV.A-D (discussing Model Rule 4.2).
849. Centennial Mgmt. Servs., 193 F.R.D. at 683, n.16.
850. FED. R. Civ. P. 26 allows a party to obtain information through interrogatories or
depositions from a non-testifying expert "who has been retained or specially em-
ployed by another party in anticipation of litigation or preparation for trial" only
in situations related to a FED. R. Civ. P. 35 medical examination of a party "or
upon a showing of exceptionable circumstances under which it is impracticable
for the party seeking discovery to obtain facts or opinions on the same subject by
other means." FED. R. Civ. P. 26(b)(4)(B).
851. Centennial Mgmt. Servs., 193 F.R.D. at 687.
852. See id.
853. See id.
854. Id. at 687-88. Because the court rejected all of defendant's grounds for imposing
sanctions on opposing counsel, it also rejected defendant's request that it be
awarded costs and attorneys fees pursuant to 28 U.S.C. § 1927. Id. Sanctions
can be imposed under that statute against an attorney "who so multiplies the
proceedings in any case unreasonably and vexatiously." 28 U.S.C. § 1927 (2001).
855. Because parties submitted briefs and supporting materials to the court but did
not request an evidentiary hearing, the court was required to "make certain fac-
tual findings and credibility assessments based on the record before it." 193
F.R.D. at 673 (citing In re Cascade Energy & Metals Corp., 87 F.3d 1146, 1149
(10th Cir. 1996)).
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side to the other to maximize his financial compensation. But even
though the attorneys escaped potentially devastating sanctions in
that case, not all litigants have enjoyed such a result.856 When one
considers the considerable time and expense of litigating the parties'
cross motions for sanctions and the ultimate holdings that rendered
further testimony by Grao inherently suspect-whether submitted via
an affidavit, in deposition, or at trial-it becomes clear that retaining
former employees as consultants or experts is not always a wise tacti-
cal decision.8 57 Entertaining an offer from an opponent's former em-
ployee/consultant to defect is equally ill advised.
G. Court Settlements Mandating Confidentiality
For better or worse, lawsuits in this country are frequently liti-
gated and settled pursuant to confidentiality agreements.858 Courts
frequently issue protective orders requiring parties to maintain strict
confidentiality of documents, testimony, and other evidence ex-
changed during discovery.8 59 Courts routinely approve settlement
agreements negotiated by the parties that prohibit the parties from
disclosing the details of the settlement.8 60 Parties also enter private
856. See, e.g., Goldstein v. Exxon Research & Eng'g Co., No. 95-2410, 1997 U.S. Dist.
LEXIS 146000 (D.N.J. Feb. 28, 1997) (determining that an agreement between a
key fact witness and the witness's former employer was improper, and imposing
sanctions that include revealing terms of agreement to jury, declaring the former
employee a hostile witness as to the plaintiff, and allowing cross examination
regarding the agreement).
857. The controversy over Grao also aptly illustrates the breadth of legal authorities
involved in this type of dispute, as the court wrested with procedural rules, ethi-
cal standards, evidentiary concerns, and case law. See also Goldstein, 1997 U.S.
Dist. LEXIS 146000 (utilizing a variety of legal authorities to conclude that con-
sulting agreement between a witness and his former employer was improper).
858. Although protective orders are still frequently issued, judges have become in-
creasingly reluctant to approve expansive protective orders that create barriers
to the public's right to know about the litigation and the facts giving rise to it.
See, e.g., John Kiernan, Confidentiality Agreements that Work, 20 LITIG. 18 (1994)
(recognizing courts' heightened scrutiny of protective orders and providing sug-
gestions on how to negotiate a confidentiality agreement that satisfies the par-
ties' objectives and meets the court's approval); see also Paul F. Eckstein, Can
Product Liability Cases Be Secret, 20 LITIG. 22 (1994) (presenting the conflicting
legal doctrines and public policies that allow for and that reject the use of protec-
tive orders to cloak litigation in secrecy, with focus on product liability cases in-
volving claims of defective products that pose harm to the public).
859. FED. R. Civ. P. 26(c) and analogous state rules empower trial courts to fashion
protective orders appropriate for the particulars of the cases before them.
860. Submission of the settlement agreement for a judge's approval may result in the
document becoming part of the judicial record. The Seventh Circuit recently held
that such documents are presumptively subject to public disclosure, even though
the parties intended for the settlement to be a private contract not available to
the public. Jessup v. Luther, 277 F.3d 926 (7th Cir. 2002). Judges of the U.S.
District Court for the District of South Carolina are considering a local rule that
would prohibit sealing of settlement agreements filed with the court. South Car-
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settlements containing confidentiality provisions without asking for
the court's endorsement.8 6 1
At a minimum, an existing confidential settlement agreement can
result in substantial pretrial battles that consume considerable time
and other resources in subsequent cases. Such pretrial skirmishes are
often a waste of those resources, but this is not always true. Battles
over the validity and scope of confidential settlements may be outcome
determinative since they delineate the testimony and other evidence
that will be available to parties .when litigating the merits of the law-
suit. This is especially true when a party to pending litigation seeks
information from an adversary's former employee whose pivotal testi-
mony is prohibited or limited due to a settlement agreement in a pre-
vious case.
As a threshold matter, settlement agreements are contracts.8 6 2 In
both state and federal courts, "[i]ssues involving the formation and
construction of a purported settlement agreement are resolved by ap-
plying state contract law, even when there are federal causes of action
in the underlying litigation."8 63 Thus, when a party or potential wit-
ness seeks refuge from discovery behind the confidentiality terms of a
settlement agreement, the issue is relatively simple: Does the settle-
ment agreement constitute an enforceable contract? Key contract con-
siderations include determining whether the parties intended to enter
a binding agreement and determining whether the terms are suffi-
ciently specific to constitute a contract.8 6 4 An equally important con-
cern is whether enforcement of the contract violates common law
principles, statutory prohibitions, or public policy.8 6 5
olina Federal District Court Proposes to Cease Sealing Settlements, 71 U.S.L.W.
2085 (2002).
861. Remedies available for breach of a confidentiality agreement depend on the de-
gree of court involvement and timing of the breach. Violation of a court-issued
confidentiality order while the litigation is pending may result in a finding of
contempt and possible imposition of sanctions available under both FED. R. Civ.
P. 37 and the court's inherent power to sanction. These sanctions range from
prohibiting a party from introducing certain evidence to entering default judg-
ment against the violator. Violations of a confidentiality provision in a court-
approved settlement may result in contempt of court sanctions. Violations of a
confidentiality provision in a privately settled matter ignite the right of the in-
jured party to pursue private contract remedies.
862. See, e.g., Gates Corp. v. Bando Chem. Indus., Ltd., 4 Fed. App. 676 (10th Cir.
2001) (applying Colorado contract law to enforce settlement agreement).
863. See id. at 670.
864. See id.
865. See id. at 686 (citing Fox v. 1-10, Ltd., 957 P.2d 1018, 1022 (Colo. 1998) (en banc));
see also Uniroyal Goodrich Tire Co. v Hudson, 856 F. Supp. 348, 353 (E.D. Mich.
1994), affd, 97 F.3d 1452 (6th Cir. 1996) (holding that a party cannot enforce a
confidentiality clause in a manner that violates public policy).
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Kalinauskas v. Wong8 66 demonstrates the clash of contract princi-
ples and public policy when a former employee is purportedly silenced
by a settlement agreement. The Kalinauskas dispute arose in the con-
text of formal discovery, but the competing policies the court weighed
to resolve the dispute are equally applicable to informal discovery.
Kalinauskas sued her former employer, Caesars Palace, and others
for sexual discrimination.8 6 7 Her attorney sought to depose Donna
Thomas, also a former Caesars employee, who had sued Caesars for
sexual harassment the previous year and settled her claim pursuant
to a court-sealed, confidential settlement agreement.8 68 The settle-
ment agreement and related documents expressly forbade Thomas
from disclosing any aspect of her employment with Caesars except the
dates of her employment and job title.8 6 9 Caesars' attorney sought a
protective order, claiming that the deposition of Thomas should not be
allowed because it would violate the confidential settlement
agreement.8 70
The Kalinauskas court identified sound legal principles and public
policy in support of and inimical to enforcement of the settlement
agreement to prevent plaintiffs deposition of defendant's former em-
ployee. Legal principles supporting enforcement of the agreement in-
cluded the sanctity of contracts and the finality of previous
litigation.8 7 1 Public policy also favored enforcement as a means of en-
couraging relatively quick resolution of disputes with minimal judicial
intervention, creating a "form of alternative dispute resolution" which
could "presumably result in greater satisfaction to the parties."872
But the court found the flip side of the Caesars' coin equally com-
pelling. As to legal principles, the applicable procedural rules called
for extremely broad discovery8 7 3 in an effort "to secure the just,
speedy and inexpensive determination" of the case before the court.
8 7 4
In this case, denying the deposition of Thomas "could lead to wasteful
efforts to generate discovery already in existence."8 75 Public policy
cautioned against the "disturbing consequences" of letting a party buy
the silence of potential witnesses in other cases against the same de-
fendant pursuant to a confidential settlement agreement.8 7 6 "[Tihe
courts must carefully police the circumstances under which litigants
866. 151 F.R.D. 363 (D. Nev. 1993).
867. Id. at 365.
868. See id.
869. See id.
870. See id.
871. See id.
872. Id.
873. See id. (citing FED. R. Civ. P. 26(a)).
874. See id. (quoting FED. R. CIv. P. 1).
875. Id. at 366.
876. See id. at 365.
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seek to protect their interests while concealing legitimate areas of
public concern,"s7 the court explained. "This concern grows more
pressing as additional individuals are harmed by identical or similar
action."878
Faced with these competing legal and policy concerns, the court
ruled in favor of allowing discovery of the former employee. Relying
on a roughly analogous situation resolved by the Seventh Circuit, the
Kalinauskas court held that where modification of a confidentiality
agreement would "place private litigants in a position they would oth-
erwise reach only after repetition of another's discovery, such modifi-
cation can be denied only where it would tangibly prejudice
substantial rights of the party opposing modification."879 Even if
prejudice is shown, the court retains "broad discretion in judging
whether the injury outweighs the benefits of any possible
modification."s80
Applying this Seventh Circuit standard, the court rejected the for-
mer employer's arguments that Kalinauskas had to formally inter-
vene in the now-settled case between Thomas and Caesars to obtain
modification of the confidentiality orderSSl and that any third party,
including Kalinauskas, had to present "extraordinary circumstances"
or show a "compelling need" to defeat the confidentiality clause in a
settlement agreement between an employer and former employee.882
The court rejected the formal intervention requirement because
the judge who settled the Thomas case did not retain supervisory ju-
risdiction over the agreement; thus, any court had "inherent authority
to order disclosure."883 In rejecting the compelling need requirement,
the court concluded that "Caesars should not be able to conceal basic
facts of concern to Kalinauskas in her case, and of legitimate public
concern, regarding employment at its place of business."884 The
Kalinauskas court also relied on the basic contract principle that par-
ties to a contract cannot bind non-parties and on the overriding policy
concern that settlement agreements that suppress evidence do not
serve the greater public good.85
Accordingly, the Kalinauskas court allowed Thomas to be deposed
regarding her experiences as an employee of Caesars, including any
information she had concerning sexual harassment, but prohibited in-
quiry into the specific terms of Thomas's settlement agreement with
877. Id.
878. Id. at 366.
879. Id. (quoting Wilk v. Am. Med. Ass'n, 635 F.2d 1295, 1299 (7th Cir.1980)).
880. Id. (quoting Wilk, 635 F.2d at 1299).
881. See id.
882. Id.
883. Id.
884. Id. at 367.
885. See id.
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Caesars. 88 6 While most discovery disputes involving former employ-
ees are, like Kalinauskas, resolved by interlocutory trial court orders,
the consequences of a court-approved settlement purporting to silence
a former employee were deemed of constitutional magnitude by the
United States Supreme Court in Baker v. General Motors.88 7
The Baker case arose from the ashes of a wrongful termination
lawsuit. That case involved claims and counterclaims stemming from
GM's discharge of forty-year employee Ronald Elwell, who spent the
last fifteen years working in GM's Engineering Analysis Group.sss
While in that group from 1974 to 1989, Elwell studied performances of
GM vehicles involved in product liability suits, with concentration on
the relationship between the placement of fuel lines and vehicle
fires.8 8 9 He frequently worked with GM lawyers defending product
liability actions.8 9 0
In 1987, the relationship between GM and Elwell deteriorated.
The parties failed to reach an agreement on a retirement and consult-
ing package for Elwell. That disagreement remained unresolved in
1991, even though Elwell's employment had been terminated two
years earlier.8 9 1
In May 1991, plaintiffs in a Georgia product liability case deposed
Elwell concerning a GM pickup truck that caught on fire following a
collision.8 9 2 Contrary to previous cases where Elwell had, as GM's in-
house expert witness, vouched for the pickup truck's safety, Elwell
testified in Georgia that GM's fuel system was not as good as those
produced by other truck manufacturers.8 93 Shortly after that testi-
mony, Elwell sued GM in Michigan state court, alleging various tort
and contracts claims related to the termination of his employment.8 94
GM's counterclaim was based on allegations that Elwell had misap-
propriated GM documents, breached his fiduciary duty to his former
employer, and disclosed privileged information belonging to GM.895
Upon GM's motion, the state trial court preliminarily enjoined El-
well from "consulting or discussing with or disclosing to any person
any of General Motors Corporation's trade secrets, confidential infor-
886. See id.
887. 522 U.S. 222 (1998).
888. See id. at 226.
889. See id. at 226-27.
890. See id. at 227.
891. See id.
892. See id.
893. See id.
894. See id.
895. See id.
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mation or matters of attorney-client work product"896 connected to
any pending or future product liability litigation.897
When settling the lawsuit for an undisclosed amount in August
1992, the parties stipulated that the trial court's injunction would be
permanent.8 98 In addition, they stipulated that Elwell would not tes-
tify as a fact witness or expert witness or serve as a trial consultant in
any products liability litigation involving GM products.899 Exceptions
to this broad prohibition on Elwell's consulting and testimony were (1)
situations in which GM consented to Elwell's participation testimony
or consulting and (2) the still-pending litigation in Georgia involving a
GM pickup truck.900 The Michigan trial court entered the injunction
as stipulated by the parties. 90 In a separate settlement agreement,
the parties included a third exception: Elwell would not violate the
agreement if ordered to testify by a court or other tribunal. 90 2
In the six years following the court-approved GM-Elwell settle-
ment, the former GM employee testified as to non-privileged and non-
trade-secret information in the Georgia case and in many other juris-
dictions pursuant to subpoenas. 903 The case garnering Supreme
Court attention was a Missouri wrongful death action brought by
brothers Kenneth and Steven Baker following their mother's death in
a Chevrolet Blazer that caught fire after a collision.904
The plaintiffs in Baker v. GM claimed the fire resulted from a
faulty fuel pump. 90 5 GM denied liability and objected to the plaintiffs'
plan to subpoena Elwell to testify in deposition and at trial,9 06 assert-
ing that the Michigan court's injunction barred Elwell's testimony in
federal court in Missouri.907 Plaintiffs countered that the Michigan
state court's injunction could not trump the Missouri Federal District
Court's subpoena, and in any event, the private settlement agreement
between Baker and Elwell allowed Elwell's testimony when compelled
by subpoena.908
The federal court in Missouri allowed Elwell's testimony, reason-
ing that giving the Michigan injunction full faith and credit would vio-
late Missouri public policy limiting the types of information shielded
896. Id.
897. Id.
898. See id. at 228.
899. See id.
900. See id.
901. See id.
902. See id. at 228-29.
903. See id. at 229, 231, n.2.
904. See id. at 229.
905. See id.
906. See id.
907. See id. at 230. The Bakers filed in state court but GM removed the case to federal
court based on diversity jurisdiction. Id. at 229.
908. See id. at 230.
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from disclosure, and because the federal court had the power to modify
the Michigan injunction if necessary. 909 Elwell's trial testimony sup-
ported the plaintiff's claims and the jury responded with an $11.3 mil-
lion verdict against GM.910
The Eighth Circuit reversed the jury's determination due to errors
including admission of Elwell's testimony. The appeals tribunal found
an equally strong Missouri public policy supporting the liberal exer-
cise of full faith and credit and found insufficient evidence that the
Michigan court would have modified its injunction if cognizant of the
Missouri case. 911 The Supreme Court granted certiorari to decide an
issue with major implications to the enforceability of settlement
agreements with former employees that purport to buy their silence:
Whether the Full Faith and Credit Clause prevents the plaintiffs, who
were not parties to the Michigan state court litigation, from obtaining
Elwell's testimony in their wrongful death action in a federal court
sitting in Missouri. 912
A unanimous Supreme Court determined that Elwell's testimony
was properly admitted in the Baker case,913 although the Justices dif-
fered in their rationale for this conclusion. The majority opinion,
penned by Justice Ginsburg,914 recognized the respect states tradi-
tionally afford judgments rendered by courts in other states pursuant
to the Full Faith and Credit Clause of the U.S. Constitution. 915 Un-
like legislation that a party seeks to use in another state, the Court
declared, "our decisions support no roving 'public policy exception' to
the full faith and credit due judgments."916
The Court identified three overriding principles guiding applica-
tion of full faith and credit in the Baker case. First, "[e]nforcement
909. See id.
910. See id.
911. See id. at 230-31.
912. See id. at 231.
913. Id. at 226.
914. The five-person majority consisted of Justices Ginsburg, Stevens, Souter, Breyer,
and Chief Justice Rehnquist. See id. at 225.
915. See id. at 232-33. The Constitution provides: "Full Faith and Credit shall be
given in each State to the public Acts, Records, and judicial Proceedings of every
other state." U.S. CONST., art. IV, § 1. Additional language in the clause empow-
ers Congress to prescribe the manner and conditions under which full faith and
credit are given. Baker, 522 U.S. at 231-32. Congress exercised that power to
enact legislation requiring federal courts to provide full faith and credit to state
laws and decisions. 28 U.S.C. § 1738 (2002). The purpose of the full faith and
credit clause "was to alter the status of the several states as independent foreign
sovereignties, each free to ignore obligations created under the laws or by the
judicial proceedings of the others, and to make them integral parts of a single
nation throughout which a remedy upon a just obligation might be demanded as
of right, irrespective of the state of origin." Milwaukee County v. M.E. White Co.,
296 U.S. 268, 277 (1935), quoted with approval in Baker, 522 U.S. at 232.
916. Baker, 522 U.S. at 233 (citation omitted).
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measures do not travel with the sister state judgment as preclusive
effects do";917 therefore, any sanctions for breach of the injunction are
assessed by the issuing court rather than the court in which the of-
fending action occurs. Second, although entitled to deferential treat-
ment, judicial decrees "commanding action or inaction have been
denied enforcement in a sister state when they . . .interfered with
litigation over which the ordering State had no authority."9 18 Third,
"anti-suit injunctions regarding litigation elsewhere, even if compati-
ble with due process as a direction constraining parties to the decree,
... in fact have not controlled the second court's action regarding liti-
gation in that court."919 The Baker Court also noted that these max-
ims must be applied in light of the imperative that "[e]xceptions to the
demand for every man's evidence are not created lightly nor expan-
sively construed, for they are in derogation of the search for the
truth."920
By placing the Michigan decree under these three lenses of the con-
stitutional microscope, the Court concluded that the Michigan injunc-
tion entered to resolve Elwell's wrongful termination case against GM
could not nullify the Missouri district court's power to subpoena El-
well in the Bakers' product liability lawsuit against GM. The Court
explained: "Most essentially, Michigan lacks authority to control
courts elsewhere by precluding them, in actions brought by strangers
to the Michigan litigation, from determining for themselves what wit-
nesses are competent to testify and what evidence is relevant and ad-
missible in their search for the truth."92 1
While affirming that other states must give faith and credit to or-
ders and judgments that Michigan courts have authority to issue, 922
the Baker Court's five Justice majority acknowledged truth in the con-
verse rule. Simply put, "a Michigan decree cannot command obedi-
ence elsewhere on a matter the Michigan court lacks authority to
resolve,"923 including a sister state's power to command a witness to
testify through its subpoena powers.
Although the four other Justices offered differing rationales for al-
lowing Elwell to testify in Missouri,924 the Baker decision leaves little
917. Id. at 235.
918. Id.
919. Id. at 236 (citations omitted) (emphasis added).
920. Id. at 239 (quoting United States v. Nixon, 418 U.S. 683, 710 (1974)).
921. Id. at 238.
922. See id. at 240-41.
923. Id. at 241.
924. The concurrence, written by Justice Kennedy, and joined by Justices O'Connor
and Thomas, suggested that the majority's full faith and credit analysis was un-
necessary because the matter could be resolved under the theory of issue preclu-
sion. Id. at 243-51. That is, since the Bakers were neither parties nor in privity
with parties in the Elwell v. GM litigation, they could not be bound by the injunc-
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hope for a former employer who pursues an injunction to prevent a
former employee from testifying in other jurisdictions, at least where
the former employees appearance is commanded by the court. Indeed,
the Baker Court was unmoved by GM's plight even when it argued
that Elwell's testimony "is pervasively and uncontrollably leavened
with"9 25 GM's attorney-client, work product, and trade secrets privi-
leged information. 926 As is standard practice where privilege doc-
trines are invoked without clear proof of violations, GM's failure to
pinpoint instances where confidential matters had actually been re-
vealed caused the Court to reject these grounds of protest. 9 27
Cases such as Baker and Kalinauskas demonstrate courts' reluc-
tance to enforce confidentiality provisions in settlement agreements,
even when those settlements received the presiding judge's imprima-
tur. The confidentiality provisions will not be honored when enforce-
ment interferes with a current litigant's search for the ever-elusive
"truth" about her case or where it impinges on the public right to know
of matters ranging from automobile safety to an employer's record on
sexual harassment.
VII. CONCLUDING WITH A MODEST PROPOSAL
The challenge inherent in any proposal for remedying dilemmas
surrounding formal and informal discovery of litigants' former em-
ployees is comprehensiveness. The myriad legal authorities that gov-
ern discovery of former employees and the attendant lack of
uniformity in interpretation and application within each category sab-
otage any effort to construct a universal solution. Such an effort also
demands the fortitude and foresight to envision the multiple moving
targets created by the new rules borne of the civil justice reform move-
ment. And, while the simplicity of uniform bright line rules is always
attractive, such rules are unavailing for situations involving discovery
of former employees. Indeed, "seldom do such categorical pronounce-
ments survive variant factual applications."928 So in closing, two sim-
ple proposals are offered.
tion forbidding Elwell to testify elsewhere. Id. at 251. Justice Scalia's concur-
rence, which Justice Kennedy also joined, equated forbidding Elwell from
testifying with the Michigan court asking the Missouri district court to enforce
the Michigan injunction. Id. at 241-43. This is improper, Scalia opinioned, be-
cause the Full Faith and Credit Clause and its implementing statute establish
rules of evidence as to the conclusive validity of a sister court's judgment, but do
not empower nor require other states to enforce the judgment. Id.
925. Id. at 238 n.10.
926. Id.
927. See id. (observing that GM did not make any objections during Elwell's testimony
on attorney-client, attorney work product, or trade secrets grounds).
928. Olson v. Snap Prods., Inc., 183 F.R.D. 539, 545 (D. Minn. 1998).
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First, attorneys must routinely and thoroughly scrutinize the roles
that former employees may play in anticipated or pending litigation
before engaging the discovery engine. A well-worn sports clich6 is
worth taking to heart: The best defense is a good offense. Attorneys
should commandeer the rules at their disposal to develop, through ne-
gotiation with opposing counsel, a fair discovery plan that includes
discovery of former employees. Counsel must be flexible and realistic,
and seek the court's guidance when necessary. 9 29 Remember that
"the attorney who seeks court approval before contact does not risk an
ethical violation, but one who does not acts at his or her own peril."9 30
The element of surprise is no doubt lost by this open and consid-
ered strategy, but the norms of the profession are changing. Coopera-
tion is being rewarded more than combativeness. Simply put, the
rules have changed, and so must counsels' game plans. And if, in
hindsight, an attorney realizes that she has overstepped appropriate
boundaries in obtaining discovery from former employees, she should
admit that to the court and ask forgiveness.931 Trying to hide behind
the blurry lines of the discordant rules is not, as noted repeatedly
throughout this Article, a fail-safe tactic.
Second, additional reflection followed by action is also required of
the persons empowered to create, amend, and apply the many existing
standards applicable to discovery of former employees. Greater clarity
is needed when drafting court rules, amending ethics standards, de-
veloping case law, and issuing ethics committee opinions that impact,
either directly or by analogy, the discovery of former employees of a
party. One wonders, for example, why the ABA choose to amend its
929. This approach was successfully used by both counsel in a case where plaintiff's
attorney feared violating Model Rule 4.2 by contacting defendant's former em-
ployees ex parte, and defense counsel feared invading attorney-client privilege
because some former employees might become class members and thus form an
attorney-client relationship with plaintiffs counsel. EEOC v. Dana Corp., 202 F.
Supp. 827 (N.D. Ind. 2002). Of course, judicial intervention does not guarantee
the outcome or clarity desired by the movant. See, e.g., Rogosin v. Mayor & City
Council of Baltimore, 164 F. Supp. 2d 684 (D. Md. 2001) (declining to approve or
to prohibit plan by plaintiffs counsel to interview defendant's former employees
due to the uncertainty of the applicable law and the variations in factual situa-
tions relating to possible privileged information to which each former employee
might have been exposed).
930. McCallum v. CSX Transp., Inc., 149 F.R.D. 104, 110 (M.D.N.C. 1993). Even when
the court refused to rule on the propriety of ex parte contacts between plaintiffs
counsel and defendant's former employees, the court opined that sanctions for
such contact would be unlikely because of the court's awareness of the unsettled
nature of the law governing such contacts. Rogosin v. Mayor and City Council of
Baltimore, 164 F. Supp. 2d 684, 687-88 (D. Md. 2001).
931. See, e.g., In re Air Crash Disaster, 909 F. Supp. 1116, 1120, 1124 (N.D. Ill. 1995)
(recognizing counsel's contriteness and imposing less serious sanctions that it
otherwise would if counsel's acts were intentional and the law more clearly
defined).
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comment to Model Rule 4.2 to make clear the rule's inapplicability to
former employees, but did not change the text of the rule. This is es-
pecially curious in light of the long-litigated conundrums resulting
from the ambiguity of the text of Model Rule 4.2 and the non-authori-
tarian status of the comments.
This is indeed a planet populated by former employees, and these
individuals hold the keys to numerous disputes in need of efficient and
fair resolution. Counsel, the courts, former employees, litigants, and
the rule makers must acknowledge this reality and work cooperatively
to delineate, in each case, the appropriate boundaries of discovery of
former employees. This Article offers an initial step in creating a com-
mon knowledge base on the current status of the law, and providing
some modest suggestions as to where it should be headed.
